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7ABSTRACT
Pattern recognition based models propose that in highly routine situations, the
FireGround Incident Commanders (FGC) make decisions using experiences of
the past similar incidents (Klein et al, 1986), which are stored in memory as
schemas (Klein et al, 2006). Due to the nonsystematic development of
schemas that guide pattern recognition (Beach & Mitchell, 1978) and the biases
attached with pattern recognition (Tversky & Kahnmen, 1974), this approach is
least favorable candidate for decision making in nonroutine situations. The
nonroutine situations are characterized by: failure to clearly recognize relevant
past episodes (Bousfield & Sedgewick, 1944), deliberate avoiding of recalling
the past episodes (Jacoby et al, 1989) or time constraint and ambiguity of
available information for decision making. This research proposes that in
nonroutine situations, the FGCs rely on thorough search and assessment of
diagnostic, relevant, and important cues. Therefore, one aim of this research is
to propose a model of the FGCs' decision making process for nonroutine
situations; the model will base on the use of cues rather than the pattern
recognition approach. This research also aims to provide a robust and coherent
definition of the FGC’s decision making process and will subsequently specify
the structure and the underlying phases of it.
The context of the research is the decisions made by the FGCs during large
fires, involving at least 5 fire appliances. 20 FGCs from 2 of the UK’s large
firebrigades with at least 7 years of experience in command position
participated in a fieldwork carried over a period of 1 year. For the data
collection, multiple case studies in the form of critical incident reports are
obtained from the participants. Each critical incident is explored further through
semi-structured interviews. For the data analysis, theoretical or deductive
thematic approach and process reconstruction method (Nutt, 1983) are used.
8Results indicate that the current definition of the term ‘FGC’s decision making
process’ is incomplete. The definition of the FGC’s decision making process
proposed in this research now, recognizes that each process of selection and
evaluation of a course of action to solve a problem (Klein et al, 1986) is
preceded by a process of identification of a problem. This definition
commensurate with the widely acceptable definition of decision making process
proposed in Nutt (1984). This research also found that the FGCs make
decisions in 2 cyclic and distinguishable phases, which are the ‘problem
recognition’ phase, and the ‘solution generation’ phase. Finally, a cue-centric
model of the FGC's decision making process is proposed. The model showed
that in nonroutine situations, when pattern recognition fails to guide the
decision making process, the FGCs develop a mental model of a situation
through thorough search and assessment of the valuable cues based on their
diagnosticity, importance and relevance. The mental model assists in
identifying problems and selecting a course of action to solve that problem.
This research fulfills the need of developing descriptive models for clarifying
issues arising in the areas of training, selection, and in developing decision
support systems (Klein et al, 1986).
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH
Both in firefighting and throughout the field of the Naturalistic Decision Making
(NDM; to be introduced in chapter 2), the approach to exploring the decision
making process remains general, with only one type of view explored.
Specifically in the literature on the FireGround Incident Commanders’ (FGC)
decision making process, the decisions are mostly explained through the
process of pattern recognition; a dominant example is the Recognition Primed
Decision Making (RPD) model (Klein et al, 1986). However, the pattern
recognition based models are valid only for highly routine situations. To a large
extent, current academic research has not focused on decision making in
nonroutine situations with time-critical characteristics as found in fire
emergency response work. Beginning from the next section, this research will
emphasize that how nonroutine situations are different from routine situations
and why the decision making theories used in routine situations are not
applicable in nonroutine situations, thus giving rise to a need for developing
more relevant theories. Moreover, research questions will also be broadly
introduced in the next section although they will be presented in sections 2.3.3
and 2.4.4 more specifically.
1.2 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH AIMS
Central to pattern recognition based models is the ability of decision makers to
visually compare current situations with past supposedly similar situations, in a
bid to categorize the external environment with respect to the categories stored
in the decision maker’s memory (Bruner, 1957). This process is performed in a
top down fashion, which is a cycle of forming and testing mental models
(Hoffman et al, 1995). These categories, referred to by several names such as
schema or frame (see Chapter 2), represent the underlying knowledge for such
complex and disparate concepts as objects, percepts, events, sequences of
events, and social situations (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980).
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This categorization process results in placing the cues in a representative
category and placing a copy of it in short term memory in the form of mental
models. The category itself is retrieved using only a few key cues (Klein et al,
2005). Once a mental model is stored in memory, decision makers gather only
that information, which is congruent with the mental model and non-congruent
information is ignored (Bruner, 1957). This mental model imposes a previously
adopted explanation of a similar situation on the current situation and suggests
an initial course of action to solve the problem. This approach is most
appropriate for highly routine situations. Other examples of pattern recognition
based models besides the RPD (Klein et al, 1986) model are the Hourglass
model for Battlefield commander’s decision making (Serfaty et al, 1997) and the
Image theory (Beach & Micheal, 1987). Recognizing that there can be gaps in
the information that a decision maker gathers for developing a mental
representation of a situation, Freeman & Cohen (1996) proposed the
Recognition/Metacognition (R/M) model. The R/M model combines the strength
of pattern recognition and critical thinking; the model proposes that a schema
retrieved from memory through pattern recognition can be improved through
metacognitive processes, which are critiquing and correcting (Freeman &
Cohen, 1996).
There are several ambiguities attached to the pattern recognition approach.
Freeman & Cohen (1996) noted that no explanation is available in the literature
on how several competing categories are combined to create a single
representative mental model. Beach & Mitchell (1978) pointed out that although
this categorization approach is easy to use, the actual development of
categories is usually not systematically done, and there is a risk of biased
selection of information for inclusion (creating an information gap), thus
emphasizing the trade-off between ease of use and general accuracy. Similarly
the selection of the information congruent with a perceived past experience
obstructs the discovery of all valuable cues, which may not be congruent with
13
the retrieved mental model, therefore introducing biases in decision making.
The R/M model developed to facilitate improving the pattern recognition based
mental models also model does not defend the decision making process
against the possibility of retrieving non-representative schemas.
Due to the aforementioned reasons, the FGCs do not use pattern recognition in
nonroutine situations, which are characterized by the events given below:
1. The decision maker fail to recognize the relevant past episodes:
Bousfield & Sedgewick (1944) found that under time pressure, decision
makers do not remember all relevant instances. Or
2. The decision maker deliberately avoids recalling the past episodes:
Jacoby et al, (1989) found that failure to recollect often occurs simply
because one did not make an attempt to recall rather than because one
truly forgot similar episodes. Or
3. Non-suitability of pattern recognition: this can be due to time constraints,
ambiguity of the information available or the novelty of the situation.
This research intends to study the role of cues in nonroutine situations and to
investigate how the FGCs use a thorough search and assessment of cues for
making representative mental models and identifying an appropriate course of
action (COA), instead of fitting cues into an existing and possibly non-
representative frame. Consequently a model representing this approach will be
presented. This approach is closer to a bottom-up (Hoffman et al, 1995)
approach of decision making in which a decision maker relies on divide-and-
conquer strategy to solve problems. The objectives of this aim are firstly to
carry out field studies and to collect data on decision making process of the
FGCs in nonroutine situations; secondly to analyze that data to develop a
FGC’s decision making process model applicable in nonroutine situations. Even
before presenting this approach, it is anticipated that the strong dependence on
cues in command decision making in nonroutine situations makes sense,
because it is now proven that the recognition process is not used in a non-
compensatory manner (Gigerenzer & Selton, 1999). In fact, recognition ability is
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used alongside task-relevant knowledge (Richter & Spath, 2006) for making
decisions. Since individuals can only recognize a limited number of past
instances and this number further decreases in a time-pressured situation
(Bousfield & Sedgewick, 1944), therefore in such situations pattern recognition
approach is compensated by the use of task-relevant knowledge.
To pursue this research, it is necessary to define what is meant by the FGC’s
decision making process. For this research, I initially considered using the
definition proposed by Klein et al (1986). However, it soon became clear that
that definition is incomplete (this will be explained in Chapter 2). Klein et al’s
proposed definition does not meet the specification of conventional decision
making process (see section 2.3.1) or the practice of the fireground command
decision making, resulting in a need for a robust and coherent definition of the
FGC’s decision making process. The objectives of this aim are firstly to search
the literature for definitions of the decision making process followed in time-
pressured situations; secondly to identify those elements that are missing in the
current definition of the FGCs’ decision making process. Thirdly, an
investigation will be conducted to examine whether there is enough support
available from the data collected to incorporate these identified elements into
the definition of FGC’s decision making process. Furthermore, the literature on
the FGC’s decision making process does not outline the structure of decision
making process. This is because many researchers believe that the decision
making process of an emergency manager does not follow a structure and that
they do not make decisions in distinguishable phases (Klein & Wolf, 1998; Klein
& Weitzenfeld, 1979). However, it is proven elsewhere that the naturalistic style
of decision making, which is unstructured in nature, has an underlying structure
consisting of distinguishable phases (Mintzberg et al, 1976). Based on the
above-mentioned observation, this research also intends to examine the
structure of the FGC’s decision making process and propose a framework of
underlying phases. The objective of this aim is to analyze the data collected for
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this research to identify the phases of a FGC’s decision making process that
give rise to its structure.
In summary, the assisting aims of this research are to provide a consistent
definition and underlying structure of the FGC’s decision making process
applicable in both routine and nonroutine situations; the main aim of this
research is to investigate the FGC’s decision making process in nonroutine
situations.
1.3 EMERGENCY CONTEXT
In the United Kingdom, fires have been a cause of many costly disasters. The
total number of fire fatalities in the England in 2009–10 was 328, 1.5% more
than in 2008–09 (Fire Statistics Report, 2010). Moreover, according to a
statistics, the cost of fire in the UK (capital expended on fire anticipation, fire
and rescue service and damages incurred due to fire) is approximately 1% of
gross value added annually (The Economic Cost of Fire, 2004). A question
arises is why are fires still a significant urban emergency. The answer lies in the
way humans live in society today. With ever-changing life styles all over the
world, houses are more and more furnished with easily flammable materials
such as plastic, woods soaked with oil, timber etc. The need for safety from
burglars, or simply for privacy, means houses do not have enough exits for
people to escape or to allow combustible gases to escape from the premises in
case of a fire emergency. A small fire may produce a lot of heat and smoke,
and it can soon cause pyrolisis of materials stored in a less ventilated house,
resulting in greater damage. To keep up with the demands of urban life and the
growing population, industries also store highly inflammable materials, such as
cylinders of different types of dangerous gases, house building material, plastic
material or fertilizers used for manufacturing goods. The information on
industrial premises or manufacturing and repairing workshops collected by fire
emergency services during the regular fire safety inspections rapidly becomes
obsolete, which leaves the firefighters with completely new scenarios with fires.
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Although not as severe as the Great Fire of London in 1666, when fire forced
the reconstruction of the whole city, fires in the UK are still a major contributor
to the loss of public property and life (252000 total fires, 9401 non-fatal
casualties, 341 fatal casualties - see Fire Statistics Report, 2010). For an
example, consider the number of warehouse fires that are reported each year.
Evans (2006) conducted a study to find the number of fires in warehouses
attended by the respective Fire and Rescue Services in the England and Wales
over a 6-year period, from 1998 to 2003. A sample of 199 FDR1 type incidents
was gathered (fires involving 5 pumps or more and which may have casualties
are classified as FDR1 (Fire Service Statistics, 2009)). The percentage of
known storage buildings from this sample turned out to be 55% percent. The
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) figures for all fires recorded
(irrespective of number of fire pumps) as fires in warehouses or storage
buildings between 1998 and 2003 indicate that the Fire and Rescue Services in
England and Wales attended 3319 such incidents. Using 55% for selecting the
buildings fulfilling all the criteria to be called a warehouse, the figure is reduced
to around 1825 incidents (in 6 years) or an average of 365 per year (1 a day –
excluding leap years). Fraser-Mitchell et al (1996) estimated the total number of
warehouses in the UK as 60540+/-1600. This means that 2% (365 / 60540 x
100) of all warehouses face fire related disasters every year.
Fire emergency response work is a time-critical work practice, where periods of
relative low-intensity work are rapidly shifted into high-intensity work associated
with a high degree of ambiguity (Landgren, 2005). However, not all fire
emergencies are equally time-pressing. For this research, nonroutine fires that
engaged at least 5 fire appliances and had been reported in buildings such as
warehouses, factories or large public buildings are considered. This is because
fires that engage a minimum of 5 fire appliances involve a large number of
personnel, resources and equipments and may result in casualties (as
mentioned before). This normally places a high level of pressure on the FGCs,
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thus forcing them to display even the rarest cognitive processes for managing
fire emergencies. However, it should also be noted that the effect of the
criterion mentioned above has decreased the number of cases of house fires
recorded in the data collected for this research, which is noted as a limitation of
this research (see chapter 3).
1.4 THE FGC’s ROLE & RESPONSIBILITIES
In the previous pages, the role of the FGC is referred to without a complete
discussion of their responsibilities. In this section, the FGC’s role and the
responsibilities attached to this role are outlined briefly. The FGC manages fire
emergencies of small to large scale. They work in naturalistic settings which are
characterized by time pressure, incomplete information and shifting goals,
among others. The role of an FGC is pivotal in fireground command decision
making because of the inventory of their responsibilities during firefighting.
Generally, an FGC in Fire and Rescue Service in the UK is responsible for all
aspects of the response operation.
Specific duties of the FGCs
1. Conducts initial situation evaluation and continual reassessments;
2. Initiates, maintains and controls communications;
3. Exercises authority over the service resources on the incident ground
4. Develops the incident’s objectives
5. Develops firefighting strategy to tackle the fire (offensive, defensive,
offensively defensive, or defensively offensive)
6. Develops an action plan and assigns resources;
7. Delegates specific tasks and responsibilities to subordinates
8. Calls for supplemental resources;
9. Develops an organizational command structure;
10. Continually reviews, evaluates and revises the incident action plan;
11. Decides when to add another layer of authority (Gold Command, Silver
Command)
12. Provides for continuing, transferring and terminating command.
Table 1: Specific Duties of the FGCs
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As this research revolves around the decision making of this role, it is relevant
to understand the role of an FGC, and its information needs in the overall
context of managing a fire incident. Table 1 presents the specific duties of the
FGCs (Perry, 2003; Born et al, 2007; Fire Service Manual, 1999). All these
functions require up-to-date information for overall situation awareness, domain
knowledge and data from past successful cases for effective and accurate
decisions during an incident, and to expedite the process of response and
recovery during emergencies (Otim, 2006).
One of the principal considerations of the FGCs is the safety of their personnel,
the savable lives and property (Fire Services Manual, 1999). Therefore, prior to
deciding upon the tactics of how to overcome the fire, an assessment of risk is
performed. The Fire Services Manual states that the FGCs identify the hazards,
assess the risks, and implement all reasonable control measures before
committing crews into a risk area. A risk is an event that can lead to a loss. For
example, live wires or a weak roof structure in a burning house are risks to the
safety of the firefighters (FF). The FGCs ideally have access to the appropriate
Generic Risk Assessment information whilst en route (i.e., while on the way to
the fire incident ground) or in attendance at an incident scene, to assist with the
identification of suitable control measures (Fire Services Manual, 1999).
Generic Risk Assessments enables identifying possible hazards, risks and
control measures at a range of incidents, thus ensuring personnel adopt a
consistent approach for managing risk (Fire Services Manual, 1999). This, in
conjunction with other specific facts regarding the premises like information
gathered during risk assessment visits, will assist the FGCs to formulate an
effective plan (Fire Services Manual, 1999).
Once at the incident scene, the first task of an FGC is to gather all available
information relating to the incident in order to conduct a Dynamic Risk
Assessment (Fire Services Manual, 1999). A Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA)
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is a continuous process of identifying hazards, assessing risk, taking action to
eliminate or reduce risk, and monitoring and reviewing in the rapidly changing
circumstances of an operational incident (Fire Services Manual, 1999). On a
fireground, the changes in a situation means progressing fire, lowering of the
margin of safety, weakening of the structure or even the depleting resources.
The DRA includes overall assessment of the situation whilst considering the
position and circumstances of each member of personnel in attendance (Fire
Services Manual, 1999). Incidents will generate an increasingly intense
command environment, as the seriousness and scale increase (Fire Services
Manual, 1999). However, the commanders also monitor the situation relative to
the position and circumstances of any individual involved in the incident. The
DRA also assists an FGC to decide on the response strategy, which can either
be ‘offensive’ or ‘defensive’ or a mix of the two. The DRA is further supported
by information obtained at the pre-planning stage and information available on
risk cards or electronic storage media. The Analytical Risk Assessment (ARA)
follows the DRA; this occurs alongside the adopted response strategy (Fire
Services Manual, 1999). The ARA is documented and later produced to the
senior staff, in addition to all previous information such as information received
from the caller, information received en route or passed on by persons present
at the scene (i.e., occupiers or other agencies), and information about the
current response operation (Fire Services Manual, 1999). This assessment of
risk is important for making other decisions, as well such as outlining training
needs.
One of the benefits of this assessment of risks is that it prompts an FGC to
consider whether to request additional resources, in the form of specialist
equipment or purely for additional personnel (Jiang et. al, 2004). The Fire
Service Manual (1999) explains that an FGC is also responsible for resource
management. (S)he must ensure that adequate resources are available by
assessing the available resources against the objectives of the incident, and
request additional support where required. An FGC must also ensure that the
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arrangements have been made to control these resources (Jiang et al, 2004).
Research has shown that the demand for resources often exceeds the
expectations of the FGCs (Perry, 2003). Therefore, it is necessary to identify
resources according to perceived and real threats (Perry, 2003), which is also
the responsibility of the FGC.
An FGC is also required to develop, implement and constantly evaluate
response plans, taking into account SOPs (standard operating procedures) and
observations from the dynamic and analytical risk assessments (Fire service
manual, 1999). An FGC is responsible for setting up the Incident Command
System (ICS), therefore (s)he must be aware of the various levels of command
expertise of personnel present at the scene (Fire Services Manual, 1999). An
FGC is also responsible for maintaining communication with personnel in
attendance and maintaining shared situational awareness. This information
from other personnel around him helps him develop or modify a strategy
according to the changing situation.
The above-mentioned responsibilities make an FGC’s role difficult and, if a
commander is not well aware of all the strategies of expert commanders for
making decisions, an acceptable outcome cannot be guaranteed.
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter 2 has 3 parts. In the first part, a review of literature is presented on the
concept of problem, the different decision making strategies and the role of task
and decision maker’s characteristics in the selection of a decision making
strategy. The second part will present a review of literature on how decision
making process is defined for naturalistic settings. While discussing the
different definitions of decision making process, the limitations of the definition
of the FGC’s decision making process will also be mentioned. In this section, a
review of literature is also presented on what phases are and what phases
have already been proposed in the literature on analytic decision making thus
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highlighting a need for developing a framework of phases of the FGC’s decision
making process. The second part of literature review will serve to develop the
first research question. The third part of Chapter 2 is a literature review on
cues, patterns and pattern recognition. This part will also discuss the biases
attached to the use of pattern recognition. The third part of literature review will
serve to develop the second and main aim of this research.
Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology used for collecting and
analyzing data for this research.
Chapter 4 presents the analysis of data gathered for this research. The cue-
centric model of the FGCs’ decision making process is proposed conceptually
in this chapter. The main themes and categories are identified and explained
using the research data. This chapter also identifies those areas that have
emerged from the research data and in which more research is required.
In Chapter 5, the cue-centric model of the FGC’s decision making process
presented in Chapter 4 will be discussed formally. Chapter 5 presents the
conclusions of this research and a brief discussion of the possible uses of the
model present in this research.
Appendix ‘A’ will present the ‘critical incident reporting’ form used for gathering
the critical incidents reports and the prompts used for interviewing the
commanders. A list of the trainings that I have obtained while conducting this
research is given in Appendix ‘B’.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Even though the cue-centric decision making approach is not entirely neglected
(Tulving, 1985; Lindsay & Kelley, 1996), it has not been given the appropriate
attention in the literature on the FireGround Incident Commander’s (FGC)
decision making process. Various reasons account for this lack of data. The
first and most prominent one is the absence of a robust and coherent definition
of decision making process of the FGCs. Current theories on the FGCs’
decision making have described it as a process in which a commander looks
for an appropriate course of action for an already recognized problem. The
process of recognizing the problem is attributed to the use of patterns, thus
neglecting the complexity of this important stage for which multiple theories can
be tested. There is a need to recognize that the usual definition of decision
making process (see section 2.3.1) that considers problem recognition as one
of the major processes is also applicable in the context of the fireground
command decision making thus reflecting the actual practice irrespective of
whether pattern recognition is used or not. This will also lead to the structure of
the FGC’s decision making process. Once the different processes of the FGCs’
decision making are specified, researchers can propose and test other theories
besides pattern recognition for identifying and solving problems. The definition
and phases of an FGCs’ decision making process will facilitate in focusing on
the main aim of this inquiry which is about how commanders make decisions in
nonroutine situations.
This chapter will systematically introduce the relevant literature and will begin
with introducing the concepts such as ‘problem’, and ‘decision making
strategies’; later on literature related to the specific research questions will be
introduced.
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2.2 PROBLEM & DECISION MAKING STRATEGIES
2.2.1 What is a Problem
Decisions are made for solving problems, but one may ask what a ‘problem’ is?
This term is mostly defined as the existence of a gap, difference, or disparity
between the way things are, and the way one wants them to be (Bartee 1973;
MacCrimmon & Taylor 1976; Pounds, 1969; Reitman, 1964). Smith (1988)
explained that this problematic gap can involve anything concerning external
reality or states-of-the-world, internal states-of-knowledge, and one's
preferences themselves (Elster 1979). Smith (1988) further noted that while an
existing state-desired state gap is a necessary condition for problem existence,
it is not sufficient. He pointed out two other conditions that figure prominently in
the everyday usage of the term: firstly, the problematic gap must be difficult to
bridge or close; Smith quoted Polya (1962) in this regard as stating that, ‘where
there is no difficulty, there is no problem’, i.e., ‘difficulty’ is a necessary
constituent of problematic situations; Smith noted that all situations that
engender a purposive activity (also see Agre, 1982; Hattiangadi, 1978; Klein &
Weitzenfeld, 1979; Maier, 1970) are not termed as problems. Secondly, Smith
(1988) noted that, to be a problem, the gap must be important enough to
inspire current or prospective solution activities and that it must warrant a place
on the decision maker's agenda. Smith (1988) further noted that problems
involve more than mere wishes; they must be able to engage a decision
maker’s intentions and actions, currently or in the foreseeable future.
In summary, ‘a problem is an undesirable situation that is significant to and may
be solvable by some agent, although probably with some difficulty (Agre, 1982).
Since a problem is an undesirable situation, therefore it does not exist strictly
as an objective state-of-the-world, or as a subjective state of dissatisfaction
(Smith, 1988). A problem is a relationship of disharmony between reality and a
decision maker’s preferences, and being a relationship, it has no physical
existence (Smith, 1988) rather problems are conceptual entities or constructs
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(Smith, 1988). The term is an abstraction from the world of observable and is
applied because it serves a useful function’ (Smith, 1988). Smith noted that the
term ‘problem’ is an attention-allocation device and marking a situation as
problematic is a means of including it in one's ‘stack’ of concerns, thus placing
it on an agenda for future attention and solution efforts. However, there is an
element of arbitrariness in labeling a situation as problematic; a decision maker
can apply the concept more or less liberally, depending on whether (s)he
prefers his/her attention to be loosely or tightly focused (Smith, 1988).
2.2.2 Decision Making Strategies
Generally, decision making is defined as a process of various activities such as
gathering information, identifying a problem, identifying alternatives to solve
that problem, evaluating those alternatives and selecting one alternative for
implementation (Simon, 1960; Nutt, 1984). Theorists have learned that decision
making is a domain-specific activity, strongly characterized by the nature of the
task being addressed (Smith, 1988). Thus, the study of decision making has
become the study of goal-directed thought, and of the human cognitive
capacities involved in such thought in particular task domains (Smith, 1988). All
of us possess repertoires of decision strategies for decision making that include
the activities mentioned above; these strategies can be considered as
numerous ways to deal with decision problems even if they are not all equally
effective (Beach & Mitchell, 1978).
These strategies have some common characteristics that enable them to be
divided into the following categories: unaided-analytic, aided-analytic and
nonanalytic (Beach & Mitchell, 1978).
2.2.2.1 Unaided-Analytic Strategies
Beach & Mitchell (1978) explain that this category contains strategies for
exploring the dimensions of a problem but for which no tools are used, and the
decision maker restricts processing to the confines of his or her mind. These
authors noted that the various approximations to the Subjective Expected Utility
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strategy (SEU) that decision makers perform entirely in their heads are some
examples of unaided-analytic strategies. They further explain that in these
strategies, while making decisions, the decision maker attempts to think about
the outcomes that could result from the available choices as well as the
chances of those outcomes occurring, and then chooses the alternative that
seems in some rough way to offer the best potential (Tversky, 1967; Shanteau
& Anderson, 1969; Shanteau, 1974; Holmstrom & Beach, 1973). Beach &
Mitchell (1978) also noted that a difficulty with this approach is that most utility
maximization strategies are compensatory in nature: less of one aspect of an
outcome can be compensated for by more of another aspect. This
characteristic makes them quite cumbersome for the unaided decision maker
because each outcome must be evaluated separately for each of its aspects,
and then the utility of each aspect must be summed up to arrive at the
outcome's overall utility (Beach & Mitchell, 1978).
Beach & Mitchell noted Tversky's (1969) additive difference model and Simon's
(1957) ‘satisficing’ strategies as other examples of unaided analytical
strategies, which are less demanding but still compensatory in nature. In a
satisficing strategy, the decision maker selects the first decision alternative that
exceeds some ‘minimum aspiration level’; this strategy's procedure consists of
comparing the various aspects of outcomes to predetermined criteria rather
than evaluating each of them, summing them up, and then comparing the
summaries; the decision rule is sufficiency rather than maximization. Beach &
Mitchell (1978) saw Coombs (1964), Dawes (1964), and Einhorn (1970) as
other examples of unaided analytical strategies. Beach & Mitchell (1978) noted
that the Elimination by Aspects strategy (Tversky, 1972) and the Lexicographic
strategy (Tversky, 1969) are similar yet simpler noncompensatory examples of
unaided analytical strategy. These kinds of strategies have the advantage of
reducing information processing by restricting attention to only part of the
available information about the alternatives, but they have the disadvantage of
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introducing possible irrationalities such as intransitivity of preference (Beach &
Mitchell, 1978).
Beach & Mitchell (1978) noted that the least formalized of the unaided analytic
strategies involves the construction of mental movies or ‘scripts’ (Abelson,
1976) or schemas in which the decision maker imagines how things might be if
this or that decision alternative were chosen, and then picks the alternative for
which the script turns out best. Beach & Mitchell (1978) envisaged that the
scripts can be simple and sketchy, or elaborate and detailed but the principle is
the same for all of them (i.e., imagining how things would be if X or Y or Z was
the chosen alternative, and choose the one for which the imagined result is
best). These authors noted that the strategy of using scripts/schemas as a
basis for decisions is the most information rich procedure in this category,
because it frequently uses both auditory and visual imagery.
Unaided-analytic strategies require attempts to at least consider different
components of the decision problem, but only partially because no tools are
used; the degree to which this is done systematically and thoroughly is dictated
solely by the abilities and desires of the decision maker (Beach & Mitchell,
1978). Beach & Mitchell further noted that the limits of unaided human
information processing preclude complicated problems or procedures, and
even simpler ones require sustained hard work.
2.2.2.2 Aided-Analytic Strategies
This category contains strategies that require the decision maker to apply a
prescribed procedure utilizing tools such as pencil and paper, mathematics, a
calculator or a computer in a guided, systematic attempt to analyze the decision
and evaluate its components (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). Beach & Mitchell
pointed out that decision analysis is considered optimal in some respects;
however, this category contains many complex procedures that may or may not
be optimal, for instance in the business environment complex forecasting
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models are designed to help the decision maker. An example of aided
analytical strategies is the listing and evaluation of outcomes that could occur if
each alternative were selected (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). Beach & Mitchell
explained that these strategies typically involve decomposition of the problem
through use of decision trees. Another example is the listing of pros and cons
of alternatives, and some sort of balancing or weighting of these consequences
(also called ‘moral algebra’ by Benjamin Franklin) (Beach & Mitchell, 1978).
Aided-analytic strategies use formal procedures to lay out the problem and to
decompose it into subparts for subanalyses (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). They
frequently require extensive information procurement; they rely on application
of often complex logical procedures, usually mathematics, to decompose the
problem and to recompose it again, and to provide summary statements to
which a decision rule can be applied in some precise manner (Beach &
Mitchell, 1978).
Together the two types of analytical decision making processes are equivalent
in concept to the vigilant mode of decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977). A
vigilant decision maker thoroughly scans all available information sequentially
and in a systematic manner, devoting a consistent amount of attention to each
individual datum. All possible courses of actions are considered before making
a choice.
2.2.2.3 Nonanalytic Strategies
This category contains fairly simple, pre-formulated rules that are applied by
rote to decision tasks (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). They differ from aided- and
unaided-analytic strategies in that little information is procured or processed,
and little time is needed; moreover, the rules do not require that the decision be
decomposed or that its multiple aspects be considered (Beach & Mitchell,
1978). Beach and Mitchell observed that the most common nonanalytic
strategy of all is habit; it is efficient, and it may be the product of an earlier,
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more reasoned strategy which has become mechanical in order to avoid having
to go through the whole strategy selection process each time the decision task
is encountered. Beach and Mitchell further explained that because the majority
of decisions are mundane and made repeatedly, habit is a valuable strategy in
this category. Similar to habit, decision makers often depend on domain
knowledge and familiarity with the information they have collected from the
environment for making decisions. The distinction between habit and familiarity
is similar to Tulving's (1985) distinction between 'remembering' and 'knowing'.
Reports of remembering are said to reflect the operation of an episodic memory
system that enables retrieval of specific information about a prior encounter
with an event (Lindsay & Kelley, 1996). Reports of knowing, in contrast, are
attributed to more automatic memory processes that give rise to an
undifferentiated and quite confident feeling of familiarity (Lindsay & Kelley,
1996).
Beach & Mitchell (1978) noted that none of the nonanalytic strategies are
complete without analytic qualities - some analysis is necessary if the decision
maker is to recognize that the present decision task is sufficiently similar to
previous ones for which the rule has been successful enough to warrant using
it again. Similarly, some analysis is required for assessing the familiarity as
robust enough to aid in building an overall understanding of the problem and
guide the decision making process. In general, nonanalytic strategies require
very little analysis (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). Nonanalytic strategies are quick
and require little in the way of resource expenditure although the behavioral
alternative decided upon may itself be quite complicated (Beach & Mitchell,
1978).
For decision makers working in time pressured situations, the appropriate
strategy is nonanalytical for its being quicker than other strategies (Beach &
Mitchell, 1978); ‘Naturalistic decision making style’ (NDM) will be introduced as
29
a subtype of nonanalytical strategy for time pressured situations in the next
section.
2.2.2.4 Naturalistic Decision Making: Subtype of Nonanalytical
Strategies
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) can be considered as a subtype of
nonanalytical strategy of decision making. In typical NDM environments
information comes from many sources, is often incomplete, can be ambiguous,
and is rapidly changing (Klein & Klinger, 1991) therefore leaving less time for a
thorough analysis of information. Naturalistic environments are characterised
by several factors. NDM is followed when goals are ill defined and the task has
no perfect structure (Klein & Klinger, 1991). Little time is available for
information gathering and making decisions (p. 3). Moreover, in naturalistic
settings there is high uncertainty about the situation, there is high ambiguity
about what is happening and not all data is available (p. 3). In such situations,
goals are also shifting quickly and it is difficult to prioritise which goals are more
important because the situation is rapidly changing (p. 3). Another
characteristic of naturalistic settings is that each action is assessed by quick
feedback, which can instigate more action (p. 3). The decisions that are to be
made in naturalistic settings are normally high stake decisions (p. 3). The
FireGround Incident Commanders are naturalistic decision makers because
they work in environments that have the aforementioned characteristics, they
face high stress, high risk, and time pressure and the lives of those affected by
the fire emergency and the lives of fire rescue team are dependent on their
decisions.
Both habit and the familiarity with the information and use of domain knowledge
are applicable in the NDM as well. Pattern recognition models are loosely
based on habit strategy, whereas familiarity with the information and use of
domain knowledge for making decisions nonanalytically has so far not been
integrated in any naturalistic decision making models.
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Naturalistic decision making in particular and the nonanalytical strategy of
decision making in general is equivalent in concept to the hypervigilant mode of
decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977). Hypervigilant mode of decision behavior
is followed in time-pressured situations because of its very nature of saving
time and effort (Janis & Mann, 1977). A hypervigilant decision maker (Janis &
Mann, 1977) performs a nonsystematic or selective information search, and
scans only the information, which is needed to make an assessment. The
information is not available in a sequential manner therefore selective
information from the gathered data is rapidly assessed and only limited courses
of action are considered for making decisions. This means that a course of
action is selected without extensive review or reappraisal.
The next section explains that how the characteristics of the ‘decision task’ and
the ‘decision maker’ dictate which decision making strategy should be followed.
2.2.2.5 Influence of the Decision Task & Decision Maker on Decision
Making Strategy
The selection of one of the above-mentioned decision making strategies for
solving a particular problem is not an arbitrary decision. This decision is
attributed to the characteristics of the task and of the decision maker. Strategy
selection is a subjective process therefore the influence of task characteristics
on it is mediated by the decision maker's perception of those characteristics
(Beach & Mitchell, 1978). These characteristics help in selecting a decision
making strategy in normal as well as urgent tasks, where time is limited.
Task characteristics with respect to the decision problem:
Unfamilarity is the degree to which the decision problem is foreign to the decision maker. Past
experience with the same or similar problems can, on the one hand, provide a specific strategy
that has been used successfully before or, on the other hand, it can rule out unsuccessful
strategies. Lack of such experience means that the decision maker must take more care in
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approaching the problem.
Ambiguity is the degree to which the problem is unclear to the decision maker. This includes
the ambiguity of the goals, decision alternatives and constraints, as well as the unavailability,
unreliability, and imprecision of relevant information.
Complexity is the number of different components of the decision problem, such as the number
of alternatives to be considered and the amount of relevant information to be considered, as
well as the number of criteria on which the decision will be judged. Also included in complexity
is the degree to which the problem will influence future decisions; if one must choose the best
alternative early on and also anticipate the consequences of these decisions on later events,
the situation is complex.
Instability is the degree to which the criteria, goals and constraints of the problem change
during and after the decision, particularly if those changes are difficult to predict.
Task characteristics with respect to the decision environment:
Irreversibility Most decisions are not all or none; the decision maker can usually make the
decision, monitor its effects, and reverse the decision if things go poorly. But when this cannot
be done, it increases the stress of making the decision by increasing pressure to be correct or
having to live with the negative consequences.
Significance The significance of the problem is determined both by the magnitude of the
outcomes involved and the breadth of the decision's ramifications for other parts of the decision
maker's life, e.g., making a correct decision may be important in and of itself, and may also
influence future promotions, self esteem, etc.
Accountability This is the degree to which the decision maker is to be accountable for the
results of the decision. One kind of accountability is personally imposed and results from
personal involvement with the decision and its related outcomes. Another kind is externally
imposed and results from being accountable to others for the decision's results rather than for
the quality of the procedure used to make the decision. High accountability increases the
pressure to be correct.
Time and/or Other Constraints Sometimes decision tasks allow ample time for deliberation and
processing, but more often there are deadlines. When time is limited, an upper limit is placed
on the resources that can be expended and, therefore, some strategies are eliminated from
consideration.
Characteristics of the decision maker:
Knowledge Probably the greatest influence on strategy selection is the decision maker's
knowledge, or lack of it, about the available strategies and their relative promise of success.
Usually, aided-analytic strategies are only available through training; most of the other
strategies are developed in the course of experience, which is also a source of knowledge.
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Ability Knowledge of and faith in strategies is fundamental, but the ability to exercise that
knowledge is quite as important. For someone who lacks the ability, the time and effort that
must be expended in the use of a particular strategy is greater than for someone who has the
ability. In short, the less able person must devote more of his or her personal resources of time
and effort to using strategies and, therefore, can be expected to be less willing to select
strategies with high personal resource requirements. The more intelligent, cognitively complex,
and analytic the individual is, the easier it should be to use analytic rather than nonanalytic
strategies and, within a given category, formal rather than informal strategies.
Motivation Whatever their intelligence, cognitive complexity, or characteristic approach to
problems, people making decisions strive to expend the least personal resources compatible
with the demands of the decision task. This could be because regularly there are other
demands; sometimes there is a personal need to appear resolute and decisive, and often there
is a tendency to avoid the emotional aspects of prolonged deliberation - what William James
called ‘the impatience of the deliberative state’. Of course, countering impetuosity is what
James called ‘the dread of the irrevocable’ (irreversibility), but unless the latter is fairly strong,
the press to decide, to get the matter settled and to cease working on it is often a powerful
motivator for selecting the fastest and easiest strategies within reason.
Table 2: Characteristics of Tasks and Decision Maker (Beach & Mitchell, 1978)
With respect to the table 2 above, when the magnitude of each factor
representing a task and the decision environment are on the higher end of the
continuum (such as high unfamiliarity, complexity, high irreversibility, high time
constrain) and if a person has more knowledge, superior abilities and right
motivation, then decision makers shift to naturalistic decision making because it
is a quick and flexible approach.
2.2.2.6 Descriptors for Task Conditions that Induce Different
Strategies
Payne (1982) in his review of decision behavior indicates that ‘decision
making...is highly contingent on the demands of the task’ (p. 382). The list
given below (table 3) will show that what motivates the selection of analytical
(both unaided and unaided included) or unanalytical decision behavior
(Hammond et al, 1984).
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1a. If the amount of information available for making decisions is large, then a nonanalytical
decision strategy is followed.
1b. Analytical decisions are made by using only little information.
2a. A nonanalytical decision maker assesses information perceptually and the reliability of that
assessment is relatively low.
2b. An analytical decision maker assesses information objectively, as more time is available
for this assessment; therefore the reliability of information assessment in an analytical strategy
is high.
3a. Those tasks that are dealt with in an analytical way are highly decomposable and several
people can make decisions for different components of one problem; normally this
decomposition is decided prior to the appearance of problems.
3b. The tasks that are pursued by nonanalytical methods are not as decomposable as tasks
solvable by following an analytical method.
4a. All selected information is given equal importance for solving the problem in nonanalytical
decision making approach.
4b. In analytical decision making, cues have different and compensatory importance.
5a. If strict guidelines and principles are readily available for solving a problem, then they are
solved by an analytical approach.
5b. If strict guidelines and principles are not readily available for solving a problem, then a
nonanalytical approach is followed.
6a. The nonanalytical decision maker does not have any control over how the information is
presented to him/her, therefore the information is available simultaneously;
6b. An analytical decision maker receives cues in a sequential manner.
Table 3: Descriptors for Task Conditions that Induce Different Strategies (Hammond et
al, 1984)
Clearly, the high availability of ambiguous non-sequential information,
perceptual assessment of information, unstructured nature of the tasks, and
absence of highly applicable rules can be observed in decisions that are made
on the fireground. This supports the use of nonanalytical strategies for decision
making on the fireground.
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2.3 DEFINITION & PHASES OF DECISION MAKING PROCESS:
DEVELOPING THE 1ST RESEARCH QUESTION
2.3.1 How is Emergency Decision Making defined in the Literature?
It is not uncommon to come across many terms in the literature on Naturalistic
Decision Making, which has so far not been adequately defined or explored
because of the lack of attention. An ‘analogical’ example is that after years and
years of research and many books and articles written, there is still no
commonly acceptable definition of ‘disaster’ (for a complete discussion, see
Quarantelli, 1986). Researchers have defined this concept at will because the
debate on what is disaster is still open. Similarly, definition of a same term may
be different with respect to different fields of research.
In much the same way, the term ‘decision making’ is also defined differently
across fields of research and is biased by the perceived or truly important
activities performed during the process of making decisions for solving a
problem. This researcher believes that the FireGround Incident Commander’s
(FGC) decision making process is inadequately defined in Klein et al (1986). In
their research on the FGC’s decision making process, Klein et al (1986), set a
working definition of ‘decision making as the selection of one option from a set
of two or more options’ (p. 11). This definition does not conform to the most
commonly accepted definition of decision making process, which is that ‘a
decision process is made up of a set of activities that begins with the
identification of an issue and ends with action’ (Nutt, 1984, p. 415). The
definition set by Klein et al reflects the ideology of the RPD model; the RPD
model sidelines the complexity of recognition of a problem by arguing that
problems are identified quickly through matching them with past similar
experiences that are inferred by a ‘few key anchors’ (Klein et al, 2005), thus
hinting at the rapid nature of the recognition of a problem. This ideology is more
prominent in Klein et al (2005) where it was stated that the concept of RPD
model is basically a combination of three decision heuristics: availability and
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representativeness ‘to identify the typical course of action’, and the simulation
heuristic ‘to evaluate that course of action’; thus completely ignoring the step of
problem recognition. The RPD model does not acknowledge the complexity of
the identification of a problem (or ‘issue’ (Nutt, 1984)). Examples of other
researchers who begin their discussion of decision making process with the
belief that a problem is already established can be observed in the literature.
Liebler & McConnell (2004), while researching decision making of health
professionals, defined the decision making process as choosing from among a
set of alternatives to determine a course of action. Similarly, Redelmeier &
Shafir (1995) supported the idea that decision making in medical problem
solving is about searching for two or more options from which a single
alternative is selected as final choice.
Since the development of the RPD model, the above-mentioned definition of
decision making is accepted without question in the literature on the FGC’s
decision making process. The effect of this limited definition is that no other
theories for identifying and solving problems, besides pattern recognition, exists
in literature on the FGC’s decision making process.
Whereas some naturalistic decision making researchers begin their discussion
of decision making with the belief that the problem is already identified, other
researchers acknowledge the presence of a process for recognizing a problem.
Orasanu (1993) studied decision making in the cockpit and found that crews’
decision making process is a set of activities such as situation assessment,
choice among alternatives, and assessment of risk, thus acknowledging the
relevance of situation assessment for identifying problems as well as the
search of alternatives for solving it. In the nurse’s triage decision making, Cioffi
(1998) found that the triage decision making process involves searching for
patient information, assessing the information, including the making of
formulative judgments (inferences), which can include probability judgments,
and the making of a final decision about the specific triage category to assign.
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Nurses have to recognize the symptoms to correctly identify the problem that
needs treatment. Once the problem is identified they further progress in
decision making process by finding alternatives and selecting an option for
solving the problem. Saaty (2001) found that to make a decision one needs
various kinds of knowledge, information, and technical data; these concern the
details about the problem for which a decision is needed, the people or actors
involved, their objectives and policies, the influences affecting the outcomes,
and the time horizons, scenarios, and constraints. The set of potential
outcomes or alternatives from which to choose is also part of this process
(Saaty, 2001). Similarly, Stiell & Wells (1999) believe that decision making
refers to efforts by clinicians to make the best use of available data when
diagnosing a problem and deciding on a therapeutic course of action, thus
acknowledging the presence of the diagnosis of problem. The current Swedish
military tactical decision making process also identifies several more steps prior
to the development of a set course of actions (Thunholm, 2005) in the decision
making process.
Some researchers also emphasize the need to recognize the novelty of a
problem. Saaty (2001) noted that ‘External factors such as time pressure and
high risk may not be perceived as such by experienced emergency
managers….here what may be defining criterion for an emergency is…the
number of possible developments’. Klein (1989) stated that ‘A part of the
difference between experts and novices is that the experts have a substantially
higher ability to discern types of situations within their area of expertise. It is
thus important to make an effort to understand the current situation and its
inherent possibilities and threats’. Skriver et al (2004) believe that decision
making is often a question of applying knowledge and experience to a situation
that may have been ‘defined in advance but still contains novel elements’.
In summary, the ‘process of recognizing a problem’, ‘understanding the current
situation and its inherent possibilities and threats’, recognizing ‘novel elements’,
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and the ‘number of possible developments’ of situation (Saaty, 2001) are other
activities performed during the decision making process which are not
recognized in the definition of the FGC’s decision making process set by Klein
et al (1986). Klein et al’s definition of decision making violates the view that
naturalistic decision making as a process has broadened its focus from the
‘decision event’ to a larger process involving situation assessment; and it is not
considered as a one-time, point specific event any more (Dreyfuss, 1997;
Zsambok, 1997).
Both individual and distributed emergency decision making research has
stressed the importance of context dependencies (Skriver et al, 2004);
therefore an accurate context specific definition of the FGC’s decision making
process is necessary. This can be achieved by recognizing the processes
mentioned above in the definition of the FGC’s decision making process, so
that it will reflect the process of the fireground command decision making and
harmonize it with the commonly accepted view (Nutt, 1984) of decision making.
2.3.2 Concept of Phase in Decision Making
Decision making is central to human activity (Ashraf & Ghosh, 2005), hence it
gains considerable attention from people at all levels (Rahman & Zakaria,
2008). In his classical study of thinking, Dewey (1933) proposed a normative
model of problem solving that proposes that people solve problems by following
an orderly sequence of phases. Each phase is normally a major process of
decision making and may consist of a collection of smaller processes that
collectively fulfill the goal of a phase. These phases keep a natural balance
between building an understanding of a problem, planning to solve a problem
and implementation of the selected course of action to solve that problem.
Many phase-based frameworks are proposed in the literature, ranging from two
to eight phases. The different phase models overlap to the extent that they can
be roughly mapped onto one another, even when they differ in their number of
38
phases and terminology (Lipshitz & Bar Ilan, 1996). These models differ in their
emphasis on the descriptive or prescriptive facets of the phase theorem, as well
as in the number and nature of their phases (Lipshitz & Bar Ilan, 1996). From
the several frameworks given in Maier (1964), Polya (1957), Bransford & Stein
(1984), Brim et al (1962), Kast & Rosenzweig (1974), Pounds (1969), Hofer &
Schendel (1978), Glueck (1976), Mazzolini (1981), Pargament et al, (1998), it
can be easily inferred that these frameworks mainly consisted of different
phases performing following activities (table 4):
Various Activities in the Decision Making Process
1. Identification of the problem in the present situation, causing the evocation
of the decision making process
2. Diagnosis of the problem
3. Recollection of all relevant past experiences
4. Development of hypotheses for understanding the situation
5. Identification of all alternative ways of solving (choices) the identified
problem
6. Rigorous assessment of each alternative on some evaluation dimension
7. Selection of a solution to solve the problem
8. Testing of the final choice
9. Seeking authority to implement the choice
10. Test run of the choice and deciding if it should be revised
11. Implementation of the choice
12. Feedback
Table 4: Different Phases of Decision Making
The aforementioned frameworks provide a general structure for abstract
problem-solving, but general procedures are extremely limited in their subject
specific effectiveness (Hyslop-Margison, 2003). While quoting John McPeck,
Hyslop-Margison (2003) underscores the ineffectiveness of various general
strategies in their role in solving ill structured problems and suggested that the
broader a given strategy is, the less efficacious it becomes for any specific
problem-solving activity.
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As for nonanalytical decision making, one can find arguments against the
possibility of any distinguishable phases in such decision making process, such
as Weick (1983) who challenges the validity of stage models. However, on the
other hand the, possibility of having distinguishable phases in nonanalytical
decision making process that FGC’s also follow could not be ruled out.
Mintzberg & Raisinghani noted that when faced with a complex, unprogrammed
situation, the decision makers seek to reduce a decision into sub-decisions to
which (s)he applies general purpose, interchangeable sets of procedures
(Mintzberg et al, 1976). Mintzberg et al believe that decision processes are
programmable even if they are not in fact programmed. Although the processes
used in unstructured decision making are not predetermined and explicit, there
is strong evidence that a basic logic or structure underlies what the decision
maker does, and that this structure can be described by systematic study of the
behavior of the decision making process (Mintzberg et al, 1976) followed under
time pressure. Similarly, Klein’s (1993) claim that situation assessment,
recursive information search and option generation drives naturalistic decision
making, also impose a structure on it.
With respect to the order of phases, it should be noted that there is a split
opinion in the literature about whether the phases have any particular order in
which to appear. Lipshitz & Bar Ilan (1996) quoted Bales & Strodtbeck (1951)
and Witte (1972) who, while formulating a phase theorem, stated that: ‘[The
phase theorem is] the idea that [problem solvers] go through certain stages or
phases in the process of solving problems, or that problem-solving would
somehow be more effective if some prescribed order were followed’. On the
other hand, in naturalistic decision making, researchers often dispute the
presence of linearly ordered phases. Smith (1989) quoted Weick (1983) as
follows: ‘Weick (1983)…asserts that real world problem situations resist the
linear sequencing suggested by such (stage) models. The inflow of relevant
information is continuous, as a result of which new ideas and new alternatives,
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goals, and even unrecognized problems are constantly coming to light.
Consequently, stage models can’t predict or prescribe what will/should happen
next in the course of problem solving’. Similarly, Klein & Weitzenfeld (1979)
suggested that solving well-defined problems progresses linearly from definition
to action basically in the way described by Lipshitz & Bar Ilan (1996), whereas
ill-defined problems (which we find in naturalistic settings) are solved through a
cyclical process in which definition, option generation, and option evaluation
are intertwined with one another and there cannot, therefore, be any
distinguishable phases.
At another point Klein & Weitzenfied (1979) strongly criticized the applicability
of phase model in tasks performed in naturalistic settings. Klein & Weitzenfeld
pointed out that the stage model is suitable for well-defined goals, but not for ill-
defined goals in which the end state is unclear. They opinioned that, most
problems in natural settings involve ill-defined goals and it is impossible to
specify goals in advance in such situations. Therefore, waiting until the goal is
clearly specified will cause delays in decision making. Klein & Weitzenfeld
argued that for ill-defined goals, the decision maker must simultaneously be
defining the goal and attempting to achieve it. Klein & Weitzenfeld stand is in
contrast to the current stage models, which suggests that the goals need to be
specified before solutions are considered. However counter to the Klein &
Weitzenfeld’s argument it is necessary to note that stage models do not
advocate a complete and accurate specification of problem before making any
attempts to solve it. A partial specification can also suffice in place of thorough
problem definition for solving ill-defined goals, which can later be improved.
Although researchers such as Klein & Weitzenfeld (1979) have been arguing
against the possibility of the presence of any ordered distinguishable phases in
the decision making process of emergency managers such as the FGCs, the
structure of many naturalistic decision making models falsify this claim. An
example is that the RPD model (Klein et al, 1986) can be seen as having two
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phases, in which the ‘first’ phase corresponds to the situation recognition stage
(which roughly corresponds to problem definition up to choice-action), and the
second phase corresponds to the stage of mental simulation (in which options
are critically evaluated one at a time, roughly corresponding to choice-
evaluation-elaboration) (Lipshitz & Adar-Pras, 2005).
Decision making consists of the processes that are mentioned above and vary
in number with respect to the field of research (Rahman & Zakaria, 2008). If it is
proven that the FGCs’ decision making process has an underlying structure,
then the above-mentioned phases have to be tailored to make a valid
framework applicable to the fireground command decision making; these
phases were originally proposed for analytical decision making process.
Although the analytical decision making process is superior in comparison to
naturalistic decision making style, it also lengthens decision making process
(Janis, 1989) therefore all these processes could not be found in a decision
making process followed under time pressure. Another major difference
between the analytical and naturalistic decision making process is not just the
number of phases, but the time spent on each phase and how thoroughly each
is being pursued. Some of the phases mentioned above still appear in the
decision making process followed under the pressure of time, but only to the
extent that many of these phases can be considered as part of few major
phases (the short amount of time available in fire emergencies casts doubts on
the presence of too many major phases in FGC’s unstructured decision making
process). Furthermore, individual decision maker under time stress uses a
number of problem solving shortcuts such as satisficing instead of maximizing
(Simon, 1960; Mintzberg et al, 1976), thus further reducing the phases required
to make a decision.
There is a need to determine whether there are any ordered, distinguishable
cyclic or non-cyclic phases in an FGC’s decision making process by
investigating ‘in detail the general knowledge, specific information, and
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reasoning processes an expert uses’ (Klein, 1989). The second aim of this
research revolves around this question. These phases are important for
analyzing the decisions made in the past and for the development of software
applications to facilitate different aspects of decision making on the fire incident
ground.
2.3.3 First Research Question
In summary, the first research question consists of two parts: Firstly, how can
the FGC’s decision making process be defined so that it is applicable in both
the routine as well as nonroutine situations? Secondly, what is the underlying
structure of the FGC’s decision making process?
2.4 CUES & PATTERN RECOGNITION: DEVELOPING THE 2nd RESEARCH
QUESTION
When, during live fire incidents or in training scenarios, a subject is being
presented with an environment or a picture of an environment, (s)he may ask
what am I looking for, am I studying the phenomena at the stimulus level or at
the environment level? Studying the fireground command decision making at
an environment level has so far been addressed in the literature in the form of
pattern recognition. However, research on studying this phenomenon at cue (or
stimulus) level, which calls for familiarity with information (remembering vs.
knowing), needs attention. This can only be achieved by clearly understanding
what are cues, patterns, pattern recognition and the problems attached to it.
The discussion on these topics will lead to the development of the 2nd research
question, which will be presented in a later part of this section.
2.4.1 Cues
Human decision making is normally categorized as skill, rule or knowledge
based behavior (Rasmussen, 1986). The performance in each category is
based on the role of the information observed from the environment
(Rasmussen, 1986), which is basically different in the different categories.
Generally, this ‘information observed from the environment’ is called cues.
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Cues are important for several reasons. For example, cues can be
psychologically analyzed (Wohlwill, 1973); they can illuminate path to crises,
problems and opportunities (Ansoff, 1980; Mintzberg et al, 1976); and cues can
also describe events carrying information about the developing trends in the
environment (Ansoff, 1980), therefore they help in ascertaining the significant
developments in the environment (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton et al, 1983; Haukedal,
1994).
It is important to mention here that cues, stimuli, signs, symbols and symptoms
are interchangeably used in the literature with respect to different forms in
which they can be perceived or what purpose they are serving. For the sake of
consistency, I will use the word ‘cue’ for the concept of stimulus and other
concepts mentioned above in conformation with Miller & Dollaro (1941) (who
opined that ‘cue’ and ‘stimulus’ have same meaning) and Pervin (1978) (who
stated that ‘… some of the differences in definitions (of stimuli) may be
attributable to concern with different kinds of stimuli…’).
Appearance of cues in the environment
While mentioning different forms of information that can be perceived, Mace
(1986) stated that for Gibson (1960) information (cues) refers to structure
carried in media by light, mechanical energy, or chemical energy and that the
structure of information is intrinsically informative about the ‘sources of its
structure’ by virtue of being lawfully specific to those sources of the structure. In
other words, cues are a ‘specific physical force, energy, or agency (resulted
because of the changes in the stimulus object) which brings about stimulation’
(Troland, 1930) and can produce a change in behavior (Jennings, 1906). For
Woodworth (1929, p. 223) a cue is any form of energy acting upon a sense
organ and arousing some activity of the organism. To Woodworth (1958, p. 60)
‘a cue, as used in psychology, is a stimulus which serves as a sign or signal of
something else, the connection having previously been learned’. While
elaborating upon the previous definition, Rasmussen (1986) defined the terms
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signals, symptoms and symbols. Signals are sensory data representing time-
space variables from a dynamical spatial configuration in the environment and
the organism can process them as continuous variables (p. 260). Signs indicate
a state in the environment with reference to certain conventions for acts, which
are performed mechanically (p. 260). Signs are related to certain features in the
environment and connected conditions for action. Signs cannot be processed
directly; they serve to activate stored patterns of behavior (p. 260), just as a
pressure gauge reading below a certain value may induce a certain behavior in
the person monitoring the gauge. Symbols represent other information,
variables, relations, and properties and can be formally processed (p. 260).
Symbols are abstract constructs related to and defined by a formal structure of
relations and processes, which by conventions, can be related to features of
the external world (p. 260). For Skinner, a cue is simply a part or modification
of a part of the environment which refers to a class of events, the members of
which possess some property in common (Skinner, 1959). Yet another view
about cues is that they can be taken as clues, which are unconscious rational
inferences from the sensed data (Harper & Boring, 1948).
Cues in problem solving
In terms of problem solving in a naturalistic setting, cues appear as an
indication of problems and they can draw a response from the perceiver.
Problems can be considered faults, which are events that threaten to block an
intended outcome (Klein et al, 2005). However, we do not directly perceive
faults (p. 17). We notice the disturbances or symptoms they produce, which we
experience as the cues that alert us to the existence of a fault (p. 17). These
disturbances are cues and although they are informative about the source of its
structure, i.e., the stimulus object (Haukedal, 1994), cues are meaningful when
viewed separately from the source. In perceptual psychology, it is a basic tenet
that one should distinguish between the cue and the stimulus object (Crech et
al, 1974, p. 241). In other words, cues are the data associated with the stimulus
object reaching the perceiver (Haukedal, 1994). Cues originate in, but are not
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identical to, the ‘objective’ changes taking place in the environment, as Estes
opined ‘by stimulus, I refer to environmental conditions, describable in physical
terms without reference to the behavior of an organism’ (Koch, 1959, p. 455).
Cues are well integrated into environments and require expertise to be
identified for use. Whether we notice these cues depends on several factors,
including the sensors that register them (Klein et al, 2005, p. 18). The sensor
data can be direct (such as visual cues, like the smoke coming from under the
eaves of a building that is starting to catch fire) or indirect (such as a fuel gauge
showing a rapid rate of fuel depletion) (p. 18). In terms of problem solving we
have to respond to the sensor data and appreciate how they can be signaling a
cue, in order to deduce that a fault or problem may have occurred (p. 18). The
disturbances that the faults produce are signaled as symptoms, and they are
noticed if the sensors are appropriately configured (p. 18).
Drawing inferences from cues
Cues are meaningful only in relation to the actively perceiving organism
otherwise they would exist without being noticed. A cue, which is not perceived
is not a cue at all, i.e., if a perceiver cannot identify a cue then that cue will not
have any objective reality because cues exist to the degree that they are
perceived (Haukedal, 1994). The impact and value of all types of cues emerge
from the actor’s perception processes (Haukedal, 1994). Barker (1968)
suggests that an environmental variable must be received by the organism to
function as a cue. Similarly, Haukedal (1994) and Minstzberg et al (1976)
believe that the cues should be noticed and processed as determined by the
structuredness or ill-structuredness of the cues (Haukedal, 1994; Mintzberg et
al, 1976). Haukedal further pointed out that many cues would not be detected if
there were no scanning mechanism for it. Transactional and gestalt students of
perception argue that the entire process of perception involves a perceiver that
is active in what it attends to and how it incorporates incoming stimuli (Avant &
Helson, 1973). The different ways of incorporating stimuli can be traditional and
transactionalist. In traditional view the cues are taken as a source of
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stimulation, which contrasts with the transactionalist concept where cue is
taken as information.
Identifying the cues
Cues have identifiable attributes and data exist along with identifiable attributes
(Haukedal, 1994), making the cues perceivable, such as smoke has color, color
can be red or black, smoke has density, and density can be high (thick) or low
(thin) and behavior of emitting can be forcing out or not forcing out. Cues are
embedded in situations and both (cues and situations) are embedded in
environment; the relationship between perceiver, situation, environment and
cues is such that in some cases it may be relatively easy to specify the cue
characteristics of the object of perception (or stimulus object), whereas in other
cases it may be quite difficult to do so (Gibson, 1960).
Figure 1: Cues, Situation & Environment
Role of potential and actual cues in triggering response
Cues, situations, and environments may arouse the organism in nonspecific
ways, operate to elicit specific responses, and serve to block behaviors, and/or
alter the probabilities of future behaviors (Pervin, 1978). The cues are
perceivable because they are independent of the perceiver and independent of
the response produced after their discovery, as argued by Arnoult (1963).
Gibson (1960) also supported the separate consideration of cues and stimulus
object by arguing for independent consideration of causal factors outside the
organism and those inside the organism. Although environments may have
features, which constrain or preclude some behaviors and support or make
more feasible other behaviors, stimuli may trigger responses, or at least are
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capable of triggering responses (Chein, 1954; Astin, 1972), which can be used
to rectify those constraints. Chein (1954) also noted that whether or not a
stimulus actually stimulates an individual depends in part on the individual and
his/her state. It is conceded that a stimulus may cause a reflex, but not an act.
Gibson (1960) notes that some psychologists allow for potential stimuli and
suggest that a stimulus need not excite receptors to be called such.
Koch asserts that stimuli are ‘potential occasions’ for the initiation of sensory
activity, and that ‘the physical stimuli, though present, may not be effective’
(Koch, 1959). The former conception allows physical energy to be called a
stimulus only when some response can be observed; the latter allows of the
possibility that stimulus energy may be present without necessarily being
responded to. Gibson (1960) also supported such an interpretation, in particular
arguing for the utility of the term subthreshold stimulus. Woodworth (1958) was
one of the first to emphasize that the stimulus does not in itself determine the
response; factors in the organism intervene to help determine it. Certain types
of responses by or within the individual can become functionally connected with
a prior event through learning; in this case, the event that triggers a response
automatically is a stimulus (Miller & Dollaro, 1941).
2.4.1.1 Types of cues
Cues can be classified as central and peripheral with respect to their
importance. Central cues are the direct result of changes in the stimulus object.
Peripheral cues exist because of central cues; they cannot exist in the absence
of central cues. Cues can also exist as a single dominant symptom to a set of
multiple symptoms (Klein et al, 2005, p. 18) or they can be standalone (non-
composite). Cues can also be categorized on the basis of their strength
(Mintzberg et al, 1976) and structure; these are of central importance
(Haukedal, 1994) and will be explained below. See table 5 below for a
summary of the type of cues.
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Types of Cues
In terms of Importance In terms of Composition
In terms of Strength &
Structure (Haukedal, 1994)
Central Cues Non-composite
Messages: Strong and
structured cues
Peripheral Cues Compound
Whispers: Well structured but
weak cues
Symptoms: Strong but ill-
structured cues
Itchers: Weak and ill-
structured cues
Table 5: Types of Cues
Cues vary in strength, which means some cues are easy to identify (Haukedal,
1994; Mintzberg et al, 1976). The strength depends on certain factors such as
contrast, movement and intensity of the cue (Haukedal, 1994). Haukedal
(1994) pointed out that cue types also vary regarding their attentional
thresholds and meaning-generating processes therefore strength is probably
best conceptualized as emerging from the dynamics between the cue and the
perceiver. On the basis of strength, cues can be categorized as strong or weak.
Cues differ in the structure dimension as they do in strength (Haukedal, 1994).
Haukedal (1994) noted that some situations faced by a decision maker will be
familiar, and means of handling them have been developed. The typical case
here is the application of standard operating procedures. Other situations,
though, are more ill-structured; they may have to be formulated by the decision
maker him/herself, and there may be no best solution (Ackoff, 1974; Mitroff &
Emshoff, 1979; Haukedal, 1994). Haukedal (1994) proposed that structure is a
function of the perceiving actor’s knowledge base and information processing
capabilities, as well as the attributes of the cue. The cue can be pointing
towards either well-structured or ill-structured problem situations (Mintzberg et
al, 1976). The latter are described as ‘problems whose structure lacks definition
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in some respect’ (Simon, 1973, p. 181). Haukedal pointed out that ill-
structuredness can be understood according to three conceptually independent
dimensions, which are the novelty, complexity and ambiguity (Kaufmann, 1987)
of the cue.
He further stated that novelty could be a result of the absence of relevant
experiences, or other knowledge that can be directly applied to the situation at
hand. While the perception of a novel cue may be seen as dependent on the
successful application of knowledge stored in long-term memory, complex cues
are more demanding on short-term memory because of the large quantity of
information they contain (Kaufmann, 1987). Ambiguous cues are met in the
form of conflicting solution alternatives, where the problem is to discern which
most effectively fulfils some goal requirement (Haukedal, 1994).
Haukedal (1994) categorized cues into 4 types on the basis of their strength
and structure: (1) well-structured and strong (WsS) Cue, (2) well-structured and
weak (WsW) Cue, (3) ill-structured and strong (IsS) Cue, and (4) ill-structured
and weak (IsW) Cue. Haukedal explained that the WsS cues are probably the
least problematic to handle. They easily pass the attentional threshold, or even
demand immediate actions because, when perceived, well-structured cues are
fairly easy to interpret since the situation and its implications are known from
earlier exposures, and are relatively simple and unambiguous (p. 271).
The problem with WsW cues is noticing them in the first place (Haukedal, 1994,
p. 271). The decision maker has to be attentive in some way or another in order
to perceive this kind of information (p. 271). This is because no immediate
action is called for. Nor are they particularly salient in any other respects (p.
271). Nevertheless, through search and scanning activities the decision maker
may be more attentive to them. The important point here is that these cues are
quite straightforward to understand, but hard to detect without some effort on
the part of the perceiver (p. 271).
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Signals such as ill-structured strong cues correspond to events in which
something has to be done, but the situation is not understood well enough to
prescribe particular actions; what is called for in such situations is diagnosis, or
the analysis of the situation’s underlying causal texture (Haukedal, 1994, p.
272). In order to prescribe actions to undertake, the situation must be
understood; ill structured and weak cues are probably the largest challenge the
decision maker is faced with when trying to navigate in the environment
(Haukedal, 1994, p. 272). This is because the cues are weak, so there is no
external motivation for taking action. In other words, it is tempting to overlook
such events altogether (Haukedal, 1994, p. 272).
Summary
Cue is a datum associated with a stimulus object; the stimulus object can be in
its normal state or in a non-normal state (as fault or problem). A cue is
embedded in a situation, which is itself embedded in an environment. A cue is
produced as a result of changes taking place in the environment, which is
actually due to the changes in the stimulus object. A cue is present in the
environment as energy in different forms, which can be perceived as (i) an
external reference to states of environment and actions upon the environment
as signals/symptoms (such as high density white smoke emitting from a sealed
compartment works as signal indicating the possibility of backdraft) or (ii) in the
form of reference to the internal conceptual representation (which is the basis
for reasoning and planning) as symbols (such as such as a red glowing layer in
a sealed room full of hot gases, also called a neutral plane, works as a
symbolic cue in a compartment on fire which may go into backdraft; very low
neutral plane has a different meaning from a high neutral plane) or as (iii) signs
which indicate a state in the environment with reference to certain conventions
for actions and serve to activate stored patterns of behavior (an example is a
sign of skull and bones which automatically makes the perceiver react in a
stereotypical manner by raising their level of caution). A cue exists outside the
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perceiver and has identifiable attributes; however, its impact and value emerge
from the actor’s perception processes. If a perceiver does not actively perceive
the data then, for that perceiver, the cues may not have any objective reality.
When relevant cues are combined, they may produce patterns. Cues can be
categorized in terms of their importance as central or peripheral, in terms of
their composition as composite or non-composite, in terms of their strength as
strong or weak and in terms of their structure as ill-structured or structured.
2.4.2 Patterns & Recognition of Patterns in Decision Making
There are several real life examples where pattern recognition is the most
dependable decision making approach, such as, firefighting (Klein et al, 1986),
battlefield decision making (Serfaty et al, 1997), medical diagnosis (Elstein &
Schwarz, 2002), puzzle solving and chess playing (Chase & Simon, 1973).
Pattern recognition is based on the mastery of the decision maker and the
routine nature of the problem and is not applicable in solving nonroutine
problems because they need systematic generation and testing of hypotheses
(Elstein, 2002). It is necessary to point out that whether a diagnostic problem is
easy or difficult is a function of the knowledge and experience (Elstein, 2002) of
a decision maker. Klein et al’s (1986) research shows that in routine situations,
the naturalistic decision makers, such as FGCs use their experience to directly
identify the situation as typical of a standard prototype, and to identify a course
of action as typical for that prototype. However, behind the process of
identification of a problem as typical or not is a neat machinery of heuristics.
This section will introduce to you the patterns, and how the process of pattern
recognition works.
What are patterns?
In decision making, a pattern is a recurring event that has occurred numerous
times in the past and which is now present in the memory as a category (or
schema). These internalized events and experiences are referred to by several
names, such as categories, frames, scripts, schemas, mental models, situation
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templates, class of events and images (please see the table 6 below for the
definition of these terms as proposed in the literature).
Definition of Categories, Frames, Scripts, Schema, Mental Models, Situation Template &
Images
Cognitive frames are internal images of external reality that shape the way people makes
sense of situations (Rudolph, 2003).
A frame is a type of data structure in which individual cases are defined in terms of a set of
features on each of a number of parameters, which are used for organizing a listing of case
attributes and provide a common representational format for all cases of the same type
(Minsky, 1975).
A frame is that portion of the perceptual cycle that is internal to the perceiver, modifiable by the
experience and specific to what is being perceived. The frame accepts information as it
becomes available and is changed by that information. (Neisser, 1976)
A frame is a culturally relative system of rules, principles and so on, which are used to organize
society and guide individual behavior. (Goffman, 1974)
A script is a regularly occurring sequence of events or activities that can be formulated as a
template for structuring the description of particular instances of events or activities of the same
kind. (Schank & Abelson, 1977)
Schema is a mental representation of the persistent features or attributes of objects. (Piaget,
1952)
A schema is a mental representation of the structure of the event descriptions, usually taking
the form of regularly occurring and culture specific sequences of dramatic events. (Barlett,
1932)
A schema is a situation- or domain specific cognitive structure that directs external information
search, guides attention management, organizes information in memory and directs its
retrieval, and becomes more differentiated as a function of experience. (Neisser, 1976)
Images as schema are specific to decision behavior and represent the decision maker’s guiding
principles relevant to some sphere of decision making. They also represent the decision
maker’s goals in that sphere, what he or she is doing to reach those goals, and his or her view
of how well those efforts are succeeding. (Beach & Mitchel, 1987)
Table 6: What are Patterns
Categories or patterns are developed through appropriate coding of the past
experiences of oneself or others in terms of its cues, characteristics, and
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connectedness. When an own experience is internalized, it is stored in memory
as a category. Besides own experiences, categories may also be a result of
assimilation (Piaget, 1930; Beach & Mitchell, 1987), i.e., the examples set by
other people. A further source of categories is the combination of several
compatible categories for the current situation, which results in the emergence
of a single category. Another source is accommodation (Piaget, 1930; Beach &
Mitchell, 1987), i.e., the modification of a not-quite-acceptable candidate to
make it conform to the constraints imposed by the existing shape of the
environment. Accommodation means that a candidate that is not compatible
can be changed where necessary to make it compatible rather than being
rejected out of hand (Piaget, 1930; Beach & Mitchell, 1987). This is the most
common form of plan formulation used in solving routine problems; sticking with
known plans, modified as necessary, enables one to profit from experience
(Beach & Mitchell, 1987).
Pattern Recognition
Pattern Recognition involves an act of categorization of external situation with
respect to internal categories stored in the memory of a decision maker. A
decision maker (such as an FGC) gets stimulated by appropriate input and
responds by referring the input to some class of events. A category is selected
on the basis of certain defining or key anchors in the input, also called cues, or
in other words, the question of which events are placed into which categories
involves the process of using criterial attribute values, or cues, for grouping
events in equivalence categories (Bruner, 1957). An abstract example is the
task of looking at a number, determining that it is divisible only by itself and 1,
and thereupon categorizing it in the class of prime numbers (Bruner, 1957).
This process does not need to be conscious or deliberate (Bruner, 1957).
The candidate categories are selected using decision heuristics such as
representativeness, availability (Klein et al, 2003; Klein et al, 2005),
compatibility and profitability of a category with respect to the current situation
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(Beach & Mitchell, 1987). Representativeness means that an event represents
the essential features of its parent population or generating process
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). The benefit of representativeness is that it is
predictive in varying degrees such as the categorial placement of the object
leads to appropriate consequences in terms of later behavior directed towards
the perceived object (Bruner, 1957). These representative categories are the
ones, which are ‘immediately available’ and can be described by availability
heuristics. Bruner (1957) observed that the availability of a category is noted by
the amount of stimulus input of a certain pattern necessary to evoke the
perceptual response. Bruner (1957) explained that the greater the accessibility
of a category, (a) the less input is necessary for categorization to occur in terms
of this category, (b) the wider the range of input characteristics that will be
‘accepted’ as fitting the category in question, (c) the more likely that categories
that provide a better or equally good fit for the input will be masked. Normally
an event that is considered representative has a high rate of availability, which
shows that it has occurred significant number of times in the past so it is fresh
in the mind. In other words, there are situations in which people assess the
frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind (Bruner, 1957). The
availability of a category also helps to discover other co-occurring categories,
because frequency of two events occurring together results in the
strengthening of the associative connection between them (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). Beach & Mitcheal (1987) defined these concepts, i.e.,
representativeness and availability as ‘compatibility heuristic’. An additional
heuristic that they define that enables selection of a category is profitability.
Profitability is the degree to which a candidate offers attractive consequences
contingent on its successful achievement (in the case of goals), implementation
(in the case of plans), or execution (in the case of tactics).
The result of this categorization process is recalling the details of past similar
experiences; the details (also termed as schemas, frames, mental models etc)
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are brought to the short-term memory. These mental models direct the
exploratory activities that make more data available, by which it is further
modified. As mentioned above, patterns are inferred by few key anchors (Klein
et al, 2006); during pattern recognition, search for more cues is guided by the
retrieved mental model by looking for information which is compatible with the
current category or, when inputs of cues are referred to appropriate categories
where the information is fragmentary, the missing properties of the input are
obtained from the category (stored in long term memory) to which part of the
input has been referred (Bruner, 1957).
In pattern recognition for problem solving, recognizing a pattern and fitting a
frame to the current situation (also called size-up (Klein et al, 1986)) is just the
first step. Once a pattern is identified, it is used to solve the problem. The idea
is that the representative frame delivers a definition of the problem and gives a
course(s) of action, which can be used throughout for solving the problem. A
problem solver uses the retrieved categories by extracting the course of action
(COA) embedded in them. However, the COA is not directly used for solving an
identified problem; its appropriateness is evaluated for use in the current
situation, through simulation heuristics (Klein et al, 2005). The simulation
heuristic is related to the construction of scenarios or examples (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982). The simulation heuristic can result from a common
introspection process of answering questions about events in an operation that
resembles the running of a simulation model (p. 201). The simulation can be
constrained and controlled in several ways (p. 202). A simulation does not
necessarily produce a single story, which starts with a beginning and ends with
a definite (or required) outcome (p. 202). Although this is required, the decision
makers construe the output of simulation as an assessment of the ease with
which the model could produce different outcomes given its initial condition and
a set of parameters (p. 202). Judgmental activities in which mental simulation is
involved are: prediction (what can happen), probability of occurrence of a
specific event, conditions required for the occurrence of an event, counter
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factual assessments (How would event ‘A’ have worked out if ‘B’ had not
happened?), and assessing the causes of the occurrence of an event.
Once a course of action (COA) retrieved from a matching category is selected
for implementation, it is implemented in one of the two ways, which are
‘instance based’ or ‘exemplar based’ process. Through instance based
approach (or principle cueing approach), decision makers adopt a principle or
formula used in the past to solve a similar problem (Ross, 1987). The COA is
implemented without further guidelines from the retrieved category. Another
way is to use exemplar based approach (or example analogy approach) in
which decision makers use the past experience as a step by step guide to
solve the current problem (Ross, 1987).
It is possible that the initial situation model that has lead to category
identification and the selection of a course of action may be incomplete, laden
with conflicting evidences and/or contain unreliable assumptions (Freeman &
Cohen, 1996). To handle these sources of uncertainty, the decision makers
generate arguments that link evidence to the assessment of the situation
(Freeman & Cohen, 1996). With arguments decision makers build and defend
their assessments and their plans (Freeman & Cohen, 1996) and modify and
improve the mental model obtained through pattern recognition. For this task
they use meta-cognitive processes which are ‘critiquing process’ used to
identify sources of uncertainty in the situation model, and ‘correcting process’
which is an attempt to reduce uncertainty by gathering more current information
and changing assumptions (Freeman & Cohen, 1996).
2.4.3 Problems & Biases Attached with Pattern Recognition
Normally, images of the future are shaped by experiences of the past; however,
it has many disadvantages as well. In his monograph ‘Hazard and choice
perception in flood plain management’, Kates (1962) writes: ‘A major limitation
to human ability to use improved flood hazard information is a basic reliance on
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experience. Men on flood plains appear to be very much prisoners of their
experience . . . Recently experienced floods appear to set an upper bound to
the size of loss with which managers believe they ought to be concerned’.
Tversky & Kahneman (1973) observed that Kates (1962) attributes much of the
difficulty in achieving more efficient flood control to the inability of individuals to
imagine floods unlike any that have occurred. The situation of the fireground
command decision making is no different. Today, the FGCs are not ready to
look beyond pattern recognition; they explain even those instances when they
have hardly followed a pattern recognition strategy, through it; it is because
there is no alternative explanation available that describes such decisions.
Thinking through pattern recognition is a very rigid approach. Pattern
recognition advocates that decision makers do not perceive individual cues
(Klein et al, 2006) and frames developed to understand a situation do not
include inferences drawn from the data. In fact, the frames guide the inferences
and collection of more cues. The pattern recognition strategy does not consider
that decisions can be made through a bottom-up strategy, i.e., driven by
inferences obtained from the processing of cues, experiences with those cues
and domain knowledge (Klein et al, 1986). This assumption has given rise to
the belief that pattern recognition is a non-compensatory (Gigerenzer & Selton,
1999) approach. One can actually find researchers openly advocating the use
of past information in such a way that considerably endangers the recency of
information (such as Lee & Bui, 2000). This may cause accidents because no
two disasters are exactly alike and relying only on past experiences may not
reflect the current situation at all, or may severely limit its understanding. In
contrast to the views of Gigerenzer & Selton (1999), Richter & Spath (2006)
found that, in practice, recognition information is not used in an all-or-nothing
manner, but it is integrated with other types of knowledge in judgment and
decision making. They conducted several experiments to test the non-
compensatory character of the recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer & Selton,
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2002) and found that recognition effects were partly compensated by task-
relevant knowledge.
It is important to note that if the patterns applied do not match the input, and
are forced upon the input, what we read from it or through it would lead to error
and non-accurate perception (Bruner, 1957). These errors develop at the level
of individual heuristics that give rise to recognition of patterns. These errors or
biases (attached with the availability, representativeness, simulation,
compatibility and profitability heuristics) are summarized below in table 7
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Availability
Events’ subjective probability appears higher than actual because of several unavoidable
environmental factors such as easy recallability.
In most situations the subjects cannot construct and enumerate all instances to which the
current information may lead. Moreover easily accessible classes appear more frequent and
classes whose instances are less frequent are ignored.
Another effect is that occurrence of a frequent event induces the confidence that another co-
occurring event will also occur (Smedslund, 1963; Ward & Jenkins, 1965); also called ‘illusory
correlation’ and it significantly biases the decision making (Chapman and Chapman, 1969).
Due to ‘illusory correlation’ decision makers may not be able to detecting those correlations
which are actually present in the environment (Golding & Rorer, 1972).
Representativeness
If the probability of occurrence of a type of situation is assessed by representativeness then the
judged probability of it occurring is estimated independently of how much information is
gathered. Thus wrong assumptions can be made through inadequate information.
The decision maker can anticipate or predict future situations without considering whether there
is sufficient validity and reliability of the data.
Simulation Heuristics
While using the simulation heuristic for simulating a COA, decision maker can give more
emphasis to dramatic situations and not consider the slow occurring changes (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982).
A decision maker accepts those events that can be reached through one plausible scenario
without considering other possibilities thus concentrating only on the simplest and most
available scenarios (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Elstein’s (2002) noted that ‘Errors…can
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occur in difficult cases in internal medicine include failure to generate the correct hypothesis;
misperception or misreading the evidence, especially visual cues; and misinterpretations of the
evidence. Many diagnostic problems are so complex that the correct solution is not contained in
the initial set of hypotheses. Restructuring and reformulating should occur as data are obtained
and the clinical picture evolves. However, a clinician may quickly become psychologically
committed to a particular hypothesis, making it more difficult to restructure the problem’.
A decision maker may develop a single compelling but inaccurate scenario and find it difficult to
view the situation in any other way.
Because of the simplified nature of imagined scenarios, the outcomes of simulations are often
counter intuitive (Forrester, 1971). The use of scenarios to assess probability is associated with
a bias in favor of events, for which one plausible scenario can be found, with a corresponding
bias against events that can be produced in a multitude of unlikely ways.
Compatibility & Profitability
Beach & Mitchell (1987) noted that sufficient compatibility of a category to a situation can be
different for different decision makers, therefore it is an open ended requirement bound to
produce some less satisfactory outcomes. As compatibility evaluation ignores the potential
profitability of candidates, if progress is apparently being made toward a goal, introduction of a
superiorly profitability candidate goal or plan will not lead to rejection of the existing goal or plan
and adoption of the superior one, and the decision maker perseveres in his or her use of the
sufficient but inferior plan (Beach & Mitchell, 1982; Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Davidson & Beach,
1981; Staw & Ross, 1978).
Table 7: Biases attached with Availability, Representativeness, Simulation,
Compatibility, & Profitability Heuristics (Beach & Mitchell, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974)
Though the pattern recognition process look simple however to use it a
decision maker must be adequately experienced and must have seen a large
number of events that can repeat themselves (or in other words, they must be
expert in their field). Pattern recognition is not useful for novices because they
are beginners who have little experience of the situation in which they are
expected to perform (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). With novices, there is evidence
that the mapping process (comparison between current and past experiences)
is often syntactic and does not take advantage of many semantic
considerations of the domain because novices do not have appropriate higher
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level structures (categories) and therefore, they rely on superficial similarities
(e.g., Chi et al, 1981; Chi et al, 1982) between the current situation and their
limited knowledge of past experiences (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986).
2.4.4 Second Research Question
A major limitation of pattern recognition based models such as RPD is that they
do not address the situations when, during the decision making process,
accurate recognition of recallable events is not possible because the
recognition process fails to deliver a comparable event (Bousfield & Sedgewick,
1944), when the decision maker deliberately avoids (Jacoby et al, 1989)
recalling past episodes during decision making, or when pattern recognition is
not suitable due to time constraints. Any attempt to use pattern recognition in
such situations gives rise to biases in the decision making process.
Therefore, this research intends to investigate how the FGCs make decisions in
non-routine situations, and what is the role of cues in such situations?
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
A well-defined research methodology is central to any type of research and
should be tailored to the aims and objectives of the research. Methodologies
give a system of precise rules and procedures, which are followed during the
inquiry process. These rules are used in evaluating the knowledge as well
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). This chapter gives the details of the
research methodology used to conduct this research inquiry and answer the
research questions set out in Chapter 2. A myriad of books have been written
on different research strategies, data analysis methods and evaluative criteria,
therefore no attempt is made in this chapter to indulge in a detailed and random
discussion of them. Instead, in the subsequent sections, the emphasis will be
on justifying the use of strategies adopted with respect to the research
questions of this thesis.
3.1 RESEARCH METHOD: FRAMEWORK
For the sake of clarity and ease of reading, here is a step-by-step outline of
how this research is conducted:
1- Literature Search and Review
a. Literature on naturalistic decision making and decision making
process, FGCs’ decision making process models and methods for
conducting naturalistic research are searched and analysed.
2- Identification of Research Aims
a. Literature review showed that there is no FGC’s decision making
process model available specifically for nonroutine situations.
3- Data Collection
a. Unit of Analysis: Individual FGCs were selected as unit of analysis
for this research (see section 3.7.1).
b. Collective Case Study Method: This method is found appropriate
because of the following reasons (see section 3.6.1):
i. This method is appropriate for use in areas of study where
less research is conducted in the past. So far, no research
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was done on FGC’s decision making process followed in
nonroutine situations.
ii. The only source of description of FGC’s decision making
process in nonroutine situation is their practice which can
be studied through this approach.
iii. A popular case study research method, i.e., Critical
Decision Method (CDM) is used for gathering cases.
c. Semi-structured Interviews: Each critical incident is further
explored through semi-structured interviews. These were found
appropriate because of the following reasons (see section 3.6.2):
i. They are appropriate for finding new phenomenon.
ii. They can advocate a change in the operating procedures.
iii. Through interviews, rich details can be elicited about the
phenomenon under investigation.
4- Data Analysis
a. Thematic data analysis approach and process reconstruction
method are used to develop themes from data.
5- Results
a. See section 3.8 for a discussion on how the data is used for
development of themes, and achieving the aims of this research.
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Figure 2: Research Method Framework
In the sections to come, a general discussion on the case study approach
(along with collective case study) and interviews is presented first. Later on, the
particular case study method (i.e., Critical Decision Method) and particular
interviewing technique used (i.e., Semi-structured interviews) are introduced.
The thematic analysis and process reconstruction method will be introduced in
the last section of this chapter.
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3.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
The term ‘qualitative’ implies the prominence of the qualities of what is under
investigation; it also involves the processes and meanings that cannot be
measured experimentally in numbers and cannot be expressed in quantities
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). The research questions established in the previous
chapters show that the motive of this research is to explore phenomena which
cannot be measured on some scale and which cannot be expressed in
numbers. Such phenomena can only be explored through the principle of
qualitative research that perceives reality as socially constructed and can be
accessed through interaction between the subject, the context and the
researcher. During this interaction, various tools and methods are used to
examine what the social ‘reality’ is, how it is created and what meaning it has
for the subject (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). The main reasons why a qualitative
research design is adopted for this research inquiry are discussed below:
Research on Less Explored Areas
Exploring the areas about which little is known or gaining further insight about a
phenomenon are common bases for conducting qualitative research (Maxwell,
1996; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). A qualitative research design is appropriate for
conducting this research, because after the emergence of the RPD model
(Klein et al, 1986), literature has shown no major example where an extensive
field study is conducted on the onsite fireground command decision making.
Later researches only promoted the concept of pattern recognition and were
conducted using artificial scenarios, so they can be termed as more of
laboratory based studies. A serious dearth of alternative views on the onsite
decision making process of the FireGround Incident Commanders (FGC) can
be easily noticed in the literature.
Capturing the individual’s point of view
Denzin & Lincoln (2000) explained that quantitative and qualitative researchers
attempt to capture and explain an individual’s point of view. However, it is
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widely believed that the instruments available to qualitative investigators can
get them closer to the actor’s opinion. This is normally achieved through
interviews and observations. Denzin & Lincoln (2000) further noted that
researchers believe that quantitative researchers rarely represent their
subjects’ opinions and perspectives, because ‘they have to rely on more
remote, inferential empirical methods and materials’. For this research, the
individual point of view of the FGCs is important because they mostly learn
about the fireground command decision making through experience, the details
of which cannot be obtained solely from training material.
Examining the constraints of everyday life
No amount of training or experience can prepare commanders for all types of
future situations. The environment on the fireground is extremely dynamic
therefore it is necessary to understand the constraints under which the FGCs
have to work. Denzin & Lincoln (2000) believe that qualitative researchers are
more likely to meet and understand these constraints. Research methods like
qualitative interviews expose a researcher to the ‘world in action’, in order to
understand what needs to improve ‘and embed their findings in’ the
investigated social system. On the other hand, ‘quantitative researchers
abstract from this world and seldom study it directly’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).
Denzin & Lincoln (2000) argue that quantitative research seeks a nomothetic or
etic science based on probabilities and derived from the study of large number
of randomly selected cases. Quantitatively collected information is not suitable
to explain phenomena in detail and conceals the effects of the constraints of
everyday life (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Qualitative researchers look at
individual cases in detail and understand what constitutes the phenomena.
They are committed to an emic-idiographic case based position that directs
attention to the specifics of particular cases (Denzin &Lincoln, 2000).
Rich descriptions of the social world
Rich descriptions of the social world are valuable for a qualitative researcher
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) because quantitative research with its etic-nomothetic
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commitments is less concerned with such detail (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).
Qualitative researchers use ethnographic prose, historical narratives, first
person accounts, still photographs, life histories, fictionalized facts, and
biographical and autobiographical materials among others (Denzin & Lincoln,
2000). It is the responsibility of the qualitative researcher to gather data about
all aspects of a phenomenon (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) and these materials
should provide rich details about the phenomena studied, which cannot be
obtained through quantitative tools such as mathematical models, statistical
tables and graphs. In contrast, quantitative tools usually write about their
research in impersonal, third person prose (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) so that
results can be generalized. Quantitative researchers are unconcerned with rich
descriptions because such details interrupt the process of developing
generalizations (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).
Traditional approaches to research in command decision making
Selecting between the duality of qualitative-quantitative methodologies reflects
the ways in which a researcher thinks about and studies social realities
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The selection of the research (qualitative or
quantitative) design is also determined by how the research is traditionally
conducted in the field.
Previous investigations conducted in the area of command decision making
have traditionally adopted a qualitative research approach (see Klein et al,
1986; Landgren, 2005). Those studies which were conducted purely in
laboratory settings also followed a qualitative approach (such as Lipshitz & Bar
Ilan, 1996). The literature shows that sociology has more frequently been
associated with qualitative methodologies (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000), however
outliers cannot be ignored. The ultimate decision on whether a study should be
conducted through quantitative research or qualitative research is made with
respect to their appropriateness for the aims of this research.
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Comparison Dimension Qualitative Research Quantitative Research
Types of questions Probing Limited
Sample size Small Large
Information/Respondent Much Varies
Administration Require interviewer with
special skills
Fewer special skills required
Types of analysis Subjective, interpretative Statistical, summarization
Hardware Tape recorder, projection
devices, video, pictures,
discussion guides
Questionnaires, computer
printouts
Ability to replicate Low High
Training of the researcher Psychology, sociology, social
psychology, consumer
behaviour, marketing,
marketing research
Statistics, decision models,
decision support system,
computer programming,
marketing research,
marketing
Types of research Exploratory Descriptive of casual
Table 8: Quantitative vs. Qualitative Research (MacDaniel & Gates, 1998)
See table 8 for a quick comparison of quantitative and qualitative research
methodologies.
3.3 EPISTEMOLOGICAL & ONTOLOGICAL POSITION
Selecting a particular methodology presupposes certain ontological and
epistemological premises (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). In the previous section it was
argued that one of the aims of the study was to understand the experience of
the FGCs as it occurs within and is influenced by fireground context. This
simple statement, however, is underlined by assumptions regarding what
constitutes reality and how this reality can become known. These assumptions,
also referred to as ‘paradigms’, will guide the research to its final completion
and presentation.
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Epistemology ‘concerns the question of what is (or should be) regarded as
acceptable knowledge in a discipline’ (Bryman, 2004; Bryman, 1988). The
different epistemological positions are briefly defined below. In the later part of
this section, the adopted position for this research will be presented.
Positivist or Realism: Assumes that social science and natural science worlds
can be investigated in the same way. The central hypothesis of positivism is
that the knowledge that can be confirmed by the physical science is the only
true knowledge.
Interpretivism: believes that there is a fundamental difference between social
and natural sciences. It states that interpretation of how people look at their
world and its subjectivity is necessary. It is necessary to look at a person’s
world from his/her point of view; this will magnify the behavior of that person in
the world.
Ontology questions whether ‘the social world is regarded as something external
to the social actors or as something that people are in the process of
fashioning’ (Bryman, 2004). The different ontological positions are defined
below. In the later part of this section, the adopted position for this research will
be presented. Objectivism: states that there is a set of external factors beyond
our reach or influence. It believes in the existence of a single ‘knowable’ and
observable truth, which should be uncovered. The observer is considered to be
an objective observer who does not influence the on going process under
investigation. Constructivism: Proposes that human subjects as social actors
are in a continuous process of constructing and reconstructing their own social
world. To understand that process the researcher has to be a part of that world
and understand it from inside.
Ontological and epistemological position for data gathering
Due to many constraints, the researcher was unable to view the actual
firefighting operations and training scenarios. However, the observation and
reporting of training scenarios would have made the research a laboratory
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based study. As for live large incidents, there are only handful of such incidents
happening within the space of a year in different parts of the UK, therefore the
chances of their direct observation is virtually impossible. Therefore, using a
case study approach, the FGCs were asked to submit written reports on
peculiar incidents that they have handled during their job, which were further
explored through interviews. This has two effects as explained by Klein (1989).
First is that time is saved by not sitting around and waiting for incidents that
fulfill the criteria for this research to happen. Secondly, as mentioned before,
such incidents can happen anywhere in the UK; this would have required time,
resources, or inexperienced researchers to report the incidents to this
researcher. Klein et al (1986) showed that by using case studies and interviews
with commanders, peculiar incidents can be reported and analyzed in detail.
Constructivism is employed for gathering the research data. The commanders
were given ample time to think about the details of the incident to be reported.
This prepared the commanders for a later face-to-face semi-structured
interview; it also enabled a deeper investigation of the reported events and to
refresh the memory of the FGCs so that all the minute details are recorded. The
epistimological position is ‘interpretivistic’, because the researcher is not a
firefighter by profession and he did not have the chance to view the fire
operations; therefore, what is reported in the research data comes from the
subject’s retrospective view of the decision making process. The commanders
were asked to submit the written reports of peculiar incidents in their own words
and language; this brought out the exact formal and informal terminology that
they use during firefighting operations.
Ontological and epistemological position for the analysis of interview data
The written critical incident reports and the qualitative interviews are the biggest
sources of the information for this research, but the interviews provided more
detail when compared to the written reports. Slightly deviating from the
traditional way of seeking information through semi-structured interviews, the
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FGCs were motivated to explain their points of view through anecdotes
wherever possible. This brought out richer details about phenomena of interest.
Firstly, using the interpretativistic research paradigm, the data is analyzed to
report the exact opinion of commanders. Secondly, constructivism is used to
understand the underlying meanings of the opinions of the FGCs, because
there is a dearth of literature available on the onsite decision making of
commanders.
3.4 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: EVALUATIVE CRITERIA
If the research process adopted does not follow any standards, the product of
the research cannot be solid. Therefore, a researcher should stress the
verification of the research process within the inquiry. Generally speaking, the
evaluative criteria for qualitative research are a very controversial issue during
its development stage. Morse et al (2002) noted that many leading researchers
like Altheide & Johnson (1998) or Leininger (1994), rather than explicating how
rigor was attained in qualitative inquiry, argued that reliability and validity were
terms pertaining to the quantitative paradigm and were not pertinent to
qualitative inquiry. Morse et al further noted that some other leading
researchers such as Lincoln & Guba (1985), Leininger (1994), and Rubin &
Rubin (1995) suggested adopting new criteria for determining reliability and
validity to ensure rigor in qualitative research. Guba & Lincoln (1981) proposed
four evaluative criteria for ensuring the rigor in qualitative research, which were
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.
Morse et al pointed out that Guba and Lincoln developed another criterion, i.e.,
authenticity, which was unique to the constructivist assumptions and that could
be used to evaluate the quality of the research beyond the methodological
dimensions (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). These criteria have been fundamental to
the development of standards used to evaluate the end product of qualitative
inquiry (Morse et al, 2002, p. 2). Morse et al noted that over several decades,
reliability and validity have been subtly replaced by criteria and standards for
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the evaluation of the overall significance, relevance, impact, and utility of
completed research. Strategies to ensure rigor inherent in the research process
itself were secondary to these new criteria to the extent that, while they
continue to be used, they are less likely to be valued or recognized as indices
of rigor (Morse et al, 2002). There are corners of the world where the terms
validity and reliability are still in use, but authors such as Yin (1994) argued that
the abstractness of these concepts can be applied to the whole of the research
including within the inquiry process (Morse et al, 2002, p. 2).
Morse et al (2002) argued that ‘by focusing on strategies to establish
trustworthiness (Guba & Lincoln’s 1981 term for ‘rigor’) at the end of the study,
rather than focusing on processes of verification during the study, the
investigator runs the risk of missing serious threats to the reliability and validity
until it is too late to correct them’ (p. 2-3). Morse et al concluded that although
the process from the constructive (during the process) to the evaluative (post
hoc) stage is incremental, there ‘is often no distinction between procedures that
determine validity in the course of inquiry and those that provide research
outcomes with such credentials’ (p. 3). Morse et al argued that the importance
of verification strategies within the inquiry process should be reconsidered so
that reliability and validity are actively attained. They proposed the following
criteria to ensure reliability and validity within inquiry process: investigator
responsiveness, methodological coherence, theoretical sampling and sampling
adequacy, an active analytic stance, and saturation (p. 5). To ensure a ‘solid
product’ (Creswell, 1997; Kvale, 1989 as quoted in Morse et al, 2002, p. 5), this
research will also adhere to these standards so that the inquiry process will
itself be rigorous and acceptable.
Morse et al (2002) defined verification as a process of checking, confirming,
making sure, and being certain; they further noted that in qualitative research,
verification refers to the mechanisms used during the process of research to
incrementally contribute to ensuring reliability and validity and, thus, the rigor of
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a study (p. 5). These mechanisms are frequently used throughout the research
process to identify and correct errors before they are built into the research
outcome and/or threaten the analysis process (p. 5). Morse et al noted that
qualitative research is an iterative process and a good researcher should move
back and forth between the design and implementation of the research, on the
basis of the results of these evaluations to ensure congruence among different
elements of research like question formulation, literature review etc (p. 5). The
verification process within the inquiry involves ‘systematically checking data,
maintaining focus, and the fit of data and the conceptual work of analysis and
interpretation are also monitored and confirmed constantly’ (p. 5). In the
following section each of the above mentioned strategies are discussed
regarding how they are applied in this research, to ensure rigor within the
inquiry. These strategies will be discussed with respect to the current research
at different stages throughout this section.
3.4.1 Investigator’s Responsiveness
Morse et al (2002) pointed out that the quality of research depends on the
researcher’s expertise, creativity, sensitivity, flexibility and skill in using the
verification strategies. He further pointed out that these qualities of a
researcher are central to the realization of optimal reliability and validity (p. 6).
The lack of responsiveness of the investigator is difficult to detect using post
hoc criteria for evaluating qualitative research. The main causes of the lack of
responsiveness of the investigator are issues like ‘lack of knowledge, overly
adhering to instructions rather than listening to data, the inability to abstract,
synthesize or move beyond the technicalities of data coding, working
deductively (implicitly or explicitly) from previously held assumptions or a
theoretical framework, or following instructions in a rote fashion rather than
using them strategically in decision making’ (p. 6).
To ensure the investigator’s responsiveness, the researcher must be
knowledgeable enough to ascertain the needs of the research. This researcher
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is adequately trained to undertake the current research. In the first year of the
research program, this researcher is trained in various aspects of how to do
research. The researcher attended a one year long compulsory custom
developed research training program, which included taught modules such as:
Effective Management of Research, Research Methodology: Research Design,
Qualitative Methods and Analysis Basic & Advance, Quantitative Methods &
Analysis Basic & Advance, and Research Ethics. Besides these courses, the
researcher has attended several other courses on the different aspects of
research, which were offered by the Loughborough University’s Graduate
School (a list of these courses can be found in Appendix B). As for the question
of sticking or not to the past assumption, the research aims set in this research
are such that they have forced the researcher to not overly adhere to the past
hypotheses; moreover, the constructionism and interpretivism approaches
ensured that the data is listened to. Details on the data analysis will be
discussed later in this chapter.
3.4.2 Methodological Coherence
Methodological coherence ensures that congruence is achieved between the
research question and the process of inquiry (Morse et al, 2002, p. 6). This
means that there should be sufficient flexibility in the research method so that
when the questions improve as the research progresses the researcher should
be able to bring an appropriate change in the method of inquiry as well (p. 6).
Firstly, in order to ensure methodological coherence, the literature on
Naturalistic Decision Making was systematically reviewed. This brought out
traditional methods in use for conducting qualitative research of this nature,
which are case studies and ethnography. The final selection of the research
method(s) is based on the research aims, and its feasibility for the current
research. The case study method is found as most feasible and appropriate for
this research. The closest approach to conduct this type of research is
ethnographic study. However, as the researcher is on a time bound study leave
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from his employer and as there was no consistent commitment on part of the
Fire and Rescue service organizations, the ethnographic study approach was
not selected.
3.4.3 Appropriate Sample
The next important aspect of verification of the research process is the
appropriateness of the sample (human or non-human). The sample must
consist of participants who best represent or have knowledge of the research
topic. The appropriate sample ensures that ‘optimal quality data….to account
for all aspects of the phenomenon have been obtained’ (Morse et al, 2002).
Although Morse et al stated that seeking negative cases is essential, this
researcher believes that seeking a particular type of data can induce
researcher bias in the inquiry process. However, to ensure truly representative
data, an appropriate sample should be combined with a flexible method that
ensures all voices are included, and will bring both supportive and contrary
opinions. Therefore, the interviewees are encouraged to be candid during semi-
structured interviews. The selection of an appropriate sample also has impact
on data analysis, since it guarantees that the categories identified can be
replicated, which verifies the data, and ensures its comprehension and
completeness (Morse et al, 2002, p. 6).
3.4.4 Collecting & Analyzing Data Concurrently
Morse et al (2002), among other researchers, advocate the need of starting the
data analysis process as soon as the data collection starts. Morse et al defend
that collecting and analyzing data concurrently forms a mutual interaction
between what is known and what one needs to know. This pacing and the
iterative interaction between data and analysis is the essence of attaining
reliability and validity (Morse et al, 2002). Keeping the above requirement in
view, this researcher started the data analysis process in parallel with the data
collection. The concurrent data analysis process enabled the research
questions to be defined more precisely and also helped to narrow down the
literature review process.
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3.4.5 Thinking Theoretically
Morse et al (2002) explained that thinking theoretically means that ideas
emerging from the data are reconfirmed in new data; this gives rise to new
ideas that, in turn, must be verified in data already collected. Thinking
theoretically requires macro-micro perspectives, inching forward without making
cognitive leaps, constantly checking and rechecking, and building a solid
foundation (Morse et al, 2002).
To satisfy this condition, the themes were initially obtained from the literature
(details later in this chapter). More themes were developed from the data. Later
on, the themes identified from literature were confirmed by the data collected
for this research.
3.4.6 Theory Development
Morse et al (2002) explained that theory development is to move with
deliberation between a micro perspective of the data and a macro
conceptual/theoretical understanding. In this way, theory is developed through
two mechanisms: (1) as an outcome of the research process, rather than being
adopted as a framework to move the analysis along; and (2) as a template for
comparison and further development of the theory (p. 19). Morse et al argued
that valid theories are well developed and informed; they are comprehensive,
logical, parsimonious, and consistent (Glaser, 1978; Morse, 1997). To ensure
that the theory developed is valid the analysis process not only paid attention to
the superficial meaning of the data but also to the latent meaning, and
confirmed the link between the research outcome and the existing literature.
3.4.7 Theoretical Saturation
Guest et al (2006) noted that, in the literature, the term ‘theoretical saturation’ is
often used. However, the term is not properly defined and no sample size is
mentioned to help attain theoretical saturation. Guest et al showed resentment
for the insistence of journals that sample size should be justified through
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theoretical saturation, a phenomenon that is vaguely defined. Guest et al
quoted Morse (1995) as commenting that ‘saturation is the key to excellent
qualitative work…(however)…. there are no published guidelines or tests of
adequacy for estimating the sample size required to reach saturation’.
Therefore, Guest et al conducted a study just to determine how large the
sample size should be to achieve theoretical saturation. Saturation can be of
various types, with the most commonly written about form being ‘theoretical
saturation.’ Glaser & Strauss (1967) first defined this milestone as the point at
which ‘no additional data are being found whereby the (researcher) can
develop properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over
again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is
saturated...when one category is saturated, nothing remains but to go on to
new groups for data on other categories, and attempt to saturate these
categories also.’
Guest et al (2006) believe that theoretical saturation occurs when all of the
main variations of the phenomenon have been identified and incorporated into
the emerging theory. In this approach, the researcher deliberately searches for
extreme variations of each concept in the theory to exhaustion. They further
note that theoretical saturation is the point in data collection and analysis when
new information produces little or no change to the themes. Guest et al
concluded that in qualitative research interviews, data saturation occurs after
twelve interviews. Guest et al justified this claim through the Consensus theory
(Romney et al, 1986). The theory is based on the principle that experts tend to
agree more with each other (with respect to their particular domain of expertise)
than novices do and uses a mathematical proof to make its case, therefore
fewer interviews/cases are required to reach the saturation point (Romney et al,
1986). Romney et al (1986) found that small samples can be quite sufficient in
providing complete and accurate information within a particular cultural context,
as long as the participants possess a certain degree of expertise about the
domain of inquiry. Romney et al (1986) calculated that samples as small as 4
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individuals can render extremely accurate information with a high confidence
level (.999), if they possess a high degree of competence for the domain of
inquiry in question.
For this research, 20 FGCs were interviewed. This researcher can confirm the
findings of Morse (1995) that even after 6 interviews the themes were reaching
a point of saturation. A process reconstruction method (Nutt, 1983) is employed
to compare different cases and drew themes. The data analysis process started
just after the first interview. As this saturation cannot be reached if each new
participant is asked entirely new questions, interview questions were very much
the same for all interviewees.
3.5 RESEARCH METHOD
A collective case study approach is deemed appropriate for this research. It is
because very little research is done on the FGC’s decision making process in
nonroutine situations and the opinions of several experienced FGCs are
necessary to develop a generalizable theory from practice. The rationale
behind decisions made in each collected case is explored through interviews.
The following section will discuss why these methods are compatible with the
research questions set in the chapter 2. This section will also discuss: the
reasons for choosing firebrigades instead of Fire Service Colleges for data
collection, the difficulty in getting access to these brigades, and criteria for the
selection of the sample (this will also include description of the participants,
cases selected and related information).
3.5.1 Case Study Method
The selection of case study as a method for this research is based on some
thorough reasons, which will be discussed in the coming paragraphs. Case
study is a method, which is used for studying a phenomenon in its natural
setting, through employing multiple methods of data collection to gather
information from one or a few entities (people, groups, or organizations)
(Benbasat et al, 1987). To conduct case studies, the boundaries of the
78
phenomenon are not clearly evident at the outset of the research and no
experimental control or manipulation is used (p. 2).
One reason for the popularity of qualitative case study research is the type of
research questions that such studies can usually answers, i.e., the study of the
complexity of the phenomenon in detail; another reason is the complexity of the
analysis process of quantitative data (Benbasat et al, 1987, p. 1). Moreover,
there is the need for studying the development of the theory in its natural
context. The last factor emerges from the argument that Benbasat et al (1987)
quoted from Franz & Robey (1984), which suggests the use of idiographic
rather than nomothetic research strategies in theory development. Benbasat et
al defined idiographic research as an attempt to understand a phenomenon in
its context (p. 1). Although, in their article published in 1987, Benbasat et al
further defined idiographic research as the intensive investigation of a single
entity or a particular event, the study of multiple cases is now a common
observation (Stake, 2000).
Another reason for the use of case studies is expanding on the existing
literature. It is a common opinion of many researchers that ‘case research
is…appropriate for… problems…in which research and theory are at their early,
formative stages’ (Benbasat et al, 1987), and ‘sticky, practice based problems
where the experiences of the actors are important and the context of action is
critical’ (Benbasat et al, 1987). The literature on fireground command decision
making provides only a few theories for explaining the process of decision
making. Therefore, a case study approach can help expand the literature by
discovering more theories that, just like recognition primed theory, exists in
practice and need to be discovered and documented. The above statement is
congruent with the claim that a case research strategy is well-suited for
capturing the knowledge of practitioners and developing theories from it
(Benbasat et al, 1987).
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The role of cues in fireground command decision making can only be explored
if the commander’s viewpoint is considered. This required interaction between
this researcher and the actors outside the laboratory settings, in which the
actors would be free to express their opinion. The Fire Service Manual (1999)
in particular and the literature on command decision making in general favor
only one viewpoint, which was given many decades ago. After the initial
investigation, it was found that although the commanders recognize the
importance of cues in decision making, they do not seem to realize the
importance of ‘realizing the importance’ of cues and how they facilitate the
making of decisions throughout the decision making process. Through
meaningful interaction with commanders while investigating multiple cases, the
researcher is able to better explain his stance and this research can contribute
to an improvement in the way the commanders are trained today.
In summary, the reasons that influenced the use of case studies here are as
follows (Benbasat et al, 1987):
- The researcher can study a phenomenon in a natural setting, learn
about the state of the art, and generate theories from practice.
- The case method allows the researcher to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’
questions, that is, to understand the nature and complexity of the
processes taking place.
- A case approach is an appropriate way to research an area in which few
previous studies have been carried out.
Intrinsic, Instrumental and Collective case studies
Case studies can be classified as Intrinsic, Instrumental and Collective case
studies (Stakes, 2000). The time spent in studying a case or cases may vary,
but this dimension will not affect a study’s status as a case study (Stakes,
2000). A study is an intrinsic case study if the study is undertaken because ‘first
and last, one wants better understanding of their particular case’ (Stakes,
2000). Stakes noted that the case may or may not represent other similar
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situations; sometimes the researcher ignores the importance of the case if it is
studied to understand bigger phenomena and concentrates on one situation
itself. As Stakes mentioned ‘the purpose is not to come to understand some
abstract construct or generic phenomenon’. On the other hand, instrumental
case study is the study in which ‘a particular case is examined mainly to
provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization’ (Stakes, 2000). The
case provides support to learn and develop a theory; the case is investigated in
detail however the aim is to understand an external concept, which also lies in
the case (Stakes, 2000). Stakes (2000) further stated that ‘multiple case study/
collective case study is the form of case study when there is even less interest
in one particular case, a number of cases may be studied jointly in order to
investigate a phenomenon, population or general condition. It is instrumental
case study extended to several cases. Individual cases may or may not be
known in advance to manifest some common characteristics (Stakes, 2000).
The cases may be similar or dissimilar with redundancy and variety in each of
them is important (Stakes, 2000). The cases are chosen because it is believed
that understanding them will lead to better understanding and perhaps better
theorizing about a still larger collection of cases’ (Stakes, 2000).
The research questions set in this research can only be answered if several
cases are studied, because firefighting operations are very dynamic in nature.
Two very experienced commanders may have an entirely different set of
experiences. Therefore, to study the role of cues in detail in fireground
command decision making, several cases are investigated using the collective
case study approach.
To pursue the collective case study, the critical decision method (CDM) is used.
More details on CDM can be found in 3.6.1.
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3.5.2 Interviews
Stakes (2000) explained that case researchers greatly rely on subjective data
such as the testimony of participants and judgment of witness. Mostly, a case
study is the empirical study of human activity. The major questions are not
questions of opinion or feeling, but of the sensory experience. And the answers
are naturally delivered with description and interpretation, opinion and feeling,
all mixed together (Stakes, 2000). When the researchers are not there to
witness the activity themselves, they have to ask those who did experience it
through means such as interviews. In qualitative research, case studies are
very often used along with interviews. Myers (1997, 1999) and Myers &
Newman (2007) noted that qualitative interviews are used in qualitative
research of all kinds, for instance in case studies, in action research, in
grounded theory studies, and in ethnographies. Myers quoted Rubin & Rubin
(2005) as saying that qualitative interviews are like night goggles, ‘permitting us
to see that which is not ordinarily on view and examine that which is looked at
but seldom seen’ (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).
However, these statements are not enough to justify the use of interviews for
this data collection. There are several reasons why interviews were found
suitable for the research questions set in the earlier chapters. Those reasons
are discussed below.
Qualitative interviews enable researchers to discover new phenomena (Kvale,
1996).
Kvale explained that a qualitative research interview facilitates the development
of new knowledge. ‘An interview is literally an inter-view, an inter change of
views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest’
(Kvale, 1996) (p. 2). However, it is obvious that the research interview is not a
conversation between equal partners because the researcher defines and
controls the situation (Kvale, 1996). The researcher who introduces the topic of
the interview, also critically follows up on the subject's answers to his or her
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questions (Kvale, 1996). Therefore, It depends on the ability of the interviewer
to bring participants to a point where they are able to give relevant information
which they were unaware they had. This new knowledge builds on
conversation, since it is a basic mode of human interaction (Kvale, 1996) and
on the interpretation of that conversation in light of the existing literature. This
also points towards another advantage of the qualitative interviews which is
that they are instrumental in unveiling those phenomena which are so far
undiscovered in the literature and are a hidden concept for the practitioners.
For the last several decades, pattern recognition a top-down (Hoffman et al,
1995) approach is accepted as the only means of decision making on
fireground. The model is widely used in developing training material for new
firefighters and FGCs. It is this current research which is exploring and
highlighting the role of cues in making decisions in a bottom-up (Hoffman et al,
1995) fashion in fireground command decision making. This is only possible
when the researcher and the FGCs openly interact; retrospective interviews
about incidents that are not imaginary but which are actually experienced by
the commanders will enable the researcher to analyze how decisions were
made in nonroutine situations and how cues facilitated those decisions.
Interviews can advocate change in the social system in which interviewees
operate and ameliorate the conditions of the interviewee.
The sensitivity of the interview and its closeness to the subjects' lived world can
lead to knowledge that can be used to enhance human conditions (Kvale,
1996). The interviewer or researcher can bring the discovered phenomena to
the practitioners and the (related) world and, depending on the nature of the
phenomena practitioners contribute to changes in their practice. Since the
development of the recognition primed decision making model, no alternative
view of decision making is proposed in the literature on command decision
making. After the publication of this research, it is anticipated that Fire Service
Colleges and fire training institutions will realize the importance of highlighting
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the role of cues in the onsite fireground command decision making and will train
the FGCs for situations where pattern recognition can lead to biases in decision
making.
Data is produced through interaction between the researcher and the
practitioners (Kvale, 1996).
One of the reasons why the qualitative interview is employed is because the
data is produced through interaction between interviewee and the interviewer
(Kvale, 1996). The qualitative research interview has a unique potential for
obtaining access to and describing the lived everyday world. The attempt to
obtain an unprejudiced description entails a rehabilitation of the 'Lebenwelt',
i.e., the life world, in relation to the world of science (Kvale, 1996). The life
world is the world as it is encountered in everyday life and occurs in direct and
immediate experience independent of and prior to explanation (Kvale, 1996).
This is only possible when a researcher is able to examine the limitations and
points of improvements closely, and get the opinion of the practitioners on how
things can be changed for the good.
Interviews elicit descriptions of specific situations and action sequences, not
general opinions (Kvale, 1996).
Through interviews this researcher was able to delineate the action sequence
that is followed in making decisions in nonroutine situations. This task required
full participation from the FGCs; therefore, to prepare commanders about a
rigorous questioning prior to interviews, cases were collected using Critical
Decision Method (CDM) (Klein et al, 1986). Through CDM, FGCs were made to
recall the details of the incident, days and weeks prior to the interview about
that incident. This way the interviewee was able to recall the minute details of
the decision making process, which was the purpose of this inquiry. However,
the exact interview probes were not disclosed to the interviewee before the
interview to ensure spontaneous response.
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Qualitative interviews also enable discovering a multitude of views of the
participants (Kvale, 1996).
The knowledge obtained is not objective, but subjective in the sense that it
depends too much on the subjects interviewed. It is in fact strength of the
interview conversation to capture the multitude of subjects' views of a theme
and to picture a manifold and controversial human world (Kvale, 1996). Since
commanders mostly learn different firefighting techniques and tricks on the
fireground, differing views cannot be ruled out. However, such differing
information is also very important to understand how the decision making
process changes under slightly different but globally same situations. The
qualitative interviews are appropriate to capture such details, because they are
flexible enough to provide access to different meanings, perspectives, and
interpretations and embrace individual differences through their sensitivity to
diverse forms of expression (Willig, 2001). It should be noted that each
commander was not asked the exact same number of questions. The questions
were modified in wording, new probes were added or existing probes were
removed on the spot in response to the incident and the interviewee’s
knowledge.
Semi-structured interviews are conducted for exploring each critical incident
obtained for this research. More details on semi-structured interviews can be
found in 3.6.2.
3.5.3 Criteria for Selecting Participating Brigades
Two of the few very large brigades of the UK, i.e., Nottingham Fire & Rescue
service and Lincoln Fire & Rescue service, agreed to participate in this
research study. A reason for selecting only large firebrigades is that small
firebrigades normally have a staff of retain firefighters, which work on part time
basis. Firebrigade departments were selected for this research based on the
criterion of selecting only experienced participants for this research, which
mostly corresponds to full time staff. Although Fire Service Colleges could have
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been contacted as well, and this would have brought relatively more
participants, they are usually less experienced when compared to on duty and
fully trained commanders (who usually serve as trainers in the Fire Service
Colleges). Another reason for conducting the study in the fire departments is
the easy access to material related to the cases studied, such as fire service
manual and post incident debriefs. Besides this, the researcher has noted that
on-duty FGCs working in large cities give more practical reasons for their
actions, i.e., they give answers, which reflect their experience.
Some large organizations (such as airports) maintain their own small fleet of
firefighters, but fully operational commanders working in urban areas
experience critical incidents (that satisfy the requirement of this research)
relatively more often when compared to firefighters working for specific
organizations. Being a part of a large firebrigade, the commanders also
routinely go through training on near-real scenarios and learn from other FGCs
in formal as well as informal meetings. This keeps their experience bank fresh.
3.5.4 Gaining Access
As mentioned above, the brigades contacted are some of the biggest brigades
in the UK. Locating the right person to facilitate access to FGCs was very
difficult at first. The researcher made several calls to the office of Nottingham
Fire & Rescue Service (NFRS), as it was contacted first. The receptionist took
those initial calls since the researcher didn’t know who is the right person to
contact. The researcher explained to the receptionist that he was a researcher
and wanted to interview the FGCs. The responses to the first few calls were
that the receptionists (different every time) took the mobile number of the
researcher and promised to call back after the right person had been identified.
However, no calls were returned after these commitments. Breakthrough came
after the researcher was able to talk to a senior fireman who had served as
FGC at Leicestershire Fire & Rescue service. The talk was purely informal, but
the outcome of that talk was the identification of the right department which
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could facilitate access to the commanders. The department was the Quality
Assurance Department.
The Quality Assurance Department (QAD) is mainly concerned with recording
post-incident debriefings and using them for the training of FGCs and
firefighters. The department head at the NFRS was contacted and the initial
research aims were discussed with him over the phone. It was explained to the
contact person that only commanders who have at least 7 years or more
command experience and have a large incident that they have attended as
Incident Commander to discuss would be invited to take part in the study. A
formal email was then sent to him to request participants for the research. The
email had a letter attached to it explaining the emerging aims of the research.
The aims of the initial interviews were to understand the decision making
process of FGCs by interacting with them. As a literature review is an ongoing
process, the interviews and interaction with the commanders played a pivotal
role in guiding a more specific literature review. The department head
forwarded the letter inviting research participants who fulfilled the above-
mentioned criteria. The voluntary participants then directly contacted the
researcher. The interviews at the NFRS were conducted over a period of nearly
5 months. The long duration was due to the tight daily schedule of the
commanders.
Soon after the completion of interviews at the NFRS, efforts were initiated to
contact Lincoln Fire & Rescue Service (LFRS) for volunteers. After contacting
the head of the QAD, the researcher followed the same procedure mentioned
above. The interviews at LFRS were conducted in relatively short time,
compared to the time spent on gathering data from NFRS. At least 10
participants were invited from each participating brigade. Over all, the response
of the brigades was very encouraging. Commanders were friendly and were
punctual in their commitment. Only few commanders backed out after agreeing
to participate, because of their personal commitments.
87
3.5.5 Criteria for Selecting Participants
As mentioned before the main criteria for the selection of participants were
number of years of experience and experience of handling large fires (i.e., fires
engaging minimum 5 fire appliances). The participants had at least seven years
of experience in the command position. The participants were mostly in there
thirties; only one commander was in her twenties. However, no compromise
was made on the selection criteria. This commander is adequately
experienced, is operational, i.e., attends fire incidents regularly, and is also
working in the training center as a trainer. Some commanders were over 40
years old. One commander who was interviewed for this research was retiring
within few days of the interview. This commander voluntarily invited the
interviewer to interview him again. However, the two separate interviews are
recorded as a single interview.
The other criterion for selecting participants was that they must have a large
incident to discuss, which they have handled as an FGC. When brigades were
approached for the purpose of inviting participants for this study, several
commanders volunteered who had more than 7 years of command experience
however they had no experience of handling large fires. Their experience was
mostly in handling small fires since they were deputed in small towns with low
numbers of fire incidents. Those commanders were not invited to participate in
this research. Participants were not paid for their participation in this research.
Given below is a list of details about the commanders; names are deliberately
omitted.
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Incident
Number Age Sex
Number of years as
FGC Current Role
Date of reported
incident Casualties Cause Brigade
1 39 Male 8 Watch Manager Jan-09 None Misuse of electrics Nottingham
2 43 Male 12 Temporary WatchManager Apr-07 None Unknown Nottingham
3 49 Male 27 Station Manger Dec-08 None Arson Nottingham
4 27 Female Approx. 7 Station Manger Oct-09 None Acetylene cylinder explosion Nottingham
5 47 Male 15 Group Manager 1990 None Unknown Nottingham
6 39 Male 7 Watch Manager Not cited None Deliberate Ignition/ Arson Nottingham
7 44 Male 7 Watch Manager May-09 None Deliberate Ignition/ Arson Nottingham
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8 39 Male 13 Station Manger May-08 None Tumble Dryer Fault Nottingham
9 35 Male 9 Station Manger Aug-09 None Hanger fire Lincoln
10 39 Male 15 Group Manager 2009 None Hanger fire Lincoln
11 42 Male 13 Group Manager Jun-08 1F Candles Lincoln
12 42 Male 19 Group Manager Jun-05 None Unknown Lincoln
13 42 Male 14 Area Manager Apr-08 None Electrical Circuit failure Lincoln
14 54 Male 25 Area Manager Jun-10 None Fault on Electrical Intake anddistribution board Lincoln
15 42 Male 17 Station Manger Jun-09 1F Unknown Nottingham
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16 41 Male 8 Station Manger Feb-10 None Petrol vapor explosion Lincoln
17 53 Male 8 Watch Manager Jul-06 1M/1F Smoking Materials Nottingham
18 40 Male 7 Temporary WatchManager Jun-09 1 FF Accidental Nottingham
19 53 Male 23 Response Manger Not cited None Unknown Lincoln
20 45 Male 17+ Group Manager Not cited None Unknown Lincoln
Table 9: List of Participants
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3.6 DATA COLLECTION
Qualitative case studies provide a chance for researchers to spend time with
actors and closely study the operations of the case, while reflecting and revising
descriptions and meaning of what is going on. Naturalistic, ethnographic,
phenomenological caseworkers seek to see what is natural in happenings, in
settings in expression and value (Stakes, 2000). Various methods are available
for conducting case studies. Critical decision method was selected to pursue
the case study research in this study. Following section will introduce the data
collection methods used in this research.
3.6.1 Critical Decision Method
This research uses critical decision method (CDM) for gathering data on critical
fire incidents. This method is widely used for investigating the questions of the
form set in the earlier chapters. Critical Decision Method is based on protocol
analysis, which is generally applicable to naturalistic tasks (Klein et al, 1989).
The CDM has been used in several studies specifically on the fireground
command decision making (Klein et al, 1986; Calderwood et al, 1987), as well
as generally in the literature on naturalistic decision making. The CDM is useful
in gathering records on past incidents of significant nature; the method is
employed because of the rarity of critical incidents and the risks involved in
being onsite while a major incident is under way (Klein et al, 1989).
CDM shares many features with other knowledge eliciting methods, especially
those related to Flanagan’s (1954) critical incident technique; however, it also
offers some specific features that distinguish it from them (Klein et al, 2002).
The CDM, like all critical incident techniques, focuses on nonroutine cases.
Incidents that are nonroutine or difficult are usually the richest source of data
about the capabilities of highly skilled personnel, which are not easily visible in
routine cases. Klein et al (2002) believe that researchers usually obtain more
specific and useful information when they probe concrete and nonroutine
events, rather than when they ask about general rules and procedures. An
interesting side effect of this approach is that the cases themselves become an
92
important source of data for suggesting future research or testing system
capabilities (Klein et al, 1989).
Klein et al (1989) explained that the CDM applies a set of cognitive probes to
actual nonroutine incidents that required expert judgment or decision making.
Once the incident is selected, the interviewer asks for a brief description of the
decision making process followed during the incident. Later on, a semi-
structured interview format is used to probe different aspects of the decision
making process.
Following, is the core procedure used for gathering critical incident reports
employed in this research:
Core procedure adapted from Klein et al (1989)
1- Criterion for selection of Incident: Nonroutine incidents that engaged 5 or
more fire appliances are selected for this research.
2- Unstructured Incident Account: The commanders were sent a critical
incident reporting form (see Appendix A) when they agreed to participate in
the research. The form was sent along with a covering letter explaining the
aims of the research. The officers were required to write down details of the
incident and their own actions from the moment the fire call alerted them.
This activity stimulated their memory about the details of the event. The
FGCs were required to elaborate on the context of the incident, because
the context has a strong effect on the way events unfold. For Barker (1968),
context or environment select and shape people, thus, they are seen as
having a coercive influence and may appear as constraints (Parsons &
Shils, 1951), or as the emotional state of a person modifying his or her
behavior (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974). Moreover, Klausner (1971) suggests
that the environment can only be defined by or with reference to and never
independent of an individual. As qualitative researchers have strong
expectations that the reality perceived by people inside and outside the
case will be social, cultural, situational and contextual, they want the
interactivity of functions and contexts to be described in as much detail as
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possible (Stakes, 2000). Therefore, the context must be described even if
evidence of influence is not found.
3- After the incident had been related, the interviewer proceeded to
reconstruct the account in the form of a timeline that established the
sequence (and if possible the duration) of each event reported by the
officer.
4- During the timeline construction, specific decisions (decision point) were
identified for further probing.
5- Each decision point was probed during face-to-face interviews.
It must be mentioned here that 2 commanders chose to speak about different
parts of the same incident. The incident was of a very large nature; a hanger
was completely engulfed in the fire. Three levels of expertise were involved as
the fire progressed. This researcher was able to interview the initial commander
and the commander who subsequently took charge from the initial commander.
The incident, which was discussed by these 2 commanders, is considered as 2
separate incidents because one of the commanders handled the situation
before the fire had fully developed. At that time the risks were still very high,
because the fire was progressing towards an area where propane cylinders and
plastic materials were stored. The aim at this point was to prevent the fire from
spreading. The second commander took charge when the fire had already
reached the cylinder storage area and when the plastic material was fully
involved in the fire. From then on, the aims became to ‘surround’ the fire and to
avoid it spreading to adjoining structures.
3.6.2 Semi-structured Interviews
The researcher had initially considered sending out questionnaires with open-
ended questions. But it was felt that during face-to-face interaction, the expert
and interviewer could discuss aspects, which were not planned from before,
therefore semi-structured interviews were employed. Qualitative interviewing is
divided into 2 broad types: the totally un-structured and the semi-structured
interview (Bryman, 2004). While the first allows maximum freedom to the
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interviewees and little control of the interviewer over the interview process, it
does not ensure that certain issues will be covered or that the interviewee will
be inclined to talk, as they may limit their responses to the simple facts (Corbin
& Morse, 2003). However semi-structured interviews are known for their
flexibility. The ease with which the probes or questions can be designed and
refined in semi-structured interviews is the most important reason for their
selection.
The development of the interview guide was based on these basic sources:
literature, past research and accumulating interview data. There were some
alterations made to the interview guide during fieldwork. Most of the changes in
the interview guide were made on the spot, depending on the personality,
educational background, knowledge and the communication style of
interviewees. This is aligned with Kvale’s (1996) argument about qualitative
interviews being a craft and depending largely on decisions made during the
process. Because questions were derived from theoretical concepts their
perception by some interviewees seemed difficult, as the initial interviews
indicated. Similar to the work of Loukidou (2008) work, some of the concepts
under investigation were more abstract and needed to be altered or
paraphrased in more conceivable terms. Attention was given to limit any
discrepancies between the primary theoretical concept and the subsequent
question. Combining questions and going back and forth to issues that had
been already discussed achieved this. So, semi-structured interviews were
chosen in order to allow the interviewees a degree of freedom to explain their
thoughts and to highlight areas of particular interest and expertise that they felt
they had, as well as to enable certain responses to be questioned in greater
depth, in particular to bring out and resolve apparent contradictions.
A practical benefit of following this form of interviewing is that these interviews
reveal certain issues that the researcher had not thought of before. For
example, during the interviews for this research, an interviewee voluntarily
talked about the change of dress code and how it has made some positive and
negative differences in the way decisions are made today and in the past. It
was a very important piece of information, which the researcher did not realize
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until the commander talked about it. Therefore, after that interview the
researcher asked a question about improvements in dress code and its effect
on decision making from every subsequent interviewee.
3.7 DATA ANALYSIS
The main data analysis method used for this research is thematic analysis. The
selection is made on the basis of several factors, which will be discussed later
on in this section. This section also talks about a very important factor of data
analysis, i.e., the unit of analysis selected for this research.
3.7.1 Unit of Analysis
Before analyzing the data, it is necessary to decide that what will be the unit of
analysis for this research. The unit of analysis is a central concept in connection
with understanding, preparing and implementing a case study (Yin, 2003;
Patton, 2002). The key issue in selecting and making decisions about
appropriate unit of analysis is to decide what one wants to say something about
at the end of the study (Patton, 2002). According to Berg (2001) the unit of
analysis is what the case study is focusing on, such as an individual, a group,
an organization, a city, and so forth. The unit of analysis is different from the
‘case’. The case can be divided into layers that surround the unit of analysis,
which is the ‘heart’ of the case (Grünbaum, 2007). The unit of analysis is on a
lower abstraction level than the case layers, and constitutes specific information
about the unknown that the research wants to enlighten (Grünbaum, 2007).
Figure 3: A Conceptual Understanding of Unit of Analysis and The Case (Grünbaum,
2007)
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There can be several ways to look at unit of analysis-case relationship, which
are:
1- Many cases – one unit of analysis in each case: also called first level
summation design, because a researcher adds together the units of
analysis.
2- Many units of analysis – one case: also called embedded design,
because the units of analysis are ingrained in only one case.
3- Many cases – many units of analysis: also called second level
summative design, because the researcher adds both the units of
analysis and the cases.
4- One case – one unit of analysis (also called congenital design).
Before deciding on which one of the above mentioned types is applicable in this
research lets discuss what the possible unit of analyses are. There are several
possibilities available to us; one possibility is to consider an individual incident
as a case, another possibility is to take an individual FGC as a case; a third
possibility is to consider a firebrigade as a case. For this research, individual
FGCs were considered as cases, i.e., the first level of summation design is
employed here. This decision is based on the following particular reasons:
1- The aim of this research is to understand the decision making process of
the in nonroutine situations. What aim is not is to understand how a
nonroutine situation unfolds; therefore a nonroutine situation itself cannot
be a case.
2- As mentioned before unit of analysis constitutes specific information
about the unknown that the research wants to enlighten. A FGC is the
only actor who makes decisions on the fireground. This makes the FGC
a hub of information about the phenomenon under study in this research.
3- The FGCs in all firebrigades of the United Kingdom are trained to the
same level; they all have the same expertise. Selection of a firebrigade
as a case is not suitable because the aim is not to compare how
differently the FGCs at firebrigade ‘a’ behave in nonroutine situations
when compared to the FGCs at firebrigade ‘b’. The aims of the research
shift the focus from the organizations’ operating procedure to the
individual’s operating procedure.
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3.7.2 Thematic Analysis
Tesch (1990) organized various ways of data analysis into three approaches.
The first one is interested in how language in data is used and what the words
lead to, i.e., the language approach (Dey, 1993). The second approach is
termed interpretative approach and is concerned with discovering the
phenomenon and its relation with the actors of the context in which that
phenomenon is found (Dey, 1993). The third one is related to discovering how
different phenomena work together (Dey, 1993). The present research follows
the second approach because the motive of this study is to recognize a
phenomenon, which this researcher believes already exists in the environment,
and the only way to discover it is through direct interaction with actors and
through interpreting their opinion for and against the phenomenon under
investigation. Due to this attempt, the development of theory is certain, also
benefiting the literature (on fireground commander decision making). The
method used for data analysis is thematic analysis, which is not only
appropriate for this research but is also frequently used in this type of research.
Braun & Clark (2006) quoted Boyatzis (1998) and Roulston (2001) about
thematic analysis in that this is the most widely used and least acknowledged
mode of qualitative data analysis. Braun and Clark also revealed that most
researchers do not explicitly acknowledge the use of this method in research or
they use alternative terminology for it, such as content analysis. Further,
Holloway & Todres (2003) believe that ‘thematizing meanings’ is one of a few
shared generic skills across qualitative analysis (as quoted in Braun & Clark,
2006). The flexibility of thematic analysis is one of the reasons for its adoption
in this research. Another reason for the selection of this analysis method is
because data for the current research is in the form of interview text and
incident record text. Thematic analysis in its several forms is a tested method
for this type of data; moreover, it is a method used in a variety of naturalistic
research which has interpreted the data for the development of theories (such
as Klein et al, 1986).
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Braun & Clark (2006), while quoting Boyatzis (1998), defined thematic analysis
as a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns or themes within
data. This method can be used to discreetly organize and describe data without
hiding important details. The method can be used to interpret various aspects of
data as well. Themes are the terms that capture something important about the
data in relation to the research question, and represent some level of patterned
response or meaning within the data set (Braun & Clark, 2006). Themes
emerge not only from the literature but also from the data. The analysis process
for this research started with an initial set of literature driven themes. New
themes emerged over time from the data. The process of theme development
and how a theme is identified is discussed in the next section.
3.7.3 Process of Themes Development
Many data analysis tools in the form of software are available today; during
research at the School of Business and Economics, researchers are trained to
use such software however, many researchers prefer to go through the data
manually. This is not surprising because these data analysis tools cannot
understand the importance of the context in which a line of text is embedded; or
in other words, the software decontextualizes the important pieces of
information. For the current research, sensitivity to the context of the
information is necessary; this is one of the reasons why this researcher
analyzed the data manually. Manual analysis of data made the process difficult
but this also made the researcher completely understand his data. After the text
from critical incident records and the interviews were categorized into themes
on paper, a single Excel 2003 work book of 3 sheets was used to store this
work electronically and to save the researcher from going through the printed
papers over and over again.
Braun & Clark (2006) explained that themes or patterns within the data could be
identified in one of two primary ways in thematic analysis: in an inductive or
‘bottom-up’ way, or in a theoretical or deductive or ‘top-down’ way. An inductive
approach means the themes identified are strongly linked to the data
themselves (Patton, 1990); this form of thematic analysis bears some similarity
to grounded theory. Braun and Clark further explained that in this approach, if
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the data have been collected specifically for the research, the themes identified
may bear little relation to the specific questions that were asked of the
participants. They noted that in this approach themes would also not be driven
by the researcher’s theoretical interest in the area or topic. Inductive analysis is
therefore a process of coding the data without trying to fit it into a preexisting
coding frame, or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions and, in this sense,
this form of thematic analysis is data-driven (Braun & Clark, 2006). Braun &
Clark explained that, in contrast, a ‘theoretical’ or deductive thematic analysis
would tend to be driven by the researcher’s theoretical or analytic interest in the
area, and is thus more explicitly analyst driven. This form of thematic analysis
tends to provide less of a rich description of the data overall, and more of a
detailed analysis of some aspect of the data. Here this researcher has used the
theoretical or deductive thematic analysis.
Braun & Clark (2006) explained during data analysis it is also decided at what
‘level’ themes are to be identified: at a semantic or explicit level, or at a latent or
interpretative level (Boyatzis, 1998). Latent thematizing is used in this research,
because semantic thematizing is more concerned with surface meaning of the
words/text and latent thematizing is concerned with the detail behind each
word.
As mentioned above, in this research, themes are identified from two sources;
one source is the literature and the other is the data itself. The themes were
determined from the following set of literature: literature on fireground incident
command decision making, literature on decision making in naturalistic settings,
and literature on human information processing, cognition, judgment and
perception. The literature on fireground incident command decision making is
limited; most literature is based on or are the extension of popular theories in
command decision making. Generally the literature available on naturalistic
decision making (which covers professionals such as pilots, naval officers,
armed forces personal and doctors) is extensive. However, the research on the
actual decision making process of these professionals is also meager. Mostly,
the literature broadly explains how decisions are made. Literature on subjects
such as human information processing, cognition, judgment and perception is
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very broad, therefore one has to carefully select what applies in naturalistic
decision making and what applies in rational decision making. Together these
three streams were able to provide initial themes for the analysis of data. More
themes emerged during the analysis process.
3.8 ROLE OF METHODOLOGY IN DATA ANALYSIS
The data analysis rigorously follows the methodology presented in this chapter.
The methodology is composed of three large components: the collection of
cases that portrays the decision making in non-routine fire incidents, the
interviews to further probe specific instances in each case, and lastly, the
development of themes that will underlie the decision making model. As
mentioned before, the data analysis started as soon as the data collection has
started. Process reconstruction is used to identify the underlying processes
(Nutt, 1983) and thus the themes. Process reconstruction consisted of following
three key activities:
1- The first is to use interviews with the FGCs who are intimately involved
with the phenomenon under study for identifying critical steps, determine
the order in which these steps are carried out, and fit sequences of steps
into activities.
2- The second step is to isolate these activities undertaken to make
decisions.
3- The third is to analyze the content of cases with similar and dissimilar
activities to distill these compliance-related steps into tactics and to
break tactics down into categories. Lastly, to classify these categories, a
framework is imposed that emerged from an examination and
comparison of these cases.
This process is similar to the approach used by Soelberg (1967), Bower (1970),
Witte (1972), Mintzberg et al (1976), and others who examined the raw data
and used intuition to organize decision activities into patterns that describe the
nature and sequence of key phases and within-phase steps of decision making.
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3.9 LIMITATIONS
- The FGCs were expected to discuss only the real critical incidents.
Some of the critical incidents discussed by commanders were very
popular and were verifiable from public records such as newspaper and
Youtube videos. However, some of the critical incidents were not popular
enough to appear in media therefore there is no other way to establish
their authenticity.
- Due to the inconsistent contact with the different firebrigades, the
researcher was dependent on discovering about the operations of the
commanders solely through the interviews and written reports. No
opportunity was presented to view the commanders in action, either in
live incidents or during training sessions.
- Small fires involving less than 5 appliances are not included in the data
gathered for this research.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the data analysis for the development of theory referred
to as ‘cue-centric model of the FGC’s decision making process.’ This chapter
comprises of three main parts. The first part, supported by the data collected for
this research, will provide a definition of the FGC’s decision making process
and its structure which are applicable in both routine and nonroutine situations.
The second part will introduce the main themes emerging from the data; these
themes will constitute the resulting decision making process model at the micro
level. The themes identified from the research data and literature, are
discussed in detail. Original excerpts from the interview text will be included as
and when required to explain a point. The third part of this chapter presents
those directions that are identified from the data collected for this research in
which more research is required. For the convenience of the reader, each
‘interview’ excerpt is accompanied by the serial number of the quoted FGC.
4.1 EFFECT OF INVESTIGATING LARGE FIRES
The context of this research is large fires engaging minimum 5 fire appliances.
Such fires are categorized as FDR1. The reason why such fires are selected is
because they are normally of big size and may involve casualties. Each fire
appliance has at least a crew of 4-7 firefighters (FF), which means that 20-35
FF are normally present on the incident ground. The large fire, the presence of
so many FF and firefighting equipment and resources means that a commander
is stretched to the limits of his/her abilities, and the risks to the victims, FFs,
property, resources and equipments is great. This in turn brings out the less
than ordinary behavior of commanders, which is not evident in routine fire calls.
Another reason for selection of such fires is the involvement of multiple
command levels. As the number of appliances, crewmembers and resources
increase on a fire ground, the command levels also increase with more senior
commanders joining the operation. Such as, consider this excerpt: A senior
commander with over 30 years of experience said that (excerpt from the
interview of FGC 3): The criteria for me being mobilized is when 3 fire crews attend an
incident, for the purpose of undertaking performance monitoring. The same commander
while discussing the selected critical incident said he received a (excerpt from
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the interview of FGC 3): message that said ‘Factory fire, make pumps 3, Fenton
Road’…..While still traveling at 18:48 a further assistance message was sent; ‘Make pumps 4,
Aerial Ladder Platform required’. This now meant that my role on arrival would be that of
incident commander…. I made pumps 10… I made pumps 12… I handed over to a senior
officer and I was placed as the operations commander to direct the fire-fighting on the incident
ground. This FGC was the second commander to reach the incident scene. Upon
reaching the incident scene, he took charge of the incident from the initial FGC
and made him ‘operations commander’. Later during this incident, an even
higher ranking FGC replaced this commander. As evident from this example, a
FDR1 type fire can soon involve multiple command levels, dozens of fire
appliances and tens of FFs.
Irrespective of the size of the fire, there is always a single FireGround Incident
Commander on the incident scene; although (s)he is supported by
crewmembers such as operations commander and sector commanders, but still
that individual commander monitors all the decisions and approves them and is
responsible for all the decisions made on the fireground. This places a high
professional demand on the commander and brings out the rarest of the
cognitive actions that a commander has either learned from training or from
experience.
4.2 WHAT IS CONSIDERED AS A CUE & AS PATTERN IN DATA
ANALYSIS?
As this research is an attempt to highlight the role of cues in decision making,
therefore, it is necessary to specify that what information obtained from FGCs
discussed in the research data are considered as cues. For this data analysis,
the information, which the FGCs were refereeing to as signs or symptoms and
which was congruent with the description of cues presented in chapter 2 are
considered as cues, examples are, smoke, neutral plane, wind direction,
density of smoke etc. Some examples of patterns are backdraft, or flashover or
a scene, which has an exact same resemblance to a situation, which has been
seen before (or simply a Déjà vu of a ‘definite’ event).
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4.3 DEFINITION & PHASES OF THE FGC’s DECISION MAKING
PROCESS
Definition of the FGC’s decision making process
The definition of decision making process as adopted by Klein et al (1986) is
visited again. It is because after a careful analysis of literature and the research
data, it is found that the decision making process on fireground is not just about
selecting an appropriate option from many for solving a problem assuming that
the problem is already found as proposed by Klein et al (1986). From the
interviews it is found that commanders spend more time in identifying and
defining the undesired instance, which is producing inappropriate output and
causing the occurrence of several more such instances; these instances are
problems (Nutt, 1984). Options to solve a problem are strongly related to the
understanding of a problem that needs a solution. Often this step of identifying
what the problem is greatly reduces the time and effort required to find an
appropriate option for solving the problem by bringing forward only one most
appropriate option. However in many other cases more than one option are
available to solve a problem; in those circumstances intelligence on the
problem, situation awareness and satisfactory performance of a course of
action with respect to the current situation assist the decision makers to reduce
the number of options for solving that problem.
This research proposes that:
Decision making on a fireground is a process that involves identifying and describing a problem
and describing the uniqueness of it which may distinguish the problem from its previously
experienced form(s); it also involves selecting an appropriate option from a set of 1 or more
options which can solve the current form of the problem.
As opposed to Klein et al’s (1986) belief, it is found that the set of only 1
alternative is perfectly normal; there is no necessity that the set should always
begin with 2 or more options from which 1 should be selected.
The aim achieved from this account of the term decision making in the context
of firefighting is to recognize the importance of the problem identification phase
in fireground command decision making and showing that the definition of
decision making which is accepted for so many years (see Nutt, 1984) is
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applicable in this area of research as well. Unfortunately, the importance of
problem recognition is not as highlighted in literature on fireground command
decision making as it should be; most often, discussions on decision making
starts from the point when a problem is already identified.
The description of the term decision making also enabled this research to
propose a framework of phases of the FGC’s decision making process. This
framework is presented next.
Phases of the FGCs’ decision making process for routine and nonroutine
situations
One of the findings from the data is that the FGCs follow 2 ‘distinguishable’ but
cyclic phases for solving problems in both routine and nonroutine situations,
which are problem recognition and solution generation. The terms problem
recognition and solution generation used here are broad in their meaning.
Problem recognition phase starts from the moment an FGC (decision maker) starts receiving
initial bits of information. These fragments of information help build an awareness of the
situation. Activities such as 360-survey of the incident ground, paying attention to the details
(individual cues), identifying goals, assessing the possibility and probability of loss,
opportunities, setting hypotheses explaining the current situation and to explain how the current
occurrence of the problem differs from its past occurrences, building a larger picture by
combining all pieces of information and anticipating the future, make up the problem recognition
phase. Together these elements help a commander to mentally visualize a situation and build a
mental model. A course of action is also prescribed during this phase however it is evaluated in
the next phase.
As soon as a commander is able to define what the problem is, (s)he then proceeds to find
and/or test a course of action to solve that problem. The solution generation phase includes
identifying 1 or more course of actions, serial mental simulation and sensitivity analysis of them
to test their appropriateness before implementation, selecting 1 ‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1960)
course of action, implementation of the course of action and getting feedback. It is not
necessary that all the subprocesses mentioned above are present in one instance of solution
generation phase. Sometimes, the problem is of a routine nature therefore the commander is
completely confident of what (s)he is doing thus they exclude some of these subprocesses.
106
During the decision making process, at all times a decision maker is looking for
more information, which is an on-going process. Normally an FGC is able to
find solutions to the problems at hand without much difficulty. However, if the
FGC is not satisfied with the finally selected solution or more information is
coming in or if the problem is not solved after the implementation of the course
of action, then (s)he goes back to the initial phase, i.e., problem recognition and
improve their understanding of the situation by including new or overlooked
(peripheral) information.
Figure 4: Framework of Phases of the FGC’s Decision Making Process
Perhaps an example in an FGC’s own words can make things more clear. As
this framework is presented for both routine and nonroutine situations therefore
the example below is not selected to represent only routine or only nonroutine
situation. (excerpt from the interview of FGC 2)…. on arrival we were met by a large
(50x50 meter site) building, issuing a large amount of smoke….My 2IC did an initial
investigation to the rear of the property as I deployed crews to get a water-feed in and extend
hose reels to the rear of the property. The 2IC confirmed that the entry to the rear of the
property was a suitable access point for an initial offensive deployment of two breathing
apparatus wearers with a hose reel. The remainder of the building had been secured with ‘site-
ex’ steel shuttering to doors and windows. I allowed my 2IC to supervise the first two BA
wearers at rear of the property as I surveyed the perimeter of the building; I sent an informative
message to control via my incident command point and then requested a Rescue Tender (fifth
appliance) because we needed to remove the ‘site-ex’ boarding up material. As I surveyed the
building at a distance of twenty meters and giving me a good overview of the site I noticed that
smoke had started to exit from around the shuttering on the doors and windows, the color of the
smoke was dark and increasing in volume. This triggered me to order the withdrawal of the two
breathing apparatus wearers who I perceived from the change in conditions to be at risk. As I
went to the rear of the property and after radioing my 2IC I was greeted by the two BA wearers
having already withdrawn because they had made a professional judgment within the building
that conditions were worsening. I was both satisfied and relieved at this decision.
Solution GenerationProblem Recognition Leads to
May lead to
Incoming
Data
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As evident from the example, the incident commander initially assessed the
situation and gathered necessary cues; the presence of dark smoke
progressively increasing in volume triggered the FGC to think of what does
these cues/signs mean and what problems they may cause. He knew that
these signs are an indication of a backdraft. The commander’s immediate
concern or you may say the problem at hand at that point was the safety of the
crewmembers. The commander knew that the building is empty with no savable
property and lives therefore here safety of crewmembers should take
precedence over any other problem. He made a quick decision to withdraw the
crewmembers entering the building. As evident from this example, the
commander made the decision in distinguishable phases, i.e., gathering cues
and understanding what the problem is (problem recognition – from ‘as I surveyed
…’) and deciding upon a course of action (solution generation – from ‘this trigger
me to order …’). During the solution generation phase, the commander obviously
didn’t have the time to gather several options and select the most appropriate
one; he instead selected first satisfactory (not perfect) solution. The selection of
first satisfactory solution makes the decision making process rapid, however,
possibility of several other options to solve a problem cannot be ruled out (other
options would have been using water spray to cool the upper layer of hot gases
in the room thus reducing the chances of backdraft etc). Another conclusion
that can be drawn from this example is that it is not just the FGCs who follow
this cycle (problem recognition-solution generation) but the firefighters fighting
the fire also follow the same cycle. As one of the commanders interviewed said
(excerpt from the interview of FGC 8): ‘DRA (dynamic risk assessment) is the job of
each and every firemen on the incident scene’. Dynamic risk assessment is a technical
term used in the fireground command decision making, which refer to the
continuous situation assessment through information search.
Now here is what also happened on the same incident ground. The reason of
citing this example from the same incident is to prove that the FGCs follow
distinguishable problem recognition-solution generation pair not once but
several times during the same incident. The example will also show that the
solution generation phase can take the process back to the initiating phase, i.e.,
problem recognition. (excerpt from the interview of FGC 2) The tactic I wanted
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employing was to make access through the front doors and for a BA crew to enter with a main
jet whilst a Positive Pressure Ventilation fan (PPV) was directed into the premises in front of the
crew. This tactic … would effectively push the products of combustion away from the BA crew
thus reducing the risk from the environment they were entering …. I observed fire fighters
creating access at the front door and the front door being breached. The BA crews were
donned and preparing to enter; the PPV crew were training the fan away from the door .…. The
fire and exhaust products pushed out of the property showing all the signs and symptoms of a
backdraft, the member of the BA team was not paying attention as the situation deteriorated. I
observed many fire fighters not reacting to this scenario so I strolled up and grasped the jet in
the BA team wearer’s hand and applied a spray from the main jet to push the advancing plume
back. You can see that the FGC was paying attention to all the symptoms; he
found that there is a mounting problem of backdraft, which he noticed through
the appearance of signs and symptoms of it. The FGC’s first intervention to
fight the possibility of backdraft through the use of PPV didn’t prove successful.
Therefore he revised the initial mental model and updated the ‘possibility of
backdraft’ with the ‘actual appearance of backdraft’ (i.e., following problem
recognition phase); this then led him to decide to cool down the approaching
plume of smoke using the water jet immediately, thus repeating the decision
making cycle of problem recognition-solution generation.
4.4 THEMES
From a design standpoint, a clear understanding of decision making in a given
environment rests on a clear elucidation of the elements in the definition - that
is identifying which things the operator needs to perceive and understand
(Endsley, 1995). Although the decision makers such as doctors, triage nurses,
pilots and power plant operators, each may also be making decisions in
nonroutine situation in the same way as explained in this research, however, it
simply is not realistic or appropriate to expect the same elements to be relevant
to them without further investigation. Nonetheless these elements of cue-centric
decision making model are delineated for the FGCs in this chapter:
Gathering information for problem recognition: Extracting Cues, Classifying
Cues as Central or Peripheral, Selecting a Cue based on its Diagnosticity,
Importance, and Relevance, Compound Cue and their Decomposition
Problem recognition: Visualization of Fire Size using Cues whilst En Route,
Problem Specific Expectations Building, Cue Discrepancy, Hypothesis
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Generation, Probability and Possibility of Loss, Leverage Points, Threats,
Developing Plan of Attack, Goals, Anticipation, Prescribing a course of action
Solution generation: Use of Standard Operating Procedure, Generating solution
for ambiguous situations, Feedback
The ‘information gathering’ is common across both stages of this model. The
only difference is that for problem recognition, the information gathering is
directed towards gathering both implicit and explicit environmental cues.
However, in case of solution generation, those non-existential environmental
cues are also noted, which are mentally identified during simulation and which
can identify the threats that ‘can’ appear due to the implementation of the
course of action selected for evaluation.
4.4.1 Problem Recognition
4.4.1.1 Extracting Cues
Commanders who were interviewed for this research emphasized the role of
extracting cues from the environment. Weick (1995) described the process of
extracting cues as one of the seven factors for making sense of the situation.
Experience plays an important role in recognizing what should be considered
as a cue. A commander said that (excerpt from the interview of FGC 8): So
basically you are looking at the cues, and even to look at those cues, you need the experience
to see which cues are important. Cues can be directly perceivable such as visual,
audible, or a feeling on the hand, skin or ears; or indirectly perceivable by
extracting them from the information coming to the FGC. In the past, FF had
personal protective clothing, which allowed plenty of bare skin, therefore in
those times it was easier (and certainly more dangerous) to extract non-visible
and non-audible cues such as rushing air signifying backdraft or rising heat on
ears etc. However, in the past and even today, the most dominant cues are the
visual ones. They make a large portion of information that commanders gather.
Cues can be extracted from visual information or from the information coming in
from the incident ground. For example, an FGC while discussing an incident
said that (excerpt from the interview of FGC 4): The warehouse stored hardware items
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sold to the companies like B&Q, etc. Attached to the rear of the building was a large office
block. When I turned up there the whole building was full alight except for the office block. In
this case a cylinder full of a highly combustible chemical went off. The chemical is so
combustible that it can burn a whole building in seconds of the explosion. There were several
hazards easily noticeable for example, asbestos in the roof, combustible cylinders, and
chemical stored in there. The commander started searching for cues even before
her arrival at the incident scene. There was large plume of smoke, which was
thick black in color, which was going miles and miles in the sky. Through this
information commander assessed the size and the severity of the fire. The
volume, the color of the smoke and the distance it has traveled indicates the
size of the fire and what is on fire. The FGC also knew how much time is
available to organize a response by noticing the presence of acetylene (which
is highly inflammable) in the fire zone. Similarly, the presence of material such
as asbestos roofing and chemical material alerted the FGC of the toxicity of the
smoke, which will be dangerous for the surrounding population.
It is not necessary that cues will always be dominantly visible; the cues can be
difficult to identify as well. In fact extracting cues is a tedious process and
require an attentive mind and body. A commander has to differentiate such
cues from the unwanted noise. For example, some commanders expect a
whistling sound when there is a closed chamber (room) on fire. This can be a
difficult task; if a firefighter is present in a chamber next to the chamber on fire,
then (s)he will be wearing a breathing apparatus as well. The helmet and visor
protecting head, face and ears has internal oxygen supply; it is difficult to hear
when a firefighter is wearing a BA because of the noise of his/her own
breathing. In severely low visibility, FFs should be very vigilant to pick the
whistling noise which is the only cue to identify the presence of backdraft in the
next chamber which they might be planning to enter.
Another example of difficulty of cue extraction can be seen in this example. A
commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 1): …the complex internal
layout combined with heavy smoke logging and stacked boxes obscured the fire from any
viewpoint other than from the adjacent window. Even our thermal image cameras could not pick
up the heat due to the cooling effects of the sprinkler system. In this incident the
commander was unable to locate the seat of the fire for a very long time. He
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ended up using more resources then normally required in such situations.
When there is mildly strong heat in the environment then thermal imaging
cameras work well, but in this situation, the heat of the fire was blanketed by
the coolness effect created by the sprinklers. The smoke was telling that there
is still a live fire around, however the air inside the burning chamber was not
guiding the commander to locate the fire.
Cues are sometimes perceived due to the presence of other cues as well. Such
as, a steel structure experiencing more than 500 degrees of temperature gets
unstable and shows the signs of it, therefore a commander should expect
blistering paint, dislodged steel beams etc. These cues might not be externally
visible, even the raise of temperature to more than 500 degree cannot be
visually experienced. Gadgets can be used for this purpose; however mostly
commanders use the commonsense that the fire is going on for so many
minutes and such as since the structure is not well ventilated therefore
temperature must be above permissible limits and ‘signs’ of deformities in
building structure should be expected.
An example of what may happen if a commander fails to extract all relevant
cues is a recent fire in a Warwickshire vegetable warehouse; in this fire, 2
firefighters lost their lives. The fire raged for more than 5 hours and at its peak
flames reached hundreds of feet in height. 16 fire engines and 80 firefighters
were called to the scene. The FGC committed the crewmembers in that
structure, which must have weakened due to the high degree of temperature.
Many commanders, who were interviewed for this research, were of the opinion
that the commander failed to notice the signs (cues) of whether the structure is
stable or not. When interviewees were asked of their opinion about this incident
they said that at such a high temperature, such structure normally becomes
unstable. An FGC said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 14): ‘when we get to
large fires or buildings that have significant fire, we will designate the safety officers to watch
(thus gathering visual cues) … for any movement within the building’. The same FGC
quoted above said that: ‘Unprotective steel work is a nightmare for FFs in a large intense
type fire, because steel loses two third of its strength at around 650 degrees. And once you get
to that you got beams buckling and the building will collapse which is what happened at
112
Warwickshire vegetable warehouse. You have got unprotective steel structure affected by fire
and suddenly under the weight (the weight is still there) the structure gives way and that’s why it
collapsed’. In the above mentioned case, the non-visible implicit cues which were
present in the environment should have been recognized. The commander
should have realized that a high degree of temperature must have weakened
the steel structure and it is unsafe to commit anyone in there. However the
commander failed to do so.
There are some cases as well, when cues are not very evident because of the
novel nature of those cues thus making it difficult to decide that what one is
looking for. It often happens in the rescue and search operations. As the
firebrigade get called for any type of incidents from fire operation to the search
and rescue operations therefore they are ready for the unexpected. In such
cases the commanders depend on their life experiences, and analogical
thinking as well. For example, a commander told that (excerpt from the
interview of FGC 11): We turned up to this school to a special service call. A lady had her
fingers struck in shredder. Straight away what goes through my mind is are the fingers trapped
in machinery or is it just caught up in it. Now fortunately, we could soon assess early on that it
was like a clamping around your hand as opposed to the hand being drawn into the metal
cutters so there isn’t the same urgency because you know she isn’t in huge amount of
discomfort. She might argue that she was in discomfort, but I knew that she didn’t have
anything life threatening or particularly worrying. Because it wasn’t something we deal with day
in day out and every shredder is different. I could get you the shredder from next door and its
totally different from the shredder you might have at your place of work etc. The only thing that
you can assess is when you see it.
4.4.1.2 Visualization of Fire Size using Cues whilst En Route:
Expectation Building
This research found that there is a pivotal role of cues in command decision
making in visually experiencing the situation whilst en route (i.e., approaching)
(Fire Service Manual, 1999; Landgren, 2005) to the incident scene. Most
commanders pointed out that whilst en route to the incident ground they build a
visualization of how large the incident would be by looking at the cues such as
smoke in the air, the distance to which it has traveled, the color of the smoke,
wind direction etc. These are what we can imagine as the quiet moments when
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a commander is looking at the environmental cues and is doing the self talk
asking or explaining some questions like what could be going on at the incident
scene and how large the fire would be. During this momentary self-talk, the
FGCs use their experiences with those cues that are reaching them. This self
talk is necessary because this establishes expectations about what the
commander will see when (s)he will actually turn up at the incident scene. This
momentary self-talk make a commander realize the severity or mediocre nature
of the situation. Landgren (2005) in his thesis on ‘En route Sensemaking’
proposed that this visual information could be supplemented with information on
the incident ground while the commander is still on the way to the incident
scene. His emphasis was on looking at the technological aspects of how this
visual information can be supplemented by giving the commander a way to
interrupt the conversation going on, on the incident ground (which an FGC can
hear on the radio in his/her car), raise questions and get feedback. Although
this technological facility is important but such knowledge would be additional.
The primary thing is the momentary conversation between the commander
himself/herself and the vast knowledge bank about those gathered cues, which
they have developed over time while traveling to the incident grounds during
various fire incidents. This reflection help build expectations about the incident,
which cannot be replaced by any technology.
Consider these examples from the interviews. A commander said that (excerpt
from the interview of FGC 7): Shortly after leaving the fire station I had a visual sighting of
the smoke plume. We were approx 5 miles from the incident location and therefore knew that
we were going to be dealing with something far more substantial than a rubbish fire. The
commander was initially mobilized to a small rubbish fire. He had the crews and
equipments to fight a small fire. But on the way he significantly raised the
number of crew and appliances by contacting the control room. The
commander said that (excerpt from the interview of FGC 7): Given the smoke
plume extended into the sky for approx 1000 meters and was jet black in color I informed our
control room that this was going to be a major incident and that multiple appliances will be
required together with specialist support from HazMat officers to police and the environment
agency. The realization was based on the assessment of cues such as smoke,
the color of the smoke and the spread of it. This realization was developed in
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the absence of more information about the incident. The commander was
second to reach the incident scene mobilized from a larger station staffed by full
time crew members; however since the fireground was located in a small
county and the fire station there was crewed by part time staff therefore
significant information about fire could not have been expected from them. In
another case, a commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 4): The fire
on the incident ground was producing a lot of smoke. The smoke was visible from ten miles
from the building…it must be a working job. The commander assessed the size of the
fire by just looking at the smoke dispersed in the sky. The commander was just
leaving from her duty station. The realization that the fire would be a significant
one was based on the distance to which the smoke was travelling. Another
commander said that (excerpt from the interview of FGC 10) I got a first call from
Lincoln which is about 20 miles away from the station…. The road from here to Hemswell is a
straight road. It is A15 direct road to the incident scene. And you can see when you come out of
Lincoln a big plume of smoke hinting that it would be a big fire. This commander also
realized the size of the fire instantly by looking at the spreading smoke plume.
A commander described that why the cues gathered whilst en route are
important to realize how the fire would be. He said that: let’s say if I set this piece of
paper on fire then it will produce some smoke, some light color smoke which would burn out
very quickly. Four, five tyres will give more significant amount of smoke but the intensity of the
fire will not make the smoke turbulence. It will burn away in a small stream into the air. However
you set on fire the Buckingham Palace for example, that will produce a wide plume of smoke
which will go up and cross a long distance. The commanders do not need extensive
technological support to realize the size of fire. More information in this regard
can only complement the assessment of FGCs which is based on the gathered
information however what is more important is what commanders extract from
the information instantly available and how they utilize that information.
4.4.1.3 Classifying Cues as Central or Peripheral
Cues are important in decision making however not all cues are worth noticing.
Even the most salient cues are not always the most important ones (Wallsten &
Barton, 1982). Commanders unconsciously classify cues as central or
peripheral (see chapter 2 for a definition of the two) before using them. A
commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 13): You don’t have to retain all
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the information that you have received from several sources. You can just retain essential
information in your mind. This essential information is not easy to spot; it requires
an expert’s eye. A cue is central if it is adding towards diagnosticity of the
situation, if they are relevant to the problem and if they are important (Anderson
1981). An FGC was of the opinion that sometimes the dominant cues may not
add any value to the information required for problem solving. Cues otherwise
central may prove to be peripheral in certain situations. Such as, the color of
the smoke, which is a dominant cue, may not be the central cues in all
situations. A commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 11): ‘I always
say when I am training others that if I set fire to this room then I can create signs and symptoms
of backdraft with different color smoke and I can go and set fire to something else with the
same property and material like this one (in the room where the interview was conducted) and it
can create signs and symptoms of backdraft but with different color of the smoke. My view is
that don’t let the view of the color of the smoke lead you down the route of the backdraft; look at
how the smoke reacts, how the combustible gases react and make a judgment from there,
because predominantly what’s burning inside will give different colors. I have seen different
colors such as I have seen yellow, I have seen light green, white, all resulted in the backdraft’.
FireGround Incident Commanders are adept at searching and finding those
cues, which are central in a certain situation for making decisions. Time spent
in analyzing information, which will not contribute towards the diagnosis of the
situation is reduced considerably by employing experience to look for what
should not be ignored. The FGCs do not completely get rid of peripheral cues;
in fact those cues are processed when the time allows them to do so, or in
cases, when the central cues are unable to assist the decision maker in
understanding the current situation.
4.4.1.4 Selecting a Cue Based on Diagnosticity, Importance, &
Relevance
To select a (central) cue, the FGCs pay attention to its importance, diagnosticity
and relevance. Peripheral cues are the signs which are there because of the
presence of central cues. Their role is more about confirming more strongly the
presence of central cues. For example, the FGCs mainly look for blackened
windows, no ventilation points, no visible flames, pulsating smoke and sighting
of neutral plane when monitoring a room/house/property on fire. Presence of
most of these cues is enough to instigate a decision making process. However,
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any (peripheral) cues such as very hot doorknobs and whistling noise can just
reconfirm that there are no open ventilation points or increase the possibility of
the presence of a neutral plane inside the room, etc.
While we are discussing the central and peripheral cues, it would be
appropriate to discuss about importance, relevance and diagnosticity in
continuation to this discussion.
Importance is a representation of the degree to which a cue can affect the
judgment (Schwartz and Norman, 1989). How FGCs judge the importance of
cues? The simple answer to this question is experience. However that
experience itself comes from training and time spent knowing the
characteristics and behavior of the cue in question. Take for example the color
of smoke; some FGCs believe that the color of smoke does not add anything
towards identifying the hazards of entering a compartment on fire. However,
some FGCs also believe that the color of smoke can tell us what is burning
inside, such as thick black smoke means that there is some carbon containing
materials burning. Similarly, if smoke is whitish then timber based material is on
fire. One cue, which might not mean much in certain circumstances, can be an
important cue in some other circumstances. An FGC interviewed for this
research suggest that today the commander’s training is far more dependable
then it was in his time. Therefore one may expect that today’s breed of
commanders will be more precise in judging the importance of a cue according
to the circumstances. However, there are exceptional cases as well. The
commander quoted above was worried about the recent trend of direct
recruitment of personnel in command positions. The recent tragedy of the death
of firemen in Warwickshire vegetable warehouse is a perfect example. The
commander on the scene was an experienced fireman however he was unable
to give due importance to the instability of the structure thus compromised the
lives of his crewmembers.
Diagnosticity refers to the extent to which a cue provides information about a
criterion to solve a problem or understand the situation (Anderson 1981).
Nisbett & Ross (1980) pointed out that in many real world situations salience
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and objective diagnosticity are confounded so that the more salient information
is also more diagnostic. But Wallsten & Barton (1982) argued that this is not
always the case. Therefore on incident ground the commanders don’t just pay
attention to what is easily visible but also to what is not so visible but may have
diagnostic value. Coming back to the same example of smoke, the above
quoted FGC and many others are of the opinion that in case smoke is not of its
usual color and its behavior is like it is pulsating and forcing itself out, they
always pay more attention to smoke behavior instead of its color. It is because,
the color of smoke can change for many reasons however the way smoke
move (such as pulsating, i.e., coming out of the room and then suck back in or
the force with which it is coming out of the room) can point towards the distinct
behaviors of fire.
Cue relevance refers to the implicational relationship between a cue and
judgment (Anderson 1981). A cue is relevant to the extent that it is used,
regardless of the situation (Schwartz & Norman, 1989). An example of cue
relevance is the unquestioned use of smoke in all fire response operations. This
relevant cue plays its role in increasing the number of fire appliance, evacuating
the fireground or declaring fire operation over etc. An example is that
FireGround Incident Commanders increase the number of fire appliances (thus
increasing the number of manpower) once they notice the volume of the smoke.
For example, an FGC stated that (excerpt from the interview of FGC 7): Shortly
after leaving the fire station I had a visual sighting of the smoke plume. We were approx 5 miles
from the incident location and therefore knew that we were going to be dealing with something
far more substantial than a rubbish fire. Given the smoke plume extended into the sky for
approx 1000 metres and was jet black in colour I informed our control room that this was going
to be a major incident and that multiple appliances will be required together with specialist
support from HazMat officers to police and the environment agency.....at close proximity to the
fire I requested a further 6 appliance be sent to offer support for fire fighting. The relevance
of cue may give an FGC a starting point to separate what to look for from what
can be peripheral.
It is not necessary that a relevant cue can be diagnostic and important as well.
Such as, though smoke as a cue is always considered relevant on a fireground
however, it can mislead if the surrounding environment is not paid attention to.
118
Such as, an FGC reported that (excerpt from the interview of FGC 4): I was called
out to control a fire incident that was reported on a 14th floor of a block of flats. The fire looked
huge and the smoke was spreading around the top of the building. I told my driver to make
pumps 4. I stayed on the ground and the other crew members went up to the floor where fire
was reported. The crew called me and told me that we are at the 14th floor will you come up. I
asked them whether they need more crew/ resources. The officer incharge said ‘no. I am
sending the crew back to the ground floor.’ And he asked me to come up on the 14th floor. It
seem very strange to me. I went on the roof and found that there was no fire. There was a
rubbish fire at the bottom of the building. The smoke was reaching to the top of the building
where there was orange sodium light; in the orange sodium light it was looking like the fire is
huge. Here, the diagnostic value of volume of smoke (which is a relevant cue)
was considered high, however it turned out to be a small rubbish fire.
In summary, the relevance, importance and the diagnosticity of the cues decide
whether they should be considered as central or peripheral cues, moreover,
dignosticity, importance, and relevance of a cue may change with respect to the
environment.
4.4.1.5 Compound Cue & their Decomposition
A compound cue is a sign, which is made from a combination of more than one
cue, and each one can be treated individually as well. Commanders are adept
at decomposing compound cues quickly. Very often the cues that are gathered
from the incident scene are compound in nature, for example, smoke (which
include color, volume and force with which it is discharging), neutral plane
(amount of unburned gases above this plane and the amount of oxygen left
below it) etc which can be treated as a single cue. However in some cases
such cues need to be broken down into its individual components and
decomposing compound cues become necessity, otherwise it can lead to
wrong conclusions. An example is assessing what’s on fire by considering the
color of the smoke. Consider this excerpt; a commander pointed out that
(excerpt from the interview of FGC 11) the time of the day can make a difference...for
example, the yellow street lighting can make a big difference on how things look.
Another example is a neutral plane, which is basically a glowing layer found in
the closed chambers that are on fire. That glowing layer is a compound cue.
How? A commander explained what a neutral plane is, in these words (excerpt
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from the interview of FGC 16): Neutral plan is the point at which oxygen in the room
meets the hot gases or smoke. When there is fire around then the smoke fills in the top of the
room. The smoke layer is also called combustable gases. As the fire increases in heat the
smoke layer will start to come downwards. In the lower part of the room is the safe air or
oxygen.…Neutral plane is the bit where the oxygen meets the smoke. The place where they
meet, the gases are mixed.….It literally it’s a glow. Sometimes its turbulent; because the
oxygen is being burned by the gases. And there is big difference between the heat as well.
Above the neutral plane it’s hot and below its cold. The neutral plane is a point where
oxygen in the room meets the hot combustible gases. One can see a glow at
this meeting point. The neutral plane as ‘a’ cue is made from two cues, i.e., hot
gases and the oxygen. The exact location of the neutral plane is important for
both the FFs committed in the chamber and FGC, because it indicates the
amount of oxygen left in the room and the amount of unburned gases present; if
the area above neutral plane is larger than the area below it then that means
the oxygen in the room is almost already consumed and anything under the
neutral plane may be pyrolizing. The aim is always to push this neutral plane in
the upper direction. If it is coming too low then it is time to get out of the room.
Compound cue decomposition is not a mandatory process. It depends on the
need of the situation. There are many instances where compound cues are
capable of invoking reaction on their own and decomposing them does not
serve any extra purpose. Such as the water running off from the structure on
fire; normally commanders make it sure that this water will be taken care of and
it should not mix with underlying water beds or water lines. Water running off
from the structure is a compound cue because it may contain elements of the
chemical products used in the construction of the building or the elements of
the burning product stored or placed inside the structure. Most commanders
take care of running off water by including the support of environmental
agencies.
4.4.1.6 Problem-specific Expectations Building
The FireGround Incident Commanders are of the opinion that even before they
reach the incident scene they have certain expectations related to the incident;
these expectations are built through cues derived from previous information that
commanders have about the incident ground, and the latest information coming
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in. A commander said that expectations are from information such as (excerpt
from the interview of FGC 11): The type of building, the knowledge of process which are
going on inside the building and asking questions from the occupiers and local people, if you
understand what normally is going on in the building that will give you an idea. Certainly
such information is not consumed directly; in fact it is processed and cues are
extracted from the information to inform the decision maker. Another
commander told that before reaching to an incident scene she heard on the
radio that there are acetylene cylinders involved in the fire. So she expected
that there would be nothing much to save, because of the flammability of the
material involved and its capacity to produce explosions. The name of the
chemical involved acted as a cue and with it the experience and training that
the commander had received over the years also resonated in her memory.
She mixed this information with the other information she was receiving from
the incident ground such as the proximity of the cylinders from the fire. In this
particular case the cylinders were directly stored in the warehouse which was
on fire. Moreover, before she reached the incident ground she can see the
smoke traveling to huge distances from the fire ground. Upon her arrival she
found that the warehouse section where the cylinders were placed has already
passed thus confirming her expectations.
Similarly, in another incident cues extracted from past information about the
warehouse helped build the expectation of the commander. The commander
interviewed for this research said that (excerpt from the interview of FGC 4):
‘The background to this premises (which the FGC decided to discuss as critical incident) is that
the xxx warehouse had ceased trading several years earlier and the building had stood empty
for a long time. In recent months a business that collect and recycle old clothing had moved in.
The Fire & rescue service were not aware that they were trading from this location. A week
before, the fire the Police attended the premises on routine enquiries and saw that the fire exits
were blocked. They informed the Fire & Rescue Service and we did an emergency fire safety
inspection. Due to concerns about the amount of textiles and clothing in the building, a building
risk information inspection took place and there was risk information placed onto the fire engine
mobile data terminals’. The commander already knew about this and he was
expecting that there would be large fire in the area if fire ever happened there.
The fire in the warehouse was as severe as expected by the commander;
during the incident the 100% of the building passed out and at a later stage of
121
the firefighting operation the efforts were directed towards ensuring that the fire
will not spread to the adjoining factories.
4.4.1.7 Cue Discrepancy
In the absence of a definite standard against which a situation can be
compared, it seems that it would be very difficult to notice how different a
situation is from its normal condition. However, that is not the case; it is
because, the FGCs in nonroutine cases are not actively looking for a ‘reference
situation’; in fact they compare the condition of the ‘environmental cues’ from
the experience they had with those cues in the past, either during training or
during live incidents. Klein & Hoffman (1992) found that both novices and
experts are equally conversant with the cues (information) that they gather from
environment. Therefore, using the experience with cues as the point of
reference is relatively more dependable for the commanders to judge the
discrepancy between what is the present situation and what is required. For
example, the FGCs through their generic training learn that at what
temperature, the cylinders containing LPG may explode. They don’t have to
know the exact temperature of a cylinder however other cues such as the time
for which the cylinders are exposed to fire and the proximity with the fire can
help a commander decide about the change in temperature of the cylinder. A
sector commander narrated one experience that he had as a sector
commander; he said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 11) ‘In the xxx Business
park job that we talked about, there were some large LPG cylinders, I am talking about 6ft high
and about 3ft in diameter, and they (initial Commander) removed all the crews from there. It
was a safe job in some of the aspects. The FGC said that if it is going to explode then we have
to pull back the crews at least a 100 meters. I said it is an awful waste because we are going to
lose the incident. I said to the FGC let me go and assess the risk. So I used the thermal
imaging camera to look at the cylinders to get the temperature from them and then looked at
something else which is in a safe area and take temperature of them. And I found that it was a
similar temperature. Then I go over and touch it and feel it and I came back and said that these
LPG cylinders are not going to explode at all. It is nowhere near to the fire’. As you can see,
the sector commander decided upon whether the cylinders are safe or not by
finding the difference between the temperature (a cue) of cylinders placed in
safe and unsafe surroundings. Although in this situation, the commander went
to the extent of using devices to check the temperature difference however very
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often commanders retrieve other cues from the environment and make
decisions (such as how long are the cylinders exposed to the fire as mentioned
above).
When the commanders do not have experience with certain type of cues then
they find themselves in dangerous situations. For example, a commander
narrated an incident from the time when he was a new FF and was not aware of
the signs and symptoms of most fire behaviors. He said (excerpt from the
interview of FGC 12): I do remember going in and it was incredibly hot there was a blazing
fire all the way along the back wall of the building and there was lots and lots of radiant heat. It
was before we had good protective clothing. So it was extremely uncomfortable to the point of
being painful. But we still going through front door. I do remember that all these bales of straw
all around us every last one of them were pyrolising and they were giving off white smoke, sort
of cool white smoke and in ever increasing quantities. Now if i saw that now i know that that
means that everything in that room is about to burst into flames. But it didn’t mean anything to
me at that time at all. I just thought that its hot; I didn’t really think what it mean. We gone in, we
may be gone in ten paces and suddenly every last part of this building just burst into flames and
we instantly hit the floor and crawl as quickly as we can. By the time we get out our clothing
was already pyrolising and they were on the verge of bursting into flames. Therefore, what
is important is to train the FGCs with an emphasis on assessing cues along
with their ability to use past experiences. The familiarity with the cues will help
them in nonroutine situations such as the one mentioned above.
4.4.1.8 Hypothesis Generation
Gettys & Fisher (1979) explained that the process of hypothesis generation has
been historically assumed to be synthetic (i.e., artistic or creative) and therefore
beyond the scope of scientific theorizing and research which results in the
limited research on the process of hypothesis generation. Gettys & Fisher
(1979) concluded that, this lack of understanding about the hypothesis
generation processes might also be ‘due to the insular development of decision
theory as a normative discipline than to the intractability of the problem’.
Hypotheses are generated by individuals using processes that are not
addressed by normative decision theory, therefore it seems unlikely that a
normative model for hypothesis generation can be developed; however, recent
advances in research on cognitive psychology and human memory, suggest
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that the hypothesis generation process can be profitably modeled by a
combination of normative and descriptive theory (Gettys & Fisher, 1979). Gettys
& Fisher (1979) proposed a hypothesis generation model that is largely
accepted in literature.
Here, no new approach is presented that explain the process of hypothesis
generation differently. In fact, commanders were found developing the
hypotheses in much the same way as explained by Gettys & Fisher (1979).
However, there is one minor difference. Gettys & Fisher (1979) proposed that,
decision makers recall several versions of hypotheses from memory that
explain the situation in different ways thus creating a hypothesis set. However,
instead of developing a set of hypotheses, in nonroutine situations, the FGCs
develop only one hypothesis that account for all gathered valuable information.
An FGC modify that hypothesis when more information, which was missed,
previously is spotted or when a dramatic change occurs in the situation.
Consider this example; in an incident, a commander turned up at a shop, which
had very few external signs of well developed fire. We went to a Jeans shop in
Lincoln high street back in 80s. And what happened is that it looked like a fire in the fluorescent
sign outside. We started watering that sign … ‘but it was all the smoke style that was blowing
out that you would say’ hang on a minute that’s not just the sign on fire and when we broke in
we realize that all the blaze were coming up….That was (fluorescent sign) just where the fire
was leaking out. The fire was actually on the first & second floor (excerpt from the
interview of FGC 19). The FGC was unable to account for the smoke that was
coming out from the shop continuously. If water is sprayed on fire then the
smoke progressively fade away. However, this was not happening in this
situation, which made the commander to further investigate the situation.
Consider another example. A commander said (excerpt from the interview of
FGC 15): I was concerned about committing crews inside the building due to the ferocity of
the fire downstairs and also the very thick black smoke from the upstairs, windows. I wasn’t
sure if the building was compartmented in some way (doors being closed upstairs etc). The
commander was facing huge public pressure to send someone inside the
house to search for a missing woman. However due to the presence of black
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smoke from upstairs and fire downstairs he was getting confused that what is
happening. The hypothesis that ‘it is backdraft’ was as correct as ‘it is
flashover’. Later he realized that the lower part of the house has developed a
flashover whereas the upper portion, which might have been sealed because of
the closed doors and windows, is developing a backdraft. He said: the
development of the fire downstairs appeared to suggest a well ventilated fire and flashover
situation, but it appeared to be a potential backdraught developing from the top left hand side of
the building with heavy pulsating smoke and no visible flame to the first two top windows. He
decided not to commit crewmembers into the house and classified this situation
as a rare case.
4.4.1.9 Probability & Possibility of Loss
Billing et al in 1980 first discussed probability and possibility of loss. In this
thesis, these concepts will be explained for nonroutine situations. FireGround
Incident Commanders look for the signs and symptoms to decide what is the
possibility and probability of a problem to actually get serious enough to
demand their attention. Consider this example; during Hamswell business park
fire incident, the FGC noticed that there were some cylinders in the vicinity of
fire which contained LPG. They were closer from the back wall of the
warehouse. The FGC thought that the cylinders must be heating up and soon
they will explode. He decided to withdraw the crew to a safe distance from
those cylinders. While the crewmembers were retrieving from the scene one of
the sector commanders objected upon that because he thought that without
further investigation declaring something dangerous will be a waste of
resources (such as manpower and time). Therefore he proposed to check the
temperature of those cylinders using thermal imaging camera. During the
interview that sector commander said that (excerpt from the interview of FGC
11): ‘there were some cylinders that had already blown up before but the cylinders which were
near to the back wall didn’t blow. The ones which had blown up before had shadowed the views
of the FGC that since some of them have blown up that mean that they all are going to blow
up’. The probability of the exploding of these cylinders in the eyes of the FGC
was very high; however a simple comparison of temperature of cylinders near
to the fire and of those placed at a distance gave an idea to the sector
commander that those cylinders are not going to explode. The possibility of
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explosion was low (as found by the sector commander) therefore the FGC
made an intervention and tried to further cool down the cylinders.
In another case, a commander assessed the probability of weakening of an
adjacent structure by noticing the direction of radiated heat. The commander
said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 4): I noticed that the office block at the rear
was not yet involved in the fire, but fire and heat (radiated heat) was rapidly spreading towards
it. Radiated heat is as dangerous as the fire itself. A prolonged radiated heat
may weaken some structures such as steel or a brick build building. However in
this case an early intervention by creating a fire break between the building on
fire and the office block reduced the possibility of loss. In another case, a
commander who was fighting the fire in a huge dump of used tyres was
assessing the probability of the damage to nearby houses due to radiated heat
by monitoring them through thermal imaging cameras. The commander said
(excerpt from the interview of FGC 7): The police helicopter had also been sent and
utilising a ground officer I requested communication with the helicopter to use it’s ‘thermal
imaging camera’ to identify if there was ‘radiant heat affecting nearby property. Fortunately the
hot gases and flames were traveling away from the next door property. The fire was left
burning because of many reasons including the no effect of radiated heat on
the nearby houses. Had the radiated heat severely affecting the buildings the
firefighting strategy would have been different.
The above mentioned elements/themes, gives a commander fairly good idea
about what the problem is and by this time (s)he had already developed a
mental model (or mental representation) of the current situation.
4.4.1.10 Leverage Points
The leverage points are events, which a commander can make use of and
using these points can make a difference on the unfolding situation. Cues
extracted from the environment lead a commander to what can be considered
as an opportunity. Opportunity recognition has long been viewed as a key step
in the naturalistic decisions (e.g., Venkatraman, 1997). The nature of
opportunity recognition is traditionally linked to human cognition and perception
(Matlin, 2002). Consider this example: a commander was fighting fire in a dump
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of over 400,000 tyres. The site owner was supposed to recycle those tyres
however he took the money and never did the job. The site was still receiving
hundreds of used tyres everyday. The owner was in court facing a trial against
him. This information brought a relief for the commander because he knew that
although there (excerpt from the interview of FGC 7) are very toxic products on
board, i.e., tyres, acetylene and LPG cylinders...On the other hand we also knew that we are
not going to have anybody involve because it was not a working place. The information that
there are ‘no persons’ reported (technical term means no victims) reduces the
stress of commander, which he used as one of the opportunities to design his
firefighting strategy. Consider another example; a commander used the
prevailing environmental conditions to fight the fire; he also used the inactive
nature of the premise as an opportunity for training his crew members during
live incidents. He said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 2): I decided that due to
the prevailing wind and the layout of the building in relation to the fire I would deploy crews
offensively through the front door of the premises once the shuttering had been removed..It was
an incident to learn from because no one was living there (in the premise). The site was closed
for a long time. For us it was a really glorified training exercise’.
4.4.1.11 Threats
The identification of threats is a dynamic process. It is normally found through
risk assessments, which is an ongoing process. The commanders use generic
risk assessment cards specially developed by the brigade. However, those risk
assessment cards do not cover every type of risk. Commanders use situation
assessment through cues, their experience bank and mental simulation to
discover what threats or risks they may have to face. For example, a
commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 12): We normally, for a gas like
acetylene we evacuate for about 400 meter which is a wide distance. For this case, we
probably got everyone back for 200 meters minimum in the early stages, which is sufficient for
propane tanks but again you never how far can an exploded container go. The plume of smoke
was probably 70-80 meters high and the cylinders were coming out of that. So it was going 100
meters into the air before coming to the ground. So they were traveling a good distance. So
those were initial thoughts that those who were involved can get injured of the cylinders are
exploding and flying. You can see that the risk assessment can be a simple
process and it can be a computational exercise as well, as shown in the
example above.
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Consider another example; a commander said that (excerpt from the interview
of FGC 13): Weather conditions can affect that how the smoke behaves. Certainly in summer
weather during the day time the smoke will go straight up and particularly in case of big fires as
it tends to gets into evening there is a sudden reduction in temperature and the smoke tends to
drop. That certainly can have an effect on how you deal with an incident coming up to that
period...The evacuation plan was something which you start to think about very early on
because as the evening comes on the smoke plumes will drop. You can see that the
commander is assessing the risk of very low smoke, which may be toxic. In this
situation the aim of the commander would be to fight the fire and make the
situation safe before the temperature drops and smoke will come to a very low
level.
It is important to note that it is not only the responsibility of the commander to
assess what may be a risk or threat for the crewmembers, each firefighter also
continuously do the risk assessment by assessing what (s)he is seeing (as
mentioned in a previous section). The above examples look like as if the FGCs
are anticipating future. However, the reason why these examples are included
here is because the task of anticipating on fireground is related to what a
problem will develop into, in few second, minutes, or hours, whereas the aim of
finding threats is to find those events that may produce due to a problem. The
threats are a byproduct of a problem.
This example will show how threats can be discounted through thorough
assessment of cues. A commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 11):
‘A couple of weeks ago I was on duty, again as an oncall officer with my phone, they told me
that they have mobilized two fire appliances to a house fire in the village where I live. It was
close from my house, I knew where the appliances were coming from. It take them round about
15 minutes to arrive in my village. So I was just dressed as I am now I turned out to the house
just to see if there is any first aid thing that I could do. When I arrived, the lady who was next
door overcome the smoke inhalation and the elderly guy had gone back in and he was quite
badly burned. His hair, all his face and hands were black. When I was speaking to them I asked
if there is anybody else inside the property, they said no. So I did a 360 survey and took a look
around and try to see if there is any fire in there and there was no visible signs of fire. It had
gone out; there was thick black smoke but there were no signs and symptoms of fire….The
crew was still 10-15 minutes away. We never go inside the property without BA, and special
clothing, stuff like that. But I can quite easily make an assessment by looking at the signs and
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symptoms. The fire was out and I could see where the fire had been. It was in the front room. I
could see it because it was clear through the windows by then. So what I decided to do is that I
will go inside the property and ventilate the place where the fire was. So I opened the windows
and came out. By the time, the crews arrived I have made a safe assessment of every single
room and made it sure that there was nobody inside the property. I did that because I made a
judgment that it was safe to do so’.
4.4.1.12 Pattern Recognition
Pattern recognition is a naturally occurring process. Even when, the FGCs are
managing nonroutine situations, they make an attempt to understand the
situation through past experiences and try to identify the patterns. Although, in
nonroutine situations it is necessary to depart from this norm; however (since it
is a naturally occurring process) its presence cannot be ignored.
Below is a process that is used for recognizing patterns:
Bruner (1957) explained that the first step in pattern recognition is primitive
categorization. He stated that before any more elaborate inferential activity can
occur, there is a first, ‘silent’ process that results in the perceptual isolation of
an object or an event with certain characteristic qualities. He further explained
that the event may have no more meaning than that it is an ‘object’, a ‘sound, or
a ‘movement’. Cue search follows the primitive categorization stage. In highly
practiced cases or in cases of high cue-category probability linkage, a second
process of more precise placement based on key cues may be equally silent or
‘unconscious’ (Bruner, 1957). In routine cases there is usually a good fit
between the specifications of a category and the nature of the cues impinging
on the organism—although ‘fit’ and ‘probability of linkage’ may stand in a
vicarious relation to each other (Bruner, 1957). Once a category is found, it is
confirmed through searching for more data congruent with that category during
confirmation check. During this process, (when a tentative categorization has
occurred) cue search changes; the ‘openness’ to stimulation decreases sharply
in the sense that now, a tentative placement of identity having occurred, the
search is narrowed for additional ‘confirmatory cues’ to check this placement
(Bruner, 1957). This stage, have the effect of reducing the effective input of
stimulation not relevant to the confirmatory process (Bruner, 1957). Once the
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confirmatory cues are also obtained the process of cue search almost stops
during confirmation completion. Bruner (1957) explained that the last stage in
this categorization process is a completion, marked by termination of cue
searching. It is characteristic of this state that openness to additional cues is
drastically reduced, and incongruent cues are ignored.
4.4.1.13 Comparison of Cue-based & Pattern Recognition Based
Mental Models
As mentioned before, this research is conducted to explain how commanders
make decisions in nonroutine situations. The process mentioned in the previous
section normally results in the discovery of a representative category in routine
situations. However, in nonroutine situations, this automatic process will result
in the discovery of a pattern, which may or may not be representative for the
current situation. Therefore, commanders compare the mental model
developed through thorough search and assessment of cues and the mental
model obtained through pattern recognition. If the two models are equivalent
then that raises the confidence of the commander in their assessment.
However, if the comparison fails then the commanders selects the mental
model developed through cue assessment. This is because, as mentioned
above, while the pattern recognition based model is being retrieved from
memory, many cues that were incongruent with the category (identified on the
basis of few key cues) are ignored (Bruner, 1957), which can lead to disastrous
consequences in nonroutine situations. The comparison only fails when the
pattern recognition based mental model is unable to explain all the valuable
cues obtained from the environment.
4.4.1.14 Goals
The cues are important in shaping the goals. Although the goals are not
precisely defined and may change, they are important. An FGCs’ general aim
or goal while on the incident ground is obviously the saving of savable life and
property however there are many subgoals as well. Subgoals develop and
change with respect to the situation assessment made through assessing the
cues. Such as a gas cylinder found on the fire ground may prompt an FGC to
assess its condition. It can be in the direct radiation of heat of fire or it can be in
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direct flames. The subgoals will be different in above-mentioned situations.
Such as if it is in the radiation of the heat of fire, the subgoal will be to cool
down the cylinders to such a degree that they will pose no more danger or to
move the crewmembers to a safe distance if the explosion is inevitable. In case
the cylinders are in direct flames, the subgoal would be to withdraw the crews
completely to a safe distance and set up an exclusion zone or if there is a
possibility to fight the fire through monitors then set them up and leave. Another
example is that when a firefighter notices a neutral plane in a room then the
subgoal is to move the neutral plane in the direction of the ceiling through
cooling the upper gas layers in the room. If the neutral plane is very near from
the floor, then the goal is to leave the compartment (the room on fire) as soon
as possible. The very sight of the neutral plane and the direction it is
progressing work as cues and enable a decision maker to form the subgoals.
Satisfactory achievement of these subgoals ensures that the overall aim of
saving the savable lives and property will be achieved.
Subgoals may change as well. This is because of lack of situation awareness or
dramatic new changes in the environment. Consider this example of how
subgoals may change fast (excerpt from the interview of FGC 12): ‘….and about
ten minutes later the owner of the building comes back, I have a chat to him and he asked have
you had any problem with the ammunition going on in the store room. No, I didn’t knew about
that. So actually we didn’t knew about the stored ammunition. Fortunately the ammunition was
in a locked steel cabinet. And it was in the part of the building which was not on fire. But
instantly we have a new problem. On this occasion it wasn’t a serious problem because there is
no fire in that part, all we have to do really, we got two options then (by the way it was seriously
large amount) one is do we assess the risks involved in this storage or do we take a common
sense view that there isn’t a fire and as long as we stop the fire entering that part of the building
we don’t actually have a problem. There was fire in the room above, and if the fire had to
spread then it would have spread from the above room. Fires tend to take a while before they
burn a floor. Generally the fire goes through the roof. It is just an example of how things
develop. Before the owner of the property revealed that there is ammunition
present in the house, the subgoals were different; however soon after this
information a new subgoal appeared. Now the commander is more concerned
about whether it is in an area of increasing temperature, how strong is the
explosive material and in case it may explode then what should be the diameter
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of exclusion zone. However once it is found that the ammunition is locked in a
steel cabinet and is in a room away from the fire the commander considers this
as a less important matter and carried on with his usual operation. In this
example the goal surfaced and changed very soon however this is not always
the case, of course, but the way the goals develop on the basis of the cues and
demand attention of the commanders is the same.
4.4.1.15 Developing Plan of Attack
Cues also help in the development of plan to attack fire such as whether the
attack would be offensive, defensive or a combination of them. Consider this
example; a commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 13): It was an
uncompartmented building. When we arrive then the fire was already breaking. So putting the
crew wouldn’t have been safe. There is a current view that you can be defensive and fight
offensively. So you can take offensive tactics but outside the zone in the same way that you can
be inside the zone and fight the fire defensively. That’s how we fought the fire. ….And it is
because it was starting to peel away it was obvious that the structural integrity wasn’t to be
relied on. So I instructed the initial commander to actually firefight but from outside. The
commander in this case used the cues such as fire coming out from inside the
building and the peeling off of paint (which means blistering heat inside) to
decide that the house must be well alight from inside and for deciding the
firefighting strategy. The commanders should be paying attention to all cues
before deciding on a firefighting strategy and before making decisions such as
committing BA crew. Another commander said that (excerpt from the interview
of FGC 11): if you can see through it (the smoke) quite well that means it is a far less
developed fire. Whereas if it is pouring out of the door and you do go to some incident where
smoke is blowing out of the door way then you know that it is fairly developed fire with a lots of
fire loading involved… If I saw really dense smoke that means I am going to keep my crews
outside and will have a defensive stance. Whereas, fairly light smoke and the light color (light
color does make a difference) then I am more likely to be able to commit crews into the
building. Off course in situation when the smoke is pouring out from under the
door, commanders have to put some control measures to either make the
situation manageable or to delay or avoid letting the BA crewmembers entering
the compartment.
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4.4.1.16 Anticipation
It is very important for incident commanders to anticipate the future for a current
situation. For example, an FGC who was interviewed for this research said that
(excerpt from the interview of FGC 20): ‘You try to anticipate that what might happen
next. So it is like paying attention to what is before you and at the same time paying attention to
what may happen next. Although we don’t do it consciously but yes in our mind we are doing
that. And that is even more apparent in the earthquake work because in India and in Haiti there
are lots of high rise buildings and you have probably the first two or three floors collapsed and
so it will look like a building and you will think that there is nothing wrong with the building when
actually there would be three floors pancaked on top of each other and I as a commander is
going to commit people in there and I am not just thinking about what happened just now but I
think of what happens if there is an after shock, a tremor. The building is already unstable’. As
evident from the example, anticipation helps the FGCs to devise a plan, which
is not only applicable in the current situation but which will remain valid if the
anticipated situation does materialize. The FGCs are not always able to
anticipate precisely, such as consider this example. An FGC said that (excerpt
from the interview of FGC 12): ‘We had a big factory fire which was burning well and then
the fire got into the compound of large gas cylinders. It got into the compound in a big way, I
knew that the cylinders are dangerous if they explode, we must have an exclusion zone of few
meters. But it never occurred to me that the cylinders may go well beyond that zone. The
cylinders explode and land 500 meters away in a housing estate’. In this example, the
commander used the heat and the time the cylinders were exposed to fire as
cues extracted from the environment and anticipated that the cylinders are now
dangerous, they may explode therefore he made a decision about whether they
should set up an exclusion zone or not. This incident also shows that it is not
necessary that their anticipation will always be correct.
Cues are important indicators for anticipation and for deciding the plan of action
to reduce the chances of damage. A commander said (excerpt from the
interview of FGC 7): ... the time (when) they estimate that there are about a millions tyres
they realize that it is going to have a massive impact both environmentally and ecologically
such as entering the water sources. The huge number of tyres and the equally higher
amount of water to be used for extinguishing that fire enabled the commander
to anticipate that the best course of action forward is not to fight the fire with
water and let it burn to avoid the damage to the underground waterbeds.
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In another case, a commander was reluctant to leave his crewmembers
positioned in a sector, which had no escape route and where it was likely that if
the cylinders explode then they will fly and land. ‘Normally an incident ground is
sectorized into four sectors. However here I decided to remove the sector one because there
was not much activity on that side. Secondly, the sector was in such a location that if fire would
have spread in that direction then it would have injured or killed the crew members positioned
there’ (excerpt from the interview of FGC 3). The incident commander was able
to recall that one event proved the correctness of the decision to remove sector
one. During the incident at one point a cylinder blasted and flew out from that
side of the building which was sectorised as sector one. There was an empty
space just opposite to the sector one; if crewmembers would have been
positioned in that sector then there could have been casualties.
4.4.1.17 Prescribing a Course of Action
Besides a better understanding of the situation, another result of problem
recognition is the prescription of a course of action. A course of action
automatically comes to mind of the commander. However, this course of action
is yet to be tested; therefore it may not be the final choice.
4.4.2 Solution Generation
Solutions come out most often from the standard operating procedures.
However, the SOPs are not always applicable. This section will discuss the use
of SOPs and how solutions are identified in non-routine situations.
4.4.2.1 Standard Operating Procedure
To find a solution to a problem for most types of situations, the Fire & Rescue
Service in the UK proposes a standard operating procedure. Normally
commanders use these SOPs; however there are situations where the SOP
cannot be used or the SOP is rather a lengthy way therefore they are avoided.
Sometimes, FGCs also bypass SOPs because they personally do not agree
with them and they are experienced enough to make changes while they are in
charge of an incident. For example a commander said (excerpt from the
interview of FGC 8): My initial plan was once more I will send couple of guys with larger
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jets, not hose reels again this is something that we tend to use hose reel for everything and
they are not always suitable. In fact there is an awful lot of science going on behind it. We tend
to use hose reel for very small fires and also 45mm, which is probably too big, which overseas
brigade, actually use. Standard operating procedures are triggered after finding
right cues that make a SOP appropriate and a decision to by pass them is also
motivated by finding cues that hints to a commander that they are not
appropriate for use right now. An example of the use of SOPs is the chip pan
fire. In the past, United Kingdom has seen many chip pan fires, such fires
involve lot of hot fat. The SOP is to use foam to cool down the fat and control
the fire. It is a common observation that if water is used on hot fat then it can
cause serious turbulence in the fat which may spread in every direction. An
FGC explained that this happens because the cold water when poured on hot
fat, it soon turns into steam and cause spurting of the fat. The common way of
identifying fat fire is the smell of fat. However not all chip shop fires are because
of the pan fire; some of them are caused by other reasons such as tables
burning in one corner etc. Therefore, FF and FGCs depend on their smelling
ability to identify what is involved in fire and then decide that whether they
should use water or not.
An FGC said that we tend to fight all sorts of fires with water (excerpt from the
interview of FGC 8) ‘that’s what we have in abundance!’ But of course decisions are
still based on the cues found and not just on the basis of what is available. A
commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 20): In the experience bank at
the back of my mind, I see that this is a chip shop there is lots of smoke and there is a deep fat
range so whilst I am talking about these signs and making further investigations I give the order
to the crew get the foam ready because we possibly need to use this then I will go and make
those further investigations and confirm that yes actually this is a chip pan fire and I need the
foam; ok get the foam in. however if I found out that actually it’s the table that is on fire and the
chip shop corner is burning and its not the fryer then I will get the hose reel, leave the foam
equipment and put the fire out. The SOPs are also bypassed when the situation is of
non-serious nature and bypassing a SOP will not cause any harm. Such as, an
FGC said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 11): ‘I have used water to extinguish
petrol fire but on a fine spray. I haven’t used it in a conventional manner as a jet, because it
would have just annoyed others, and it wouldn’t have made any difference. If you want to
extinguish the fire quickly then you should use the foam. But we used high pressure hose reel.
Because the petrol was drained into a very small area which was all contained and it was on
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fire so just put the hose reel on spray and just cool down the surface of the petroleum down to
extinguish it. I used water because it was so much easy in that situation then to open a foam
drum. It was a decision out of convenience’. In this situation the commander decided
upon using water spray because the cues obtained from the environment were
all reflecting the presence of a controlled situation and it could save time as
well.
Although, the use of SOPs are recommended however they cannot be provided
for each and every type of situation. The next section discusses those
circumstances when an SOP is not available or is not appropriate for use at that
time and generating a new solution is necessary.
4.4.2.2 Generating Solution for Ambiguous Situations: Information
Gathering & Mental Simulation
If a standard operating procedure is found inappropriate then FGCs in
nonroutine situations conceive a course of action and evaluate it on an
evaluation dimension. While evaluating the COA, the FGCs pay close attention
to the cues that will either prove the suitability of the course of action or its
unsuitability for the current situation. Here, a procedure for selecting an option
is proposed which is slightly different from many procedures available in the
literature (other evaluation procedures will be discussed in chapter 5). From the
interviews with the commanders it is found that each course of action is
evaluated on an evaluation dimension; the evaluation dimension initially
consisted of the identified threats, goals and opportunities. These elements are
permanent members of the evaluation dimension. While considering each COA,
it is assessed whether it is satisfying the elements of the evaluation dimension;
the sensitivity of the COA is also analyzed with respect to the changing
conditions. When an option is considered and rejected then new threats are
identified (which could have resulted due to the implementation of the rejected
COA); commanders put those new possible threats on the evaluation
dimension as well. The moment a satisfactory option is found it is selected as
final for implementation. The evaluation of alternatives is not a rigorous
procedure however the idea is to rapidly simulate the options in mind and
making sure that it will satisfy the evaluation dimension.
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Consider this example (explanation from the interview of FGC 7). An FGC was
called to a fire incident in a warehouse storing used tires; nearly 400,000 in
total. If one tire is burned then it releases several gallons of oil. This was adding
to the fire loading material. The commander was initially told that it was a
rubbish fire he was going to, however from a distance when he saw the huge
plume of smoke he knew that it is a substantial fire. Whilst en route he asked
for more fire appliances and on reaching the incident ground (and finding out
that there were 400,000 tires on fire) he increased the number of fire appliances
to 6 so that he can have more manpower and resources. Now the resource that
he first used to fight the fire was water which as mentioned by another
commander that they have in abundance. At one time, they were using nearly
2000 gallons of water per minute.
The commander assessed the sensitivity of this course of action (use of water
to extinguish the fire). He said: The trouble is I am putting water on the fire scene about
2000 gallons of water a minute and that water was to go somewhere clearly we were not being
able to putting the fire out. The commander knew that they would never be able to
extinguish the fire because of the number of tires involved. The commander
was in contact with HAZMAT officers as well and they were telling him that the
fumes from this fire could cause lots of problems to the residents. Later the
environmental agencies also reached the scene. They pressed the commander
to not to use water any more since there were waterbeds nearby. If this toxic
water will enter the waterbeds then it will contaminate the drinking water. The
commander was stuck in between, two courses of actions: (i) whether not to
extinguish the fire which may force them to evacuate a large city due to the
huge toxic smoke or (ii) try to extinguish the fire which may then contaminate
the waterbeds if the water used for extinguishing the fire enter the waterbeds.
The commander decided between the two COA by monitoring the wind
direction first. The direction of wind is certainly an important cue. Fortunately,
the wind direction on that time was taking the smoke fumes away from the city.
He established a contact with Met office and asked them to keep reporting him
about any possibility of change of wind direction. To save the waterbeds, he
immediately stopped his activities to extinguish the fire (thus selecting the first
COA). The other cues that commander noticed that prompted him to select the
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selected COA was that there were houses in the route of the smoke however
there was a steep slope just under the incident site. The houses were many
meters below the incident ground; moreover the smoke was going several
meters up in the air. Between the incident ground and the houses there was a
large field. So the distance (a cue) between the houses and the incident ground
and the height (another cue) to which the smoke fumes were going up in the air
assured the commander that residents will not be affected by the smoke and he
can get away with leaving the fire burn itself out. Secondly the decision to stop
the use of water averted the chances of flooding the houses on the side of the
slope.
It is evident from this example that the commander paid attention to cues of
threats the environment is producing and the threats that the selected option for
solving the problem may produce. He was looking for a solution that can satisfy
both types of threats and do not produce any new threats. He selected an
option ‘not to do anything’ which is a valid option according to Janis & Mann
(1977); that option or course of action satisfied the needs of the situation. The
wind direction never changed throughout the incident and three days after the
incident. The tire dump kept burning for three days. And the water they used
initially was to a large extent absorbed by the grass on which the tires were
placed. Had they used water a little longer then they would have been dealing
with problem of large scale water contamination which they would have
produced in pursuit of solving another problem.
4.4.2.3 Feedback
In decision making on fireground, a feedback process does not occur only
once. Just like there are many small problems needing a solution, every
problem also need a feedback to assure the commander that the implemented
action has worked. How do cues help in this regard? Consider a room which is
about to go into backdraft, a ventilation made to prevent this to happen can
either cause a sudden backdraft or it may prevent it. Many commanders say
that once a ventilation point is made in the room full of combustible gases and
water spray is used to further cool down the room’s atmosphere, there is a
chance that the backdraft can be averted. How do decision makers know
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whether their solution has worked? Soon after a ventilation point is made, the
inside of the room gradually becomes visible, the smoke is gone and
temperature starts to drop (which can be noted using thermal imaging camera).
These cues help an FGC to notice that his/her decision was right. Similarly, in
case of flashover, although it is not possible to save what’s on fire, the fire can
be prevented from engulfing the surrounding objects. An example of feedback
from environmental cues can be obtained from the case of tire dump fire
incident discussed in a previous section. The crew stayed on the incident
ground for many days. All this time, the crew members were observing the wind
direction and the spread of fire. The commander said, had the wind direction
changed, they would have attacked the fire offensively and would have to
evacuate the surrounding areas.
Another example can be taken from the classic research conducted by Klein et
al (1986) (excerpts included): ‘......the room was unusually hot and unusually quiet. The
firefighters continued to hit the visible flames, but water was not affecting the heat. The Captain
was in the habit of leaving his ear flaps open on his mask. He could sense the intense heat and
experience the quiet. ‘It (the fire) was different enough, it didn't react normally. If you cool
something down, it becomes cool and this didn't. The quietness got me. There was something
wrong.’ Capt. L told his men to evacuate. The men said, ‘Where's Jack, Jack is missing!’ as
they were going out. The men were unaware that the Captain had told this man to take a break.
The Captain thought the man was genuinely missing and remained. The Captain ran to the
window to inquire about the man and ask for another line. Just as he did, the floor in the
adjoining room collapsed (where the firefighters had exited) and the Captain jumped out the
window. After joining the firefighters outside, Capt. L found out the fire was in the basement and
joined the other firefighters in containing it’. As evident from the example, the
commander was paying attention to the cues, which he was expecting there. In
this case, the commander wanted to feel the decreasing temperature. However,
when it didn’t happened he decided to leave the premises immediately. In
another example, a house was on fire and the firefighters were fighting the fire
defensively. The commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 15): I had
asked for spot temperature to be recorded inside so we could review the effects on the property
as the incident progressed. This was because the temperature would be a good
indicator of whether the firefighting is making any difference. A significant drop
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in the temperature would even have prompted the commander to change the
fire fighting strategy from defensive to offensive.
The above examples prove that the use of cues aid in feedback as well. Cues
are effective interpreter of the efforts of the commanders; if the intended results
are achieved then the expected cues will appear otherwise the situation will
remain the same. This is another point where a commander may go back to the
initiating stage of problem recognition and improve the mental model by
gathering more information which may result in prescribing another course of
action.
4.5 Cue-centric Model of the FGC’s Decision Making Process
Using the thematic analysis procedure explained in section 3.7 and 3.8, this
research has found that in nonroutine situations when patterns are not easily
extractable (i.e., pattern recognition fails), are unsuitable or avoided then
FireGround Incident Commanders (FGC) make decisions via this approach:
1. For defining a problem, the FGCs extract those environmental cues that
have high diagnosticity, importance and relevance with respect to the
current situation; those cues, which are compound in nature, may also
be decomposed to use individual cues making that compound.
2. Recognizing Problems through Cue Processing:
a. Cues obtained from step 1 are processed for developing a mental
model to understand the situation and defining the problem. A
mental model is a mental representation of the current situation. It
is a result of specifying many elements such as expectations
building and noting their violation, assessing the probability and
possibility of loss, development of hypotheses to explain the
situation, identification of leverage points, identification of threats,
development of plans, setting goals, and anticipating future.
b. Parallel to this, a commander may divert attention to naturally
occurring phenomenon of pattern recognition (i.e., categorizing
the external situation with respect to internal categories
representing past experiences; see chapter 2 for a detail
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discussion of pattern recognition) which are identified using only
few key cues, and can be confirmed by searching more cues
conforming to that category.
Compare Cue-based mental model and Pattern-recognized mental
model:
c. Mental model develop through cue processing and mental model
obtained through pattern recognition are compared mentally. The
comparison fails if the pattern-based mental model is unable to
explain all (diagnostic, relevant and important) cues gathered by
the FGC and ignores some of those environmental cues as
anomalous with respect to the identified category. This model
proposes that in both cases of comparison outcome, i.e., success
or failure, the model developed through cue processing is
preferred over pattern based mental model. However, in case of
successful comparison, FGC feel more confident about his/her
understanding of the current nonroutine situation.
During this step, a course of action is also recommended. This course of
action is not final and may be rejected or accepted based on the
assessment made in the next step.
3. Once a mental model is developed and a course of action (COA) is
recommended, the COA is evaluated. A COA is evaluated through
mental simulation, and checking its sensitivity in different situations;
during this process the FGCs pay close attention to the cues that will
either prove the suitability of the COA or its unsuitability in the current
situation.
4. If a COA is found appropriate then it is implemented and feedback is
obtained through assessing cues after its implementation. If a COA is
found inappropriate then a call is made to step 2 for gathering more
information, reassessing what the problem is and modifying the mental
model which subsequently then recommends a new COA for
consideration.
A pictorial representation of the model is shown in the figure below.
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Figure 5: Cue-centric Model of the FGC’s Decision Making
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4.6 Related Phenomena: Future Directions
There were three phenomena that were found during this study that have
influence on the FGCs’ decision making process. They are: (a) public pressure
(b) interpersonal communication, and (c) locating the fire incident ground.
4.6.1 Public Pressure
Most FGCs talked about their experiences of the external pressure that they
face from the general public and the media gathered around the incident scene.
For example, in one incident a commander committed a crew member into a
river to search for a boy who had drowned 15-20 minutes ago and was not
visible since then. The commander was under the (as placed by another
commander) ‘immense moral pressure’ to make a decision. Although he knew
that now it is a body retrieval case, which is not his crew’s responsibility
however leaving the incident ground then was just not possible. The result was
the death of the crewmember by drowning who was sent for body search; that
crewmember failed to keep afloat since he was not trained for body search
tactics. Similarly, in another case, a commander was under pressure to commit
his crewmembers to search for a woman in a house, which was on fire. Nobody
had seen her since the start of the incident. She was not visible from the room
window where she was supposed to be present. No one had heard her
screams as well. The woman’s husband who managed to escape from the
burning house was adding violent pressure to the agitated pressure from the
crowd. However the FGC decided not to send his crewmembers in there. The
body was found later and the examination confirmed that she died in the initial
moments of the fire due to smoke inhalation. That commander said (excerpt
from the interview of FGC 2): There are certain instances where you are having a huge
moral pressure to act. I think this is something that comes with experience possibly or the
nature of the person to how they react to that. There are many cases in other fire services
throughout the country that due to moral pressure FF have lost their lives. There is a likelihood
that members of the public will act if you don’t. It was purely because of the development of the
fire that member of the public didn’t went back into the house and because police was in
attendance. The presence of public is the direct reason of external pressure.
However another reason is the moral pressure that a commander face and may
have to take risks in trying to save a probably unsavable life. A commander put
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this as (excerpt from the interview of FGC 15): Problems come in when people get into
this moral dilemma if they know that somebody need rescuing at that time they take greater risk
because at that time they will be focusing on rescue rather than the condition of the room and
decide whether it is safe.
The public pressure and their presence on the scene can also make the
operation difficult. A commander said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 7):
When we went to this job there were 300 people watching it. And I couldn’t get the fire engine down
this road. Although, the expectations of people is there but I am looking from the point of view of
health and safety risk. Should the wind direction change or someone if get knocked over by the fire
engine luckily for me there was a police commander on site I had the police helicopter we
immediately start moving people away. But this presence of public was still producing
pressure which cannot be dismissed. A less experienced commander such as part
time FGCs and firefighters, under such pressure may take an action, which may
result in causing harm to the crewmembers or the bystanders.
There is a need to do more research in this area and find how commanders are
affected by public pressure. There is also a need to educate the members of
the public so that the problem can be dealt with as a social problem. Regular
fire evacuation exercises should not only include how people should evacuate
the building but it should also include training to make people control their
emotions and let the firefighters do their job.
4.6.2 Interpersonal Communication & Team Building
An interesting aspect of team building is to find people who can coexist and
work. This is specially the case when the team members are required to work
on tasks which involves saving the lives and property of people. Many
commanders and firefighters were of the opinion that they face a different type
of pressure when they are working with less familiar partners/crewmembers. A
commander narrated a near death experience in which his BA wearing partner
was new to him. He said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 5): My partner that day
had been detached in from another station. Although we are all trained to the same standard, it
is more comforting when you are used to wearing BA with a team colleague, another firefighter
from another station always adds a slight apprehension to such situations. Unluckily the two
BA wearers supposed that the situation is of ordinary nature therefore they
didn’t followed the standard operating procedure to put a line which would trace
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their route back to safety this resulted in their getting caught into a sudden
rolling flashover. When people are working with known people then they know
each other’s mental capabilities and judgmental abilities. The commander said
that if he had been working with his usual partner then they would have
followed the SOPs because in his opinion his usual partner was a careful
person. Not only firefighters but the commanders also feel uneasy when they
are working with crewmembers they are less familiar with. As evident from this
excerpt (excerpt from the interview of FGC 8): For this to take place (implementation
of the plan), I required experienced sector commanders to implement my plan and (therefore I)
chose officers on scene who I trusted. This is not always possible but on this occasion, I was
fortunate to have personnel whom I had worked with for many years.
The commanders are also of the opinion that the success of a fire rescue
operation equally lies on good interpersonal trust. A commander said (excerpt
from the interview of FGC 8): That (success of plan) also depend upon the crew I am working
with. If it’s the crew that I know and I know the personal and I know their abilities then i might look at
the things that yes I trust their judgment and then the initial attack to see what the conditions are like
or if I am unfamiliar with them or if I see some new personal who I didn’t knew I may take a slightly
different view and will deal with it defensively and make it sure that they will do what I ask them to
do. Commanders reduce their cognitive load by interpersonal trust and good
communication. A commander reveals that (excerpt from the interview of FGC
8): Every incident have one commander and few sector commanders. I as an FGC give brief to
the sector commanders. They in turn instruct their FF to implement it. However, they can also
make decisions and so long as they follow the brief that I have given to them. For example, in
this incident, I gave an instruction with regard to water, I said that when we get water we want
larger hose, because we can then put out fire effectively. I briefed one of the sector
commanders to look after his sector at the front of the house. And manage the water supplies
and that’s I needed to tell him…..How he did that is upto him. The last thing that I said that if
you have any problems or questions come back to me. I was still able to see from that point that
whether things are progressing or not because it was a very small area to cover. At larger
incidents, such as larger industrial premises where the main control area could be 200-300
meters away, again in this situation we work through trust in each other and how we operate. It
should also be noted that to ensure that sector commanders and the fire crew
follow a commander’s instructions, a commander should be able to
communicate his/her plan effectively.
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Commander should also know the capabilities and limitation of each
crewmember and should express him/herself in such a way that each
crewmember should know what is in the mind of the commander. A commander
said (excerpt from the interview of FGC 8):...unless I will not physically draw them
(plan) people are not going to know it. So it is the communication that is also very important.
Everyone must know that what’s going on in my head and that where and how you get the real
transformation of the information and that’s how I make sure that the plan that I have on mind is
actually working.
Lack of communication and trust may complicate things and usual operations
can become a large interpersonal communication exercise. A commander said
(excerpt from the interview of FGC 11): We had fifteen appliances at a farm fire and
about six officers. I initially arrived to assess what was being done. It was spread over a
massive area, about 40-50 acres and the area was heavily engulfed in fire. The difficulty in that
fire operation was because the fire was being tackled in so many different areas it took a long
time to get an effective communication between myself and the commanders on the ground to
actually get a single plan. We decided to pull everyone out and call more appliances and try to
meet the spreading fire and try and extinguish it. It was not a difficult fire but it was difficult in
terms of communication. There were so many people that we were not to work against each
other. While emphasizing the need of teams which have full trust in each other,
commanders believe that team members should be aware of each other
personally to some extent. A commander said: When you know someone well and you
know how they work you tend to trust in the information that they are feeding back to you. If you
don’t know a crew member that well then you might question the information passed on by him
a little bit more. You will certainly rely on the information coming from the sectors commanders,
and the crew member you know.
If a commander is working with unknown face or less experienced commanders
then the things may go wrong. Consider this example (excerpt from the
interview of FGC 8): I had the fire the other week. I was mentoring the IC. The ground floor
was burning out, upstairs were sealed. There was no one in the house. I sectorized the incident
with the back sector as the sector 3 and the sector 1 on the front where the FGC was. We
extinguish the fire almost on the downstairs but it exceeds and we see something is going on
upstairs and the chances are that it could be through the roof so i set with the OIC and i said tell
you what i am going to do we will ventilate it and we will do it coordinated. We will go from the
back, the window was in the sector 3 and 1. We will ventilate the sector 1 and then ventilate the
3 and hopefully get the jets in there at the same time and hit the first floor. In the meantime at
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the same time, because of the lack of knowledge, the fire grown because the crew in the sector
3 started breaking the windows and put water in without coordinating. Next thing i knew that
there was fire in the roof and I asked that why is the roof on fire? I can’t understand that what
was going on. I had a quick roam around I came to know that they have taken action without
being coordinating with the FGC who has the overall picture and therefore we lost half of the
roof because of the action of the crew. It was a mistake on sector 3 commanders’ part he
should know that particularly ventilation must be coordinating and we lost half of the roof.
Team building for emergency response is a vital part of successful operation.
Although care is taken in team development and usually teams consist of
people who know each other well however the teams where members are new
to each other is unavoidable for many reasons. More research is required on
team building for firefighting operations and also to train personnel to work with
each other when working with new members in small and short term teams,
effectively.
4.6.3 Locating the Fire Incident Ground
Similar to the findings of study conducted by Landgren (2005) for Swedish fire
and rescue service, it is found that firefighters working in the UK also face
problems occasionally in finding the exact location of the fireground. Here is an
example (excerpt from the interview of FGC 15): We got call for a house fire and it
was nearly three in the morning. As we were mobile to the incident the first thing which we got
was what we call revised address. So the fire control was getting numerous calls to say that
there is a house fire. A lot of those calls were panicked and frantic. So the information took
some time before we got a proper address. Fortunately the initial address that we got was in the
same direction as where the house fire turned out to be. So we received a radio message to
receive a revised address. In another incident, a commander was not told about the
exact way to reach the building on fire although the address was correct. When I
came to the site I didn’t know the site but the access was little bit hit and miss, the first time I
went towards the building it was not the right access to the building so I had to back out and
use a different access route to get to the building (excerpt from the interview of FGC 9).
I believe that IT can play its role in this area; software applications can be
developed for locating the fireground precisely. However debate is open to the
researchers.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Bruner (1951) noted that when a representative category for the current
situation from past experiences is not available, or when the linkage between
cue and category is low in probability in the past experience of the decision
maker, the conscious process of cue searching occurs. These cases are
nonroutine in nature and referred to in the previous chapters as the cases when
patterns are not easily extractable, or pattern recognition is not suitable or
avoided altogether. Under these circumstances, the decision maker is ‘open’ to
maximum stimulation (Bruner, 1951). It is found that in such situations during
fireground command decision making, cues are comprehensively used for
processes such as developing mental model, identifying threats, opportunities,
goals, or assessing a course of action. It is important to note that the past
experiences still play an important role in decision making during nonroutine
incidents; however, the emphasis is not on finding a reference event to
compare the current event with; in fact the FGCs make decisions by using their
experience with those environmental cues that are gathered from the incident
scene.
Consider this incident as example of cue-centric decisions (FGC 8): It was
probably about 1993. So I was a fire man. It was before we knew a great deal about backdraft/
flashover. We deal with them traditionally. I turned up at a house fire. We were a crew of four.
Me and my mate went into the house through the front door. There was not a lot of smoke down
stairs. As well in the first floor, smoke was about hanging up there, it looked a great deal a small
fire perhaps. As we went up there everything was red hot absolutely red hot; it was burning and
burning but there was no fire. Nothing was on fire. We searched couple of rooms couldn’t find
any fire. It was only three bedrooms semi-detached house. We searched around looking for this
fire but we couldn’t find anything at all. We went back down stairs and ask the OIC what he
think because we can’t see any fire, bear in mind that we didn’t knew a lot about the backdraft
and flashover at that time. The OIC was looking from outside and he said that it must be really
small fire then, if we can’t find it and suggested ventilation. But it was really hot in there,
exceptionally hot. So we thought to just ventilate it. So we start to ventilate the room by opening
the rooms in the hallway. We realize that the room we have been in, on ventilation the gases
start to disappear; everything in the house started to melt. There was still no fire, but everything
started to melt. Smoke alarmer melted. Everything was dripping and melting which tells that the
heat was up there. We find this room where we have not been to, so we laid down. I told my
mate that i will open the door thinking that this room is probably near to the fire. But there were
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no visible signs of fire, just heat and smoke. And as we did that, as we opened the door about a
little, and went to pick the bench up to put it between the door, the door slammed back; and it
started creaking and creaking. It was a normal domestic door. And I started to think that I don’t
know what this is. We knew that there is a lot of pressure in there. But we didn’t understand the
reason of the pressure. We decided to just open the window from outside. We put a ladder near
to the window; which the other crewmembers did. When the outside crewmembers tried to open
the window, a biggest plume of smoke came out from the window straight over the lads and
suddenly the whole room engulfed in flames.…we didn’t quite knew that what’s going on and
didn’t liked the sound of it. We asked them to ventilate from outside that was the best decision I
have made in my life.
This example shows that the FGC was unaware of any possibility of a situation
which is fairly common today, i.e., backdraft (backdraft is a sudden fire in a
room full of hot gases with no open ventilation points. The gases accumulate
because there is no escape route and consume all oxygen in the room so the
fire starves itself leaving hot gases behind. As soon as there is any inlet of
oxygen, all hot gases ignite and cause explosion). However, the FGC made the
decision in this nonroutine situation by relying on cues and their assessment.
The decision to ventilate the room by opening the window saved the firefighters
from an accident. The nonroutine nature of the situation made the experienced
FGC and the FFs as novices for this particular situation; the use of thorough
search and assessment in this example showed its appropriateness for both
experts and complete novice or novices who are otherwise experts. The only
requirement to use this model is stock of domain knowledge and familiarity with
the cues, which can be obtained from training (Klein, 1993).
5.1 DISCUSSION
The results in the previous chapters indicate an approach to decision making
during firefighting not previously discussed in the literature. The model explains
how the FGCs make decisions in nonroutine situations when pattern
recognition is not only difficult but is also misleading. In this chapter, several
aspects of this research are discussed: (a) a cue-centric model of the FGCs’
decision making process for nonroutine situations (b) its application in routine
situations besides the nonroutine situations (c) level of expertise required for
using this model and (d) its application.
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5.1.1 Cue-centric Model of the FGC’s Decision Making Process
The major finding of this research is that the FGCs base their decisions on a
thorough search and assessment of cues in nonroutine situations where pattern
recognition is difficult, misleading, avoided or when a commander was not
experienced enough to make decisions through pattern recognition. Senior
FGCs do try to explain their decisions through top down (Hoffman et al, 1995)
pattern recognition approach for decisions made in nonroutine situation as well
because of the lack of appreciation of the role of cues in decision making. As
mentioned in an earlier chapter, top down decision making approach is a cycle
of forming and testing mental models for understanding the situation. Another
reason is because so far no other explanation of fireground command decision
making was available in the literature. Yet another reason is that decision
makers are usually not aware of how they do things differently in different
situations (Klein et al, 1986).
The proposition is that commanders develop mental models of the nonroutine
situations through a bottom up (Hoffman et al, 1995) approach using an
assessment of cues. Bottom up here means that FGC do not try to fit a situation
in a frame retrieved from memory through only a few key cues, because
processing information in this way results in ignoring those cues, which are not
congruent with the frame. In fact in nonroutine situations, commanders gather
valuable cues based on their diagnostic value, importance and their relevance,
they then build a mental model through combining these cues to make a bigger
picture. This guarantees that each valuable cue is used for decision making.
This process of assessing cues is performed unconsciously and rapidly and is
mostly based on familiarity with those cues and domain knowledge. The
development of a mental model to identify the problem is based on identification
of many other elements. During this process, an FGC identify central and
peripheral cues, build expectations about how the situation would look like or
how severe the problem is, an FGC also notice that how the condition of current
cues violate the expectations about those cues. The FGCs also develop
hypotheses to explain all the valuable cues selected from the environment and
assess the probability and possibility that the identified problem will get serious.
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If the probability and possibility of problem is high then the problem is
immediately dealt with otherwise in practice it is delegated to subordinates. An
FGC also identify goals and opportunities to make situation better. The threats
that can hinder the achievement of those goals are also identified. Together
these elements help identify what the problem is and build a mental model. This
assessment of cues also results in the prescribing an appropriate course of
action (COA), which almost mechanically comes to their mind; this COA is then
simulated to check its appropriateness. If during this process, more information
comes in then the mental model is modified.
This model also recognizes that since pattern recognition is a naturally
occurring phenomenon, therefore, an FGC always try to identify a category that
is representative of the current situation. The model has a provision to compare
the mental model developed through pattern recognition and the mental model
developed through cue assessment. The comparison is successful if the pattern
recognition model is able to account for all the cues that are gathered for
developing a cue-centric mental model. The comparison fails if the pattern
recognition is not able to account for all the gathered cues. When the
comparison is successful, the commanders feel more confident about their
assessment of the situation. However, if the comparison fails then the
commanders continue with the cue-centric model because it explains all the
valuable cues (thus explaining the situation well). Similar to Klein et al (1986),
for our subjects, option generation fell out of their situational awareness. The
FGCs were able to identify good options immediately – this was part of their
skill. A suitable course of action (COA) comes to the mind of the FGC
automatically. However, in contrast to Klein et al, this research is placing more
of the burden on the familiarity with cues and the use of domain knowledge for
developing a mental model to represent a situation and generate a plausible
option in nonroutine situation as the first one considered.
Once a course of action is suggested, the decision maker tests the COA on an
evaluation dimension serially. The selected COA is also tested for its sensitivity
to the changing situation, i.e., it is checked how it will behave if the actual
situation is slightly different from what is perceived. For a time-limited task
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concurrent evaluation is probably impossible as it takes a lot of time to consider
all the options along all the evaluation dimensions. It is found that options are
evaluated in serial fashion (Klein et al, 1986).
The figure 6 below shows concurrent evaluation of COA, serial evaluation as
explained by Klein et al (1986) and the serial evaluation process as explained in
this research. Figure 6-a shows a standard decision analytical structure, with
the options down the side and the evaluation dimensions across the top. In
such a model, the decision maker is presumed to consider several options at
the same time; perhaps performing pair-wise comparisons, and to make
concurrent, conscious judgments and relative evaluations of the strengths and
weaknesses of the different options (Klein et al, 1986). In contrast, figure 6-b
shows a serial option evaluation model. Here, an option is generated, and then
either implemented or rejected (Klein et al, 1986). If rejected, a second option is
considered, and so forth (Klein et al, 1986). This may be described as a serial
model of decision making, because although one or more options are
considered, only one option is examined at a time (Klein et al, 1986). Several
approaches to serial evaluation models have been proposed. Some of them are
shown in the table 10 below:
Lexicographic method (Aumann, 1964; MacCrimmion, 1968): It postulates that a decision maker
generates a set of options, orders the evaluation dimensions, starts with the most important, and selects
the option that has the highest rank on the most important dimension. If there is no clear winner, the
second dimension is examined, and so on. This model allows serial evaluation, but still concurrent
consideration of options, and does not fit the majority of data.
Elimination by aspects (Tversky, 1972): Here, several options are generated, they are evaluated on the
first dimension, any that do not pass a criterion are rejected, and the remainder are evaluated on the
second dimension, and so on. Again, this is concurrent consideration of options and serial evaluation on
dimensions. This model does not fit data because it stops when one option is left remaining. This could
still take a long time, and It is unrealistic since an option might still be unacceptable on remaining
dimensions. Finally, It does not allow the generation of new options without starting the whole process
over. Clearly, this will not do for a time-pressured task.
Conjunctive Standards (Bettman, 1971; Kleinmuntz, 1968). Here, there are criteria for each evaluation
dimension. One option is generated, and if It fails to meet any of the criteria it is rejected and. a second
option is evaluated.
Table 10: Serial Evaluation Models
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Figure 6: Models of Option Evaluation
Figure 6-c shows the approach proposed in this research. The evaluation
dimension initially consists of threats, goals, and opportunities. If the COA is
able to satisfy these elements and does not produce any more threats then it is
selected as an option for further processing or implementation. However, if the
COA fails to satisfy the threats, goals, and opportunities and instead uncovers
more threats that may come up if it is implemented then those threats are also
added to the evaluation dimension.
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This is a serial evaluation of COAs and is more close to conjunctive standards
(Bettman, 1971; Kleinmuntz, 1968) and Klein et al (1986) serial evaluation of
options. The difference between this process and conjunctive standards and
Klein et al’s described process is that unlike them, it ‘does’ describe what
constitutes the evaluation dimension and how it is further populated and that
the options are evaluated thoroughly (it is necessary to evaluate an option
thoroughly because of nonroutine nature of a situation) against threats, goals
and opportunities and globally against any subsequent element placed on
evaluation dimension. If the COA is not suitable and during the simulation
process some more information comes in then the mental model is modified
using the new set of information, which then leads to identification of another
COA.
This model is also consistent with Simon's (1960) notion of satisficing. Simon
introduced the concept of satisficing to point out that decision makers typically
do not do all the work to ensure optimal decisions. In cue-centric model, the
search for an option is not for an optimal solution but for a solution, which
meets the minimum requirement of satisfying goals, threats and use
opportunities and is not producing any new threats. Certainly one can find
several options, which satisfy this criterion to a varying degree but the first one
that satisfies this need is selected immediately.
Following are the main differences between pattern recognition and cue-centric
models of the FGCs’ decision making.
Pattern Recognition Cue-centric
Schema based Familiarity with cues & Domain knowledge
based
Mental model is mapped on to the current
situation (top down)
Mental model is developed from the
environmental cues (bottom up)
Cues not conforming with the mental model
retrieved from memory are ignored
All important, relevant and diagnostic cues are
used to develop mental model
High chance of introduction of biases in
decision making when pattern recognition is
Low or no chances of introduction of biases in
decision making
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difficult or unsuitable altogether
Not clear in situations when more than one
mental models are applicable
Only one mental model is developed using
cues
Only applicable to experts Applicable to both experts and FGCs with
moderate experience but adequate training
Not applicable in situations when pattern
recognition fail
Applicable in all situations including when a
pattern can be identified
Table 11: Difference between Pattern Recognition and Cue-centric Models of Decision
Making
5.1.2 Applicability in Routine Situations
Pattern recognition based models are applicable in highly routine situations.
This model on the other hand is not only applicable in nonroutine situations (for
which it is primarily developed) but also in routine situations. Klein (2005)
believes that decision makers such as FGCs identify patterns (categories)
through only few key cues. This is dangerous in the sense that these few key
cues can lead to placement of all subsequent cues in a wrong category. On the
other hand if a category is identified correctly for routine situations then it will
reduce the chances of biases. If a mental model for routine situation is also
developed through thorough search for valuable cues, in bottom up fashion,
decision makers will be more confident about the category identified thus
avoiding the chances of inaccurate assessment of the situation and
incorporating all the valuable information.
5.1.3 Level of Expertise Required
Experts compared to less experienced professionals differ primarily in their
knowledge schema (Klein & Hoffman, 1992). Experts possessed a large
number of schemas that enable them to categorize problems according to
underlying concepts and laws and then apply well known basic approaches for
solving problems of a given type (Klein & Hoffman, 1992). However there are
different strategies that are also applicable in an experts’ decision making,
which are bottom up besides the top down approach. Hoffman et al have
concluded that both experts and novices rely to some extent on top down and
bottom up reasoning; but for different reasons. Experts use bottom up approach
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when no fitting schema is available for comparing the current situation and
making decisions.
Schema based models that follow a top down approach are appropriate only for
expert FGCs. This is because they rely on incident specific memories, which
can be modified to represent the current situation. However, the model present
in this research is not only applicable to experts but also to novice FGCs. It is
because the only requirement of this model is the familiarity with the cues and
domain knowledge, which can normally be obtained through training. Even a
complete novice FGC is still able to identify critical cues. They are not
overwhelmed with information and are reasonably aware of important items of
information (Klein & Hoffman, 1992). In the 80s and 90s the fireground
command decision making was not as extensive as it is today, therefore it can
be relied on for providing right information for making decisions. This model
incorporates a less experienced commander’s ability to ‘see what is there’ and
the experts’ ability to ‘see what is there and what is not there’ (Klein & Hoffman,
1992).
5.1.4 Potential Application
The cue-centric model of decision making under time stress for nonroutine
situations has potential implications for the selection, training and support of
decision makers. The model suggests that it will be useless to require decision
makers to search for representative category to reflect the current
environmental situation when the problem is not of routine nature. This is a
time-consuming process. Instead, decision makers must rely on their familiarity
of cues and experience with those cues and domain knowledge to build a
mental model using them (cues). With regard to selection, there may be
individual differences in the way people feel comfortable relying on cues of
different types. Different experts and novices have different levels of familiarity
with cues that appear in different types of fires. If these differences could be
established and validated, it may help assign individuals to conditions where a
certain type of cues may be more dominant as compared to other type of cues.
With regard to training, it may be valuable to reconsider the worth of teaching
people to concentrate more on assessment of cues and generate and evaluate
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‘a’ mental model instead of a variety of partially matching models. Finally, this
model suggests that it would be a mistake to develop decision aids only along
the lines of pattern recognition based decision theories. In nonroutine
situations, people need more detailed information on the environment and
decision aids that can support this information will not only be helpful for
nonroutine situations but also for routine situations therefore it would be much
more valuable to make sure that decision support systems are providing an
effective situational awareness, which will improve performance (Klein et al,
1986).
5.2 CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
This research had expected to study those details of pattern recognition
process that are not explained in the RPD model, and instead this research
found that pattern recognition does not explain all types of decisions. Therefore
a new model is developed whereby the FGCs make decisions in nonroutine
situations using thorough search and assessment of cues and links decision
making to identification and selection of valuable cues and use of domain
knowledge to accurately reflect the current situation. It asserts that decision
behavior can no longer be attributed only to pattern recognition for all types of
situations.
Research is needed into using this model in training the FGCs. It is hoped that
the use of this model in training scenarios will provide a means for increasing
the applicability of it more consciously during the fireground command decision
making; it will also be helpful in explaining the decisions as they have actually
been made without wrongly attributing all types of decisions to pattern
recognition.
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APPENDIX A – INCIDENT REPORTING FORMS & INCIDENT
RECORDS
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Critical Incidents Reporting Form
Name:_____________________________________________________________________
Age:______________________________________________________________________
Sex:_______________________________________________________________________
Number of years of experience as IC ___________________________________________
Current Role _______________________________________________________________
Date of when the selected critical incident had occurred ____________________________
Location ___________________________________________________________________
Casualties _________________________________________________________________
Cause ____________________________________________________________________
Please write the incident in the given space below. After completing this short form please return it via
email to: k.shaikh@lboro.ac.uk. Shortly you will be asked for a one-to-one interview.
Thank you
M Khalid SHAIKH
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Individual Incidents
As it can be seen from the data, 18 commanders reported unique incidents;
however, 2 commanders (9, 10) spoke about the same incident. It is because of
the size of the incident (thus making total 20 records). The incident was so big
that it involved 3 levels of expertise. I was able to speak to the initial and the
subsequent commanders. They said that the levels on which they joined the fire
operation were different in dynamics; initially the aim was to prevent the fire
from spreading in the whole premise. Later, the aim became to content the fire
within the same premise.
Questions Asked
a. Information Availability: What information was available?
b. Inferred Information: What information was inferred from the available
information?
c. Information View: How the information was viewed; was it viewed to recall a
similar experience from the past or the information was used at cue/stimulus
level for making decisions?
d. How does the commander view the role of smaller units of information (or
cues) and the role of recognition in making a decision?
e. How were the options selected for making decisions?
f. What was the role of cues in selecting an option for solving a problem?
g. What happens when a commander does not have knowledge about some
phenomena, which is happening before him/her?
h. What strategy was used (offensive/defensive/hybrid)?
i. Analogy: Stress the IC to give analogical examples to further clarify his/her
statement(s).
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Incident # 1
The incident commander on duty was a 43 years old male with 12 years of
experience in the field. The incident occurred on Sun 08th April 2007 at Byron
Industrial Estate. There were no casualties involve. The cause of the incident
was not known, however an arson attack was suspected.
Critical Incident Report:
On Sunday 8th April I was acting Watch manager for a night shift riding 526
(Arnold first pump). At 22.18 we received a call to report of Alarms at Cottee
Fibres, Brookfield Industrial Estate – a large Victorian mill. This call came from
the collector station as the Sprinkler system was linked automatically. Thus we
were sent alone – 1 pump attendance. However, unbeknown to us a number of
999 calls were being received by control reporting a fire and they therefore
mobilised a second pump whilst we were en-route. Upon our arrival there were
no signs of fire, this is a large 70m by 30m three storey building within a large
complex of old industrial buildings. The Sprinkler bell was sounding but there
was no smoke or signs of fire at the front of the building (where we had arrived).
I decided to undertake a full survey whilst the crew gained full access through
the chained gates. When I walked to a vantage point to view the rear of the
building I could see flames and a smoke plume coming from a 1st floor window.
I immediately sent a message ‘Make Pumps 4 building well alight’. I needed
more information and to assess best access to fight the fire. I printed off a plan
of the area and walked around the other side to see if we could access the fire.
I requested that two of the oncoming appliances attend via the adjoining road at
the back of the building. When I returned to the front, having found out that we
could not get full access to the rear from our location, I made my plans.
Unfortunately we had no additional information on the property, no internal
layouts or hazards info (7.2 (d)). 426 had arrived by this point. I decided to get a
jet on the fire from the nearest point we could access – to leave our two pumps
where they were. The two pumps on the adjoining road could attack the fire
externally from that side. We would then commit
BA wearers with jets from inside the building from the front. I committed 2 BA
with a hosereel to investigate and got 426 to run out a jet round the back to get
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immediate water on the fire. I made pumps 6 to account for the number of BA I
would need to commit and requested an aerial ladder platform in case the fire
developed further – this was a building whose construction (oil soaked timber
floors) and previous and possible current use meant fire spread could be rapid.
I did not want to lose this building. As I was committing the BA, a man
approached me who knew the use of the building. He advised me that the first
two floors were used as a warehouse for wrapping paper, cards etc and the top
floor was a fibre manufacturer – high fire loading. Once I had established a jet
on the fire from 426, it was immediately apparent that the water supply was
poor. I made pumps 8 for water relay from a nearby main road where water
pressure was likely to be higher and advised the FF on the jet that they would
have to make do until other appliances were in attendance.
My BA team then contacted me – they could not find the fire. There was a maze
of stockpiled goods and internal walls all heavily smoke logged. This became
very stressful for me, as I was desperate to know what was going on inside the
building, whether it was spreading and we had insufficient water at that time. I
was determined that I would not have a ‘White Watch car-park’ to my name –
losing my first ‘big’ building. I sent an additional team with a jet (when additional
appliances arrived) a very experienced Watch Manager as BA team leader and
they could not find the fire. Where was the fire, why could we not find it?
Fortunately by this point the two appliances sent to the rear of the building had
already had jets on the fire for a while and were committing BA via a fire
escape. A Station Manager took charge of the overall incident and made me
sector commander of the front sector. It remained frustrating as we sent further
BA teams in who still could not find the fire. The other Sector had the fire under
control and didn’t quite understand why we were so pressured or why I had
made pumps 8. By the end of the incident we had used 4 jets, 1 hosereel jet
and 10 BA. Luckily the Aerial was not required. After approximately 2 hours I
sent a stop message and we started scaling down the incident. The fire had
been restricted, to a large degree, by the sprinkler system and fortunately we
only lost a part of that floor of origin. The seat of the fire was next to a large
frame knitter’s window and our immediate concerns were that it could have
been a malicious act. We left the debris in situ for a fire investigator to assess in
the morning and kept two appliances at the scene overnight damping down in
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case it reignited. They were under strict instructions that they should leave the
debris as much as possible and only extinguish re-ignitions. Unfortunately when
I returned in the morning with the Fire Investigator, they crews had taken it
upon themselves to remove all the debris out of the window so that they would
not have to baby-sit the incident and left us nothing to investigate. We found out
later that the building was owned by a Councillor who was on the Fire Authority
who had decided only recently to keep the sprinkler system rather than
decommission it. The debriefs highlighted the fact that the complex internal
layout combined with heavy smoke logging and stacked boxes obscured the
fire from any viewpoint other than from the adjacent window. Even our thermal
image cameras could not pick up the heat due to the cooling effects of the
sprinkler system. Lessons were learnt and we didn’t have a White Watch car
park!
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Incident # 2
The incident commander on duty was a 40 years old male with 5 years of
experience in the field. The incident occurred on 20/6/2009 at Byron Industrial
Estate. There was one casualties involve (a fire fighter).
Critical Incident Report:
I was first in attendance at a large building used as workshops and storage of
coaches. Smoke was issuing on arrival and I confirmed that there were
cylinders involved so I ‘made pumps 4’, informed Control about the cylinders,
and requested a high-rise appliance. I confirmed that no one was still in the
building (as well as trying to locate plans of the building). I then moved the
appliances either side of the incident due to the severity of the fire and the
likelihood of cylinders exploding. I also requested the attendance of the Police
and Council Emergency Planning Officers so that surrounding properties were
evacuated and the occupants housed temporarily. The crews ran out two jets
(one from each appliance) and we began to fight the fire ‘defensively’. I also
instigated a cordon to identify a safe zone around the incident. I then ‘made
pumps 6’ and asked for an increase in water pressure, as well as the
attendance of the Command Unit. I asked for one of the oncoming appliances
to travel to the incident via a neighbouring road in order to gain information
regarding the rear of the property safely. I also requested that all oncoming
appliances travelled to the incident from a certain direction in order for me to
keep tabs on my resources available. On arrival of the ALP I liased with the
crew as to the best location so that they would have some protection from the
building. I also made sure that none was in the cage as I deemed it too unsafe.
Further jets as necessary were run out to protect a diesel tank and
neighbouring units. When a senior officer arrived I fully briefed him and carried
on in a role of ‘Operations Commander’. Later on I was ordered to utilize
equipment off the Environmental Protection Unit (which is based at Stockhill) in
order to try and prevent the water run-off from polluting the drains. We held two
debriefs on station for the initial crews, but there was debrief held at H.Q. a
couple of months later, although this was poorly attended and some issues
weren’t discussed.
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Incident # 3
Critical Incident Report:
The incident commander incharge for this incident was a 49 years old, male
station manager. He has over 27 years of experiences as IC in the Fire &
Rescue Service. The selected incident occurred on 02/12/08 at Rani Drive,
Heathfield Estate, Nottingham. No casualties were reported. The reason for the
incident was reported as arson. At 18:32 fire control received the first of 42
emergency calls reporting a building on fire in the former Mojo Cash and Carry
Warehouse. The road names given included Fenton Road, Rainy Drive and the
correct address Rani Drive. 2 fire engines were mobilised to the incident which
arrived at 18:38. They were presented with a fire outside the building
underneath a delivery bay canopy. The fire was involving packaging and a large
commercial rubbish skip. This appeared to be connected to the building via a
ducting and was believed to be a rubbish compactor unit. The initial incident
commander is a very experienced watch manager with 28 years service and a
good understanding of operational tactics. At 18:43 he requested assistance
with the message ‘Make pumps 3, large single storey building 10% one end
well alight defensive mode’ I was the duty operations officer covering the
Nottingham City area for the period 09:00 on 2nd December 2008 to 09:00 on
Wednesday 4th December 2008. I had been at work during the day at Fire &
Rescue HQ and went home to be on call at approximately 17:30 arriving at my
home address at about 18:00. I sat down to have a meal at 18:15 and had just
finished this when my pager operated at 18:44. The message said ‘Factory fire,
make pumps 3, Fenton Road’. The criteria for me being mobilised is when 3 fire
crews attend an incident for the purpose of undertaking performance
monitoring. I was mobile in my car to the incident at 18:48 and fire control gave
me additional information that the building involved was not actually on Fenton
Road but was located on the small industrial estate behind there and was the
former Mojo Cash and Carry Warehouse. The assistance message from 18:43
was repeated to me and I was told who the incident commander was. I know
the incident commander very well and have a high level of professional respect
for him so I was confident that his assessment of the situation would be sound.
I know this location and had a basic appreciation of the size and construction of
188
the building though I had never been inside it. While still travelling at 18:48 a
further assistance message was sent; ‘Make pumps 4, Aerial Ladder Platform
required’. This now meant that my role on arrival would be that of incident
commander. I arrived at 18:55. I turned into Rani Drive and parked well away
from the incident to allow oncoming appliances to get closer than I needed to
be. I dressed in my PPE and put on my fire ground radio and contacted the
initial OIC telling him I was there and asking for his location. I ran up to the
incident command point (located on one of the fire engines) and handed my
name tally in and told them that I was not yet taking over. I went to the initial
OIC and asked for a brief. As he was explaining what had happened so far we
walked up to the part of the building where the initial fire was. The background
to this premise is that the Mojo warehouse had ceased trading several years
earlier and the building had stood empty for a long time. In recent months a
business who collect and recycle old clothing had moved in. The Fire & rescue
Service were not aware that they were trading from this location. A week before
the fire the Police attended the premises on routine enquiries and saw that the
fire exits were blocked. They informed the fire & Rescue Service and we did an
emergency fire safety inspection. Due to concerns about the amount of textiles
and clothing in the building, a building risk information inspection took place and
there was risk information placed onto the fire engine mobile data terminals. A
printed copy of this was handed to me while carrying out a hand over briefing
with the initial incident commander. As I took the briefing I walked up to the end
of the building. There was a serious fire under the canopy involving the whole of
one end of the building. The roller shutter doors were closed but starting to
buckle due to heat. I could not see whether the fire was breaking through the
roof at this point but I believed it had not yet vented. Fire fighting involved 2
main hose jets. One was being used to fight the fire at the end of the building. A
second was being directed into a fire exit door to the side of the building that
had been forced open by crews. The building was fully secure when crews
arrived and there was no one in the building. The main risk to crews was from
(a) propane cylinders inside the building and (b) the fact that the fire loading in
the building was very high with no internal separation. I was not happy about us
committing crews in to fight the fire so I confirmed that I wanted us to fight the
fire defensively from outside at this stage. Water supplies were poor and could
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only supply enough water for the 2 jets in use. At 19:05 the initial commander
made pumps 5 for manpower. Prior to taking over I walked around the whole of
the building to get a good understanding of access points and fire spread.
When I looked through the fire exit door where the jet was working the smoke
level was down to about 2 metres above floor level and there was a glow of an
intense fire to one end of the building. I could not see direct flame. The rear end
of the building (furthest from the fire) had another fire exit which crews were
forcing open. Once opened it was found to be blocked by large 1 tonne bales of
compressed clothing so access could not be gained and we could not see
along the length of the building. The fourth side of the building was accessed by
a narrow 1 metre wide path between the wall of the building and a steep earth
bank. I went about 75 metres along this but was becoming concerned that I had
only one way back so turned round. I knew it would not be safe to commit
crews along this path. At 19:10 the fire broke through one end of the roof and I
took over and made pumps 8. The roof was made of corrugated asbestos
cement sheeting. When exposed to fire it fails with explosive force and we
could hear the roof sheets starting to pop. The ALP had arrived at 19:05 and
was awaiting instruction as to where it needed to be deployed. I told them to set
up half way down the building to give me an aerial observation point to try to
judge how far down the building the fire had spread. I also wanted to use it as a
water tower to stop the fire consuming the whole building. Getting extra water
onto the incident ground was now a priority. A junior officer was detailed to take
2 fire engines and start to get water pumped to the scene from a river about
500 metres away. I requested the High Volume Pumping Unit to assist with this
at 19:19. The fire by this time is venting well from one end of the building.
Flames are rising to a height of about 20 metres and there is a large pall of
smoke rising into the night sky. On Fenton Road are a row of houses and I was
concerned about fire spreading to the gardens and sheds behind these houses.
3 crews were round on Fenton Road evacuating people and trying to deploy
covering jets to the gardens. At 19:38 when an additional officer arrived I sent
him round onto Fenton Road to manage this. At 19:40 the fire was now
involving about half the building with 25% of the roof involved. I made pumps 10
and as I was passing this message suddenly the remainder of the roof failed
rapidly with a sequence of large and violent explosions. At 19:41 I made pumps
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12. 75% of the building was now involved in fire and flames were rising to 30
metres into the air. I withdrew all the crews from close to the building and we
reversed the ALP back to a better location. At 19:50 I handed over to a senior
officer and I was placed as the operations commander to direct the fire-fighting
on the incident ground. At 19:52 a message stating 100% of the building was
passed. At this point there was a sudden large explosion believed to be a
propane cylinder which resulted in the end gable wall (opposite to where the fire
started) collapsing. From this point on the fire fighting operation was altered to
prevent spread to other buildings. There was nothing to save in the warehouse,
which was now totally destroyed. Fire fighting and damping down continued for
a further 18 hours.
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Incident # 4
Critical Incident Report:
I received an alerter message and phone call from control room. They
confirmed me the address and the appliances dispatched to the incident scene.
At that time I was posted at skill development center. While en route to the
incident scene, the smoke plume was visible from the SDC. I sent an
informative message to make pumps 10 and requested for an aerial ladder
platform. While en route I can listen to the panic on the incident ground via
radio in my car. I was told that there is poor water supply and we may require
BA wearers to fight the fire from inside. The fire involved acetylene and LPG
cylinders. When I reached the incident scene I parked my car well away from
the incident scene and out of the way of the oncoming appliances. From the
place I was parked I can have a good view of the incident scene while I was
donning the PPE. I can see that the warehouse was a large building which was
well alight. Public gathered to see what was happening. I got debrief from the
Officer Incharge who reached the incident scene before me. I was told that the
building was 150 x 50 meter long structure. It was a storage facility for
hardware and multi use items. Cylinders were involved in the fire; HAZMAT
officer on the scene were inspecting the cylinders. No people were reported to
be victims of the fire. Fire was spreading rapidly because of the acetylene
which is a highly combustible material involved in the fire. Concerns were to
safe the rear of the building, which was an office block. I requested a plan of the
building and generic risk cards for acetylene and LPG cylinders. I spoke with
the owner of the building who confirmed the location of the cylinders and any
other hazardous material stored in the building; he annotated the building plan
to locate these materials. I asked a sector commander to locate the utility
supply points and isolate the building. I requested further information about the
premise via command support or OPS1 and on any building that may be
subject to fire spread. I requested further information about the chemicals
stored inside the building and the potential risks involved. After gathering all this
information I informed the initial commander that I am assuming the charge as
an IC. I donned the surcoat and sent a message back via command support
unit about my taking over. I appointed the former IC as the operations
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commander. I did the 360 survey of the building. I noticed that the office block
at the rear was not yet involved in the fire, but fire and heat was rapidly
spreading towards it. There was a field with horses at the left, there was a road
to the right and immediately in front of the building was a storage yard with
numerous HGVs. The hazards identified were asbestoses roofing, acetylene
and LPG cylinders, rapid fire spread to the rear of the building, general public
(inner and outer cordon required to control them). The incident ground was
divided into four sectors. The main priority was to create a fire break from the
warehouse building to the office block. Cylinders were identified and located
and all information has been passed to the hazmat officer and he was
commencing cooling and monitoring for heat and explosions hazards. In the
sector 3, 4 BA were deployed to create a fire break. In sector 1 jets were used
to cool the cylinders under the instructions of the hazmat officer plus additional
jets were used to bring the fire under control. Aerial ladder platform was placed
in the sector 1 for fighting the fire.
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Incident # 5
Critical Incident Report:
This incident occurred in approximately 1990 whilst I was a Firefighter at
Central Fire Station in the City of Nottingham. The building was known as the
Frymer Factor. It was a large building, approximately 100x40 metres and of
approximately 5 floors. It was previously used as a factory premises and was
undergoing renovation into flats.
There had been several smaller fires there previously although these were not
attended by me. The call to the premises was for a small fire somewhere within
the premises. The mobilization to this was 3 fire appliances and a high-rise
appliance due to the type of the building. 2 fire appliances and the high-rise
were from my station and another fire appliance was from another nearby city
station known as Stockhill. On arrival there was a small amount of smoke
exiting a window on the 4th floor near to one end of the building. My role that
day was breathing apparatus (BA) wearer and I was the Team Leader (TL) of a
team of two on appliance known as 418. My partner that day had been
detached in from another station. Although we are all trained to the same
standard, it is more comforting when you are used to wearing BA with a team
colleague, another fire-fighter from another station always adds a slight
apprehension to such situations. My boss that day was an experienced Sub
Officer from the city from my watch in whom I had total confidence. On arrival
we were briefed to make our way up to the 4th floor and deal with the fire. We
took with us our BA and a line to enable us to haul a firefighting hose up the
outside of the
building. Standard BA entry control procedures were not implemented as this
was considered to be a small fire that might only require BA for comfort.
Unfortunately the staircase at the end of the building we were at was blocked
off as part of the renovation into flats. We walked the length of the building
where we met the Stockhill crew. We located the main spiral staircase and
made our way up to the 4th floor. On leaving the staircase we entered a lobby
area of some 4x4 meters. This then fed the main floor. The area had large
windows that were made up of smaller glazed panels. There were now 4
personnel with BA and another Leading Fire-fighter (LFf) in charge. I and the
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other BA wearers lowered a line out of one of the broken panelled window
areas where the base-crew attached hose. We hauled up the hose and started
to flake it out in preparation to drag it along the length of the building. As the
building was approximately 100 meters long and we were at one end, we had 3
full lengths - approximately 75 meters of house. We considered that this we be
enough to reach the fire. Whilst we had been hauling and preparing the hose,
the LFf had been to recce the incident and had returned under some state of
urgency stating that the fire was growing quickly and that we needed to get
‘under-air’ very quickly. The LFf exited the lobby to liaise with the Sub O to
arrange more resources as he has realised that this was not the small incident
as initially assessed. The hose was ‘charged’ and we donned our BA. As we
were donning we could hear the fire begin to rumble and within seconds we
were engulfed in high temperature smoke. At this point, I realised that we
needed to exit the building as we were not prepared to deal with this fire.
Unfortunately we had not applied the appropriate BA procedures and we had
no means of retracing our steps to safe air outside of the building. The noise
from the fire was very loud and the visibility was less then 100mm. The heat
was so intense that we were forced to the ground away from the ceiling heat.
The gases within the smoke were burning above our heads and this would have
been in the region of 1000oC. We managed to huddle together and
communicate by shouting through our facemasks. The normal means of
retracing steps would have been to follow the hose out of the building; as the
hose went out of a small space where a pane of glass had once been (and 4
stories up) this was not an option. Another option would have been to follow a
guide line out from the scene; we had not laid one. We were in a room with
several doors and windows and only one led to safety. The heat was rising and
we needed to act fast. The only item that we knew went outside was the hose. I
could recall leaving the stair area and walking straight to the window, what we
needed to do was go to the window via the hose, turn 180o and try and locate
the door to the stairs. I recall trying to explain this to my colleagues and needing
to keep in contact with each other due to the lack of visibility. We formed a link,
one holding the window, the others spreading out and keeping contact by
holding hands. I was at the end searching for the door. It felt like an eternity, but
I was convinced that I was right, the door was here somewhere. The
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temperature was radiating down with greater intensity, the visibility was less
than 100mm and our BA air was limited. After several attempts to locate the
door, I eventually found it and communicated this back and we all left the area. I
recall the spiral staircase vividly because as we left, we were obviously under
great stress and we left the most direct route which was close to the centre
where the step was probably only 50mm deep! I recall coming down the stairs
without much control but very quickly…Soon we were outside to the sound of
evacuation signals. We were unaware of this whilst inside, but has become
apparent to all outside that this incident had gone wrong. Unbeknown to us, the
fire had rapidly grown and had progressed via what I can only describe as a
‘rolling flashover’. As the fire progressed from one room to another, it flashed
over and progressed through the factory at an increasing rate. Our relaxed
initial attendance developed into a survival situation within minutes. Our
procedures and decision making was flawed throughout, yet I was fully
complicit. I later learnt that at one stage the boss had decided to ‘make pumps
10’ and one of my colleagues wanted to pass the message as he had always
wanted to be at a 10-pump job; at the time we were inside struggling to exit. No
debrief occurred. My lasting recollection of this incident is that this was the only
one where I actually thought that I was going to die…
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Incident # 6
Critical Incident Report:
The incident commander is a 39 years old male with 3 years of experiences as
IC. His current role is watch manager. The incident he reported occurred at
Sellars Wood Drv. junction of Crabtree Rd., Bulwell, Nottingham. There were no
casualties reported. The cause of the incident was deliberate ignition/ arson. On
the ??? at ??? hours I was the OIC(Officer in Charge) of two fire appliances
deployed from Stockhill Fire Station, Nottingham to a building fire at the junction
of Sellars Wood Drv. And Crabtree Rd., Bulwell, Nottingham. As I collected the
turn out slip and offered the carbon copy to my 2IC (Second in Command)
Crew Manager Tim Marston I commented,’…it’s a building fire, I bet it’s the
abundant warehouse on SellarsWood Drive’. On route I briefed my crew as to
tactics that were to be deployed given that we knew that the establishment we
were attending had been unoccupied for some time and had become a target
for petty crime and arson attacks. On arrival we were met by a large (50x50
metre site) building formerly a public house, issuing a large amount of smoke. I
made a decision that initial resources deployed to this incident would not be
sufficient for the task in hand, to that end I sent a ‘make up’ message ; ‘…make
pumps four, aerial appliances one.’ (This is a request for two more fire engines
and one aerial appliance). I requested the aerial appliance as an insurance
policy because although I may not have needed it, I had been informed earlier
that day that Nottinghamshire’s two aerial appliances were not available due to
mechanical failure and crewing issues. The appliance requested would be
travelling from Derby, some considerable time away. Both appliances had been
parked to the rear of the site and were off the main highway. My 2IC did an
initial investigation to the rear of the property as I deployed crews to get a water
feed in and extend hose reels to the rear of the property. The 2IC confirmed
that the entry to the rear of the property was a suitable access point for an initial
offensive deployment of two breathing apparatus wearers with a hose reel. The
remainder of the building had been secured with ‘site-ex’ steel shuttering to
doors and windows. I allowed my 2IC to supervise the first two BA wearers at
rear of the property as I surveyed the perimeter of the building; I sent an
informative message to control via my incident command point and then
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requested a Rescue Tender because we needed to remove the ‘site-ex’
boarding up material. As I surveyed the building at a distance of 20 meters and
giving me a good overview of the site I noticed that smoke had started to exit
from around the shuttering on the doors and windows, the color of the smoke
was dark and increasing in volume. This triggered me to order the withdrawal of
the two breathing apparatus wearers who I perceived from the change in
conditions to be at risk. As I went to the rear of the property and after radioing
my 2IC I was greeted by the two BA wearers having already withdrawn
because they had made a professional judgment within the building that
conditions were worsening. I was both satisfied and relieved at this decision.
Due to the deteriorating nature of this incident in terms of the aggressiveness of
the fire I decided that defensive tactics would be employed until further
resources arrived. A third appliance arrived from Arnold Fire Station and I
deployed them on the rear flank of the building. I asked them to provide
covering jets as the crew from the Rescue Tender arrived and set about the
task of removing the ‘site-ex’ shuttering from the windows of the building. By
now smoke was issuing from the upper floors of the property and flames were
exiting where the shuttering had been removed. At this point four pumping
appliances were in attendance and I had deployed them into four sectors at the
four flanks of the building. I decided that due to the prevailing wind and the
layout of the building in relation to the fire I would deploy crews offensively
through the front door of the premises once the shuttering had been removed. I
briefed crews and sector commanders on the tactics I wished to employ and
had the fire fighters layout the equipment necessary for the tasks in hand. The
tactic I wanted employing was to make access through the front doors and for a
BA crew to enter with a main jet whilst a Positive Pressure Ventilation fan (PPV)
was directed into the premises in front of the crew. This tactic known as Phase
3 PPV would effectively push the products of combustion away from the BA
crew thus reducing the risk from the environment they were entering. The crews
were briefed throughout the site and the equipment was laid out. I observed fire
fighters creating access at the front door and the front door being breached.
The BA crew were donned and preparing to enter; the PPV crew were training
the fan away from the door. The door was breached and at that point the BA
team that was entering hesitated as the team leader, who was an experienced
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fire fighter paused to grasp a piece of equipment. The fire and exhaust products
pushed out of the property showing all the signs and symptoms of a back draft,
the other member of the BA team was not paying attention as the situation
deteriorated. I observed many fire fighters not reacting to this scenario so I
strolled up and grasped the jet in the BA team wearers hand and applied a
spray from the main jet to push the advancing plume back. I then beckoned the
BA team leader to get on with the task in hand as briefed. The crews then
snapped back into their tasks and as briefed the fan was played on the doors
pushing the products of combustion through the building allowing the BA team
to enter with the main jet followed by another two BA wearers assisting as the
flames were extinguished. The remainder of the incident progressed
successfully following the model of damping down, incident command and
welfare considerations. As this incident had progressed into the early evening I
scaled down resources as appropriate and made arrangements for my crew to
be relieved by the oncoming night shift. The following night shift my 2IC and I
debriefed this incident in our training room. We drew a plan of the site and then
went through how the incident had progressed chronologically from our initial
turn out, to our offensive mode and withdrawal; and then recommitment of BA
teams when further resources allowed. I asked members of the Watch to
contribute with facts and opinions as the events unfolded. I also asked Watch
members to contribute any learning points or safety critical events that had
happened. Penultimately I asked Watch members to suggest ways we could’ve
improved our approach to this incident. I finally thanked all who had attended
this incident and the effort they had shown that afternoon.
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Incident # 7
Critical Incident Report:
On the 29/05/09 at approx 21:30 hrs we received an emergency call to a
rubbish fire at Warsop. A retained appliance from Warsop had also been
mobilised. Shortly after leaving the fire station I had a visual sighting of the
smoke plume. We were approx 5 miles from the incident location and therefore
knew that we were going to be dealing with something far more substantial than
a rubbish fire. Given the smoke plume extended into the sky for approx 1000
metres and was jet black in colour I informed our control room that this was
going to be a major incident and that multiple appliances will be required
together with specialist support from Haz Mat officers to police and the
environment agency. On attendance the Warsop appliance had been at the
incident approx 3 minutes and had carried out an initial assessment of the area.
As I was the highest ranking officer I took charge of the incident and nominated
myself as OIC. At close proximity to the fire I requested a further 6 appliance be
sent to offer support for fire fighting. This automatically prompts our control
room to request the command support unit together with senior officers. The
immediate issues were accessing the site that was on fire and where we were
going to get water from to tackle the fire as massive amounts would be required
and local supplies would be ineffective. My second thought was to protect the
local residents from toxic smoke and to protect nearby property from fire. This
was like no other fire I had attended as by 10 minutes into the incident the fire
plume was approx 200 metres into the air covering an area of approx 2500
square metres. Requesting data on the premise I discovered that there were
approx 500,000 used tyres that were burning together with cylinders (possibly
Acetylene or LPG). Utilising risk based data and conducting a dynamic risk
assessment of the fire I adopted a defensive attack initially. This was to
preserve water supplies until substantial water could be located and to co-
ordinate a prescribed plan of attack liaising with partner agencies. One special
appliance requested was an Aerial Ladder Platform that can be used as an
aerial monitor to spray water downwards. Having positioned this and supplied it
with water the ALP generated a fault and became unusable. However, the
spread of fire was working toward the ALP and posed immediate danger.
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Having sectored the incident into 3 manageable zones, I closed down 1 zone to
focus on protecting a £300,000 appliance from fire. This was successful and the
appliance was re-located to safety. Involved in fire was also 3 steel constructed
buildings with unknown contents. The water monitors we had in place were
ineffective on the intensity of the fire and I decided to re-direct our efforts
toward the buildings and preventing fire spread. Local live stock adjacent to the
fire had been moved to safety and a nearby railway had been contacted to
prohibit trains in the event that I had to utilise the elevated position to fire fight.
With the police in attendance I requested that crowd control be their first priority
as a large volume of public had gathered to see the fire. The police helicopter
had also been sent and utilising a ground officer I requested communication
with the helicopter to use its thermal imaging camera to identify if there was
radiant heat affecting nearby property. Approx 1 hour into the incident a senior
officer approached me for a brief and elected to take charge of the incident.
However, he also stated that I was to remain as Operations commander as I
had initiated so much into the fire fighting plan. The buildings presented their
unique problems as their contents were unknown. However, I did know that the
vehicles adjacent to them (2 large HGV tractor units and a rubber shreading
machine) were considered very valuable and therefore salvage of these were a
priority. I elected to adopt a defensive fire fighting strategy throughout as there
were no lives at risk to save and that property, albeit valuable, did not constitute
risking lives to save it. Liaising with the environment agency, they preferred the
fire not to be extinguished using vast volumes of water as this would present
other problems with run off affecting nearby properties or contaminated water
entering the water table affecting the local water supplies. In total the incident
commanded 10 appliances, 3 specialist appliances, 5 officers, 2 HazMat
officers, Partner agencies, and was not extinguished for approx 6 weeks.
Approx 2 weeks post the incident the service held a structured debrief allowing
all parties involved to pass on 2 learning points and 2 good points from the
incident. This is the protocol for an incident of this nature. The incident
commanded ongoing transitional decisions reflecting on the immediate risk, to
the long term implications of evacuation if required. All of which I had to
consider and monitor. This had been my largest incident to date as Officer–in-
charge and to date is one of the largest the Service has attended. The
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responsibility of so much equipment and personnel was immense and the
support I received was second to none. I would be happy to discuss further any
points you may wish to discuss but you will appreciate that an incident of this
magnitude cannot be told very easily on paper.
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Incident # 8
Critical Incident Report:
This incident was at a public house and arcade complex which was occupied at
the time by the premises cleaners. The premise was not open for business due
to the time of day (early morning). 2 appliances were sent initially and on
arrival, made pumps 4 due to large volumes of smoke. I arrived approximately
10 minutes after the first appliance and was met by an inexperienced crew
manager who gave me a brief of his actions. I immediately took over the
incident and made pumps 8. This incident was unusual due to the rapid fire
spread which occurred. From 10 minutes after I arrived, the fire had spread
from a first floor fire to involve the entire roof and ground floor. In my 20 years
experience, I had never seen fire spread in such a large building happen so
rapidly and this changed my operational plan significantly. Plan1) I intended to
force entry in to the arcade which adjoined the PH and send in a team of 4 BA
wearers with 45mm fire fighting jets to cool the 1st floor fire area with an attack
from the large, wide stairs. Set up a water relay from the nearest 2 hydrants
(100m away) and defensively fire fight from an external fire escape. Revised
plan) With the rapid fire growth, I deemed it unsafe to commit personnel and
needed to understand why the fire was spreading so fast. I discussed with the
owners who arrived approx 30 mins in to the incident the building construction,
layout (received a floor plan) and it came to light that there had been 10 tonnes
of rubber sound insulation fitted the previous month in the roof void which
explained the rapid fire spread. Also, the floor plan indicated the open plan
layout of the building which contributed to fire spread. At this time, my priority
changed to saving the adjoining arcade and its contents which involved both
offensive and defensive fire fighting tactics. For this to take place, I required
experienced sector commanders to implement my plan and chose officers on
scene who I trusted. This is not always possible but ion this occasion, I was
fortunate to have personnel whom I had worked with for many years. Defensive
fire fighting took place via 6 main jets and a hydraulic platform with offensive
fire fighting from within the arcade area. I also utilised 2 safety officers to
ensure personnel did not go in to areas I deemed as unsafe and also to look for
signs of building collapse which was a severe risk to my fire fighters. Within the
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first 40 mins, I had made a decision that the main building, the pub was lost and
could not be saved. It is important to accept limitations during any incident, both
of your crews, equipment and the incident at hand as this gives clear direction
as to the type of operations that are required, numbers of personnel required
and resources on scene. I also took the decision to place crews on the flat roof
of the arcade to fire fight the main building. For this to take place, I had to be
confident that the roof was sound and that the fire was held and would not
spread to the arcade. Before doing this, I held a command meeting to go over
my plan, risk assessment and to ensure I received the thoughts of my sector
commanders and that they were clear of my objectives. This incident lasted
around 8 hours, crew welfare was an issue but again, this was given to a
functional officer to arrange in respect of crew rotation, relief’s, fire ground
feeding etc and worked well.
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Incident # 9
(Report and interviews from 2 Incident Commanders is collected for this
incident who have worked as initial Incident Commander, Incident Commander
for Hemswell Business Park fire incident.)
Critical Incident Report:
In August last year, I was at Lincoln Station when the appliances there were
called to a large factory on the Hemswell Business Park. The call was a ‘make
pumps 5’ so I knew there was a significant incident developing. Shortly
afterwards, I was mobilised as a Command Support Officer. I travelled down
the A15 which is a long straight road out of Lincoln and from approx 8 miles
away, I could see a large black plume of smoke from the incident site. On
arrival, I took the first entrance into the large industrial estate and parked before
getting my fire kit on. Several appliances were in the area where I was. There
was a dividing fence between to entrance points to the estate, approx 800m
apart and the building involved in the fire was at the back of the
estate, approx 700m from the entrance. The building was identified as AWS
Plastics, a large plastics recycling factory. The surrounding area was factory
units including, antiques areas, garages, fabricators and haulage companies,
etc. From where I had parked, I ran through the estate amongst people who
were watching and retreating to a safe distance. As I approached the incident I
met with another Station Manager who was obviously working hard and his
appearance suggested a serious incident. He informed me of a number of static
gas cylinders in close proximity to the incident and we discussed the tactical
plan. We used the crews that were available to run out covering jets as
cylinders exploded in the area and the fire spread rapidly through the building
which was approx 150m x 60m (an old aircraft hangar). Once the initial tasks
were completed, we withdrew and evacuated all people to a safe distance and
began to monitor the situation. Several more senior officers attended and spoke
with us about the sector we were working in. The Incident became 15
appliances initially and lasted over a number of weeks as the building became
unsafe to enter.
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Incident # 10
Critical Incident Report
I got a first call from Lincoln which is about 20 miles away from the station. I got
a little bit of information about where the fire was believed to be and what it is
believed to involve. And I knew that which fire engines were going initially. The
road from here to Hemswell is a straight road. It is A15 direct road to the
incident scene. And you can see when you come out of Lincoln a big plume of
smoke hinting that it would be a large fire. The people who reached there first
made pumps 10. The building was well alight. Certainly I knew that it would be
a long job and it will require a person of my level to go and oversee the incident.
While on the way I can actually see in the far sight that couple of explosions
were going on. When I came to the site I didn’t know the site but the access
was little bit hit and miss. When I pulled near to the building there were two
fireengines already there. It was a significant fire when I got there and there
were big cage of liquid petroleum gas cylinders at the front of the building. And
they were very close to the fire. The first crews were trying to keep them cool by
using the water supply. But to be fair with the severity of the fire there was no
way that we could have saved those cylinders. I quickly realized that with the
severity of the fire in the main building there were a lot of plastics involve, the
granulated plastics in bags it was very likely that fire will spread; I knew that
where the site was the water supply was very poor anyway, so I pretty much
straight away ask for 15 fireengines and then got the crews who were there to
start to withdraw to a real safe distance. While the FFs were withdrawing the
cylinders started to explode. From there it was really a case of logistics that
what will happen next and then building a plan of what to do when the
resources will arrive, where they will go and what I want them to do and I will
make it sure that the incident is sectorised so
basically break the incident into different portions and put somebody incharge
of each section and I will keep the job of overseeing the whole incident scene.
An area manager then came on and I took over the role of operations
commander I was still looking after all the operations, and the IC was really
sorting out with the press and giving feedback to station and doing all the
peripheral operations and taking the pressure away from me.
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Incident # 11
Critical Incident Report:
(This IC was working as a Sector Commander at Hemswell Business Park
incident; although he sent another incident to discuss with the interviewer
(given below) however he later talked about the Hemswell fire incident as well.
The incident he initially chooses to discuss was important in his opinion
because the incident had similarities with the incident he attended at the
beginning of his career as a firefighter.)
I was mobilised in the early hours to a house fire with people still inside. On my
arrival two crews were already in attendance with BA Crews committed. The
fire development had been rapid with flames now issuing out of the bedroom
window with a ‘blow torch’ affect. The detached house was of a standard
construction with an estimate build within the 1970’s. There was worrying signs
of back draft and flashover in different parts of the building due to the degree of
fire spread throughout the property; this made it extremely dangerous for BA
Crews as the stairs were now starting to burn through. There was a priority in
locating a casualty that was still missing which resulted in the search pattern of
the crews to be widened; this was outside the specific details given by the
escaped occupants (4). Eventually we established some control on the incident
ground after about 10 minutes of my and other group managers arrival, with
casualty located and removed from the fire with serious smoke inhalation.
Outcomes of De-Brief
 Attention detail. Get the basics correct and when things develop it will fall
into place.
 Widen search pattern at an earlier opportunity.
 Broaden view with regards to deploying resources.
 Importance of clear communication between the: ECO, IC and BA
Teams.
 Put into practise what we have learnt.
 Keep an open mind.
 Be there to ensure briefs are repeated.
 Commit subsequent teams to safer areas when appropriate.
 Improve the booking in of Officers to the Incident Command Unit.
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 Ensure DRA completed at the earliest opportunity so oncoming
personnel can be briefed.
 Team member identified Childs toys to help the IC Commander build a
picture of possible occupants.
 Gas and electric to be isolated at the earliest opportunity.
 Information was good on arrival for the Initial Command set up.
 Leadership was first class from the first pump to the incident closing.
 Crew safety was good with BA Team leaders ensuring team safety.
 Ladder placed into the rear of the property for exit if required.
 Crews got water to the incident very quickly.
 Initial fire fighting minimised risk to the BA Teams.
 Good effective ventilation with main jet.
 Good make up for additional resources.
 BA team and ECO superb effort in severe conditions.
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Incident # 12
Critical Incident Report:
At that time I haven’t been in the firebrigade for very long, may be about a year.
And we were turned out to a farm building, which was on fire and it was a large
barn but the all four walls of the barn were lined with the bales of straw from
floor to ceiling. It was for insulation to make it warmer. And then it was full of
sheep. It was fairly regular farm building full of sheep but from floor to ceiling it
was full of bales of straw. When we got there it was already a well-developed
fire on the back of the wall and on the barn and on the floor. Most of the sheep
were already dead. Those weren’t dead were panicking badly. Myself and my
colleague who were in this service for about a year. We were called to go in
there and release as many sheep as possible and try to let them out. At that
time i don’t think I understood anything about flashover, but i do remember
going in and it was increadibly hot there was a blazing fire all the way along the
back wall of the building and there was lots and lots of radiant heat. It was
before we had good protective clothing. So it was extremely uncomfortable to
the point of being painful. But we still going through front door. I do remember
that all these bales of straw all around us every last one of them were pyrolising
and they were giving off white smoke, sort of cool white smoke and in ever
increasing quantities. Now if i saw that now i know that that means that
everything in that room is about to burst into flames. But it didn’t mean anything
to me at that time at all. I just thought that its hot; I didn’t really think what it
mean. We gone in, we may be gone in ten paces and suddenly every last part
of this building just burst into flames and we instantly hit the floor and crawl as
quickly as we can. By the time we get out our clothing was already pyrolising
and they were on the verge of bursting into flames. We sort of put them out
through hose reel. And that were the old days before anybody had any training
in fire science. I am reasonably confident that any FF you got now would in that
situation would look around the room and know that this building is about to
burst into flames. And they would come straight out of the room. I hope that’s
the case.
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Incident # 13
Critical Incident Report:
At approximately 2300 I was called to a report of fire in a printing factory
approximately 4 miles from my home. I responded as the nearest Flexible Duty
System officer with two appliances also mobilised from the local Fire Station
which is approximately 2 miles from the premises. This station is crewed by
Retained staff so a short delay in getting mobile was experienced while
firefighters responded from home or work. On my arrival the first IC had only
arrived and was assessing the scene, a large volume of smoke was emitting
from the building which was a part bricked portal frame construction with a
single story brick build office block integral to the structure. Smoke was issuing
from the eves for the full length of building and fire was starting to break
through the roof at one corner. A number of buildings were adjacent to the
property but at least 10 meters separated them from the burning building. I took
charge immediately on arrival and confirmed with the first IC that they
had made ‘pumps ten HP required’. I also requested a further three Flexi Duty
Officers to assist with incident command. Having confirmed with the site
manager that all members of staff had safely evacuated the building my
instruction to the sector commanders was to fight the fire and protect the
surround building but not to commit firefighters inside the building. It was clear
by looking at the paint blistering on the portal frame walls that the entire
production area would be beyond effective intervention and I decided to try to
prevent damage to the neighbouring buildings. When the owner of the plant
arrived he informed me that all artwork and records were contained on
standalone computers kept in the single story office section, I therefore
informed the sector commander of that area to commit crews to hold back the
fire and commence salvaging the computer hardware. I was aware of a local
river and assessed the water main would not be sufficient for fire fighting water
so requested a High Volume Pumping unit to attend. Additionally there was a
quantity of industrial solvent involved. The incident was scaled down in the
early hours (0430 approx)
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Incident # 14
Critical Incident Report:
A fire occurred in a plant room attached to sandwich panel constructed storage
area. The fire initially involved an electrical intake and distribution board and
also spread to involve a mains gas intake. The fire involved ten fire appliances.
A hydraulic platform and a number of specialist vehicles to provide water
supplies and operational command and support. At the height of the fire there
were 8 main Firefighting water jets and 8 personnel using Breathing apparatus
to fight the fire. We were reliant upon support from the utilities services and this
hampered fire fighting operations until supplies were isolated.
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Incident # 15
Critical Incident Report:
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Incident # 16
Critical Incident Report:
I was incident commander at a fire involving a row of modern 3 storey town
houses in February 2010. On arriving I was faced with a large developed fire
which had spread to adjoining buildings. It was also noticeable that the front of
the building was bowed out indicating some type of explosion. I was unsure as
to whether casualties/persons were missing or whether occupants in adjoining
houses were at home. The fire eventually spread through the roof. A turntable
ladder was used a water tower in sector 1 and water from main jets were used
in sector 3. The fire was brought under control and was prevented from
spreading to the third house in the row. The cause was later determined to be a
petrol vapour explosion caused by the occupier following a disagreement with
his wife. The fire caused quite a scene as it was in the middle of a busy town
centre. It presented a challenge in terms of incident management due to the
unsafe structure and the need to take action.
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Incident # 17
Critical Incident Report:
In the summer of 2006 Blue Watch, West Bridgford attended a local fete in the
park in town. Appliances 519 and 419 were in attendance along with the chip
pan demonstration unit. I was officer in charge of 519 and was on normal
turnout while 419 was placed on ‘life risk’ turnout only. While at the event 519
was mobilised to a report of a fire involving a carravan at Greenacres Park,
Adboulton Lane. On arrival I was confronted with a fire involving a static home
and was informed by the local residents that the occupant was inside the house
in the living room. The crew on 519 consisted of myself, the driver and 2
breathing apparatus wearers of which one was on his first tour of duty since
completing his basic training course at S.D.C. My first priority was the need for
furthur brigade assistance and I immediately sent a ‘persons reported’ message
to control. My next priority was to formulate a clear and concise plan of action
that would enable us to initiate a safe and effective rescue of the occupant. I
quickly established that the seat of fire was in the living room of the house and
that we had open access to the room via an open door at the front of the
building. Due to the small size of the building I decided to initiate a snatch
rescue. After briefing the crew, checking their P.P.E, communications and hose
reel jets I committed the B.A team with a hose reel on the rapid deployment
board. The team entered the building, quickly knocked down the fire and soon
exited carrying the occupant. 518 arrived on the fire ground and I instructed the
O.I.C to attend to the medical needs of the rescued occupant, appoint an entry
control officer, initiate a command point and send an informative message to
control. Crews from 519 and 518 were then instructed to make a thorough
search of the building and continue damping down. The attendance of a fire
investigation officer was requested and the crews briefed on the importance of
preserving the fire scene. On arrival of the ambulance the fire victim was
handed over and consequently conveyed to hospital. After a crew debrief and
welfare checks it was concluded that in a difficult situation by formulating and
communicating a clear and concise plan, and by observing correct procedures,
even with limited resources a safe and successful outcome was achieved.
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Incident # 18
Critical Incident Report:
The incident that I am discussing is where we were called to a house fire.
Although this is a normal type of job that we often attend, during this occasion
we had the problem of the fire being involved in the roof space and this was
spreading to the neighbouring terrace properties. My initial assessment was
that this had the potential to be very serious as this could involve 4 properties in
total. Due to this my first actions were to ensure that all the properties were
vacated with immediate effect. A cordon was then set up to ensure that no
members of the public would enter a danger area and both myself and the crew
were aware of the danger area. Other initial actions involved committing BA
crews to tackle the fire in the property involved and the adjoining properties to
stop the fire from spreading. Other actions involved requesting the attendance
of the ALP (Arial Ladder Platform) and additional appliances due to the size of
the incident. At a later time it was established that the Police would also be
required at this incident due to items found in the property involved, therefore
damage limitation was also paramount to preserve the scene as much as
possible. One of the scales we use to work out the risks taken are along the
principle of: in a highly calculated way fire-fighters will risk some life to save
saveable life, may take some risk to save saveable property. Will not take any
risk to save life property that is already lost. After the incident debriefs were
held at a station level with information being sent to Operational Assurance
Team. This ensured that any learning points were then forwarded to all
operational personnel.
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Incident # 19
I was xxx for a night shift. At xxx at 5.30 we received a call to report of a fire in a
Skegness pub. Fire broke out at the Square Peg pub, Grand Parade. The fire
had started in the cellar and offices of the building. Thick black smoke could be
seen in Skegness and at the height of the fire flames could be seen from
Roman Bank. Fire was so severe that firefighters have to be withdrawn from the
premises. A hydraulic platform was used to douse the flames from above. The
wind was making the fire worse. Large quantity of smoke was billowing out from
the building, almost obscuring it from view. Due to the shortage, water was
taken from the pond in the Tower Gardens to fight the fire. 12 fire crews from
Skegness, and surrounding areas were called to the scene. I was dealing with
the media and other agencies. The initial IC who is a senior watch manager
remained as operations manager and directed the operation in consultation with
me.
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Incident # 20
Critical Incident Report:
I was called out to Trafford Park area. A fire had broke out at a removals and
storage facility on Marshall Stevens Way off Westinghouse Road. It was around
11.45. Size of the fire was huge. There were personal belongings of people
stored in the warehouse. A large number of furniture and paper were involved.
While approaching the warehouse I saw a large smoke plume across the
skyline of Trafford. When I was near to the place I can easily see flames
reaching around 40 50 feet up in the air. On arrival I found a rapidly spreading
fire in the upper levels of the building in the storage area. The color of the
smoke was dark black. I was the second officer incharge to reach the scene.
Due to the time of the day, a large number of people were gathered around the
place. The estate where the warehouse exist has canal on one side of it. So it
was a relief that water will not be a problem. The structure was steel frame built.
Later we found some brick build structure inside the warehouse. I asked for
water tower to continuously put water on one side. No BA wearers were
committed inside the building because of the intensity of the fire. Such structure
normally loss its strength at around 700 degrees. Due to the nature of the
stored material the temperature must have reached that point. Luckily no
person were reported. My main concern was the adjoining buildings. The aim
was to content the fire and don't let it spread. We managed to stop the blaze
from spreading to adjacent buildings, including a chemical storage site at the
rear of the structure. The fire spread very quickly, fanned by strong winds,
which resulted in thick plumes of smoke that were visible for miles around. One
part of the warehouse collapsed which gave us more space to fight the fire
offensively but in defensive manner. In all 60 FF were called out. At the height
of the incident, at least 10 fire engines, a number of specialist equipment and 3
aerial appliances were used to fight the fire.
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APPENDIX B – CANDIDATE’S RESEARCH TRAINING RECORD
Compulsory Research Training
Training Schedule 2008/09
Semester One
Dates Module
07/10/08
14/10/08
Effective Management of Research
21/10/08
28/10/08
04/11/08
11/11/08
Principles of Research Design
18/11/08
25/11/08
02/12/08
09/12/08
Qualitative Methods & Analysis 1
13/01/09
20/01/09
27/01/09
03/02/09
Quantitative Methods & Analysis 1
Semester Two
Date Module
10/02/09
17/02/09
24/02/09
03/03/09
Research Ethics & Business Audiences
10/03/09
17/03/09
24/03/09
28/04/09
Qualitative Methods & Analysis 2
05/05/09
12/05/09
19/05/09
26/05/09
02/06/09
Quantitative Methods & Analysis 2
09/06/09
16/06/09
Effective Management of Research
* Denotes student presentations - all academic staff are invited to attend these student
presentations.
Professional Development Training Start Date
Citation searching 15 Jun 2011
Real Creativity - a constructive approach to problem solving 20-21 Oct 2009
SPSS 20, 27 May 2009
Ethical Thinking in Research 24 Feb 2009
Writing up your PhD Thesis 16 Feb 2009
Keeping your Research Up-to-Date for Postgraduates 5 Feb 2009
Designing and Producing Conference Posters 28 Jan 2009
221
Finding Research Information 19 Jan 2009
What is a Literature Review? 6 Jan 2009
Postgraduate Great Debate 16 Dec 2008
The Effective Researcher 1-2 Dec 2008
RefWorks 25 Nov 2008
The Enterprising Researcher 18 Nov 2008
Getting Articles Published for Researchers 12 Nov 2008
Finding Research Information 4 Nov 2008
Types of Data and Experimental Design 22 Oct 2008
Questionnaire Design 15 Oct 2008
PRINCE 2 Foundation 17-19 Sep 2008
Working Effectively with Outside Organisations for PGRs and RAs 2 Jul 2008
